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Notice to Readers
This publication, Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit, is a Practice Aid intended to provide CPAs with
the most recent information related to the implementation of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 316).
This publication is an Other Auditing Publication as defined in Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 95, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 150). Other Auditing Publications have no authoritative status; however, they may help the
auditor understand and apply SASs.
If an auditor applies the auditing guidance included in an Other Auditing Publication, he or she
should be satisfied that, in his or her judgment, it is both appropriate and relevant to the
circumstances of his or her audit. The auditing guidance in this document has been reviewed by the
AICPA Audit and Attest Standards staff and published by the AICPA and is presumed to be
appropriate. This document has not been approved, disapproved, or otherwise acted upon by any
senior technical committee of the AICPA.
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Preface
The accounting profession was under fire. Throughout the long, hot summer, newspapers were
filled with new details of a corporate accounting scandal. One of the largest, most respected
companies in the United States had been caught inflating earnings and assets through blatant
manipulation of the accounting rules. Thousands of investors and employees had suffered.
Congressional hearings were called to examine and understand the fraud, and everyone asked,
“Where were the auditors?” The accounting profession was under immense political pressure
from reform-minded lawmakers, and the negative publicity surrounding the perceived audit
failure cast all CPAs in the most unfavorable light.
Sound familiar? The year was 1938.
The corporate accounting scandal was McKesson-Robbins, in which the company inflated assets and
earnings by $19 million through the reporting of nonexistent inventory and fictitious sales. In the
wake of the scandal, the auditing profession responded by setting the first formal standards for
auditing procedures, including guidance on the auditor’s responsibilities for material misstatements
due to fraud.
In the years since McKesson-Robbins, the business world has been rocked by even bigger corporate
frauds, and each time the profession has come under criticism—some of which is justified and some
of which is not. Once again, but in a new century, we have witnessed the quick, spectacular failure of
some of this country’s largest companies, amid a series of indictments, arrests, and allegations of
financial fraud. As CPAs, we find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of having to defend our
work and our credibility. We are now at the beginning of the post-Enron world.
In the summer of ’02, the Sarbanes-Oxley bill was signed into law, and by all accounts, it has the
potential to dramatically change the auditing profession. I was attending a conference on the day the
bill passed. The next morning I attended an audit update session. Ignoring his prepared remarks, the
presenter took questions from the audience on the future of the profession in the wake of the justpassed legislation. One of the questions was, “How will we be able to earn back our reputation and
the trust of the public?”
The answer he gave rang true and helped calm the sense of unease that had permeated the
conference. As a profession, he said, the way to regain our reputation is the same way we earned it in
the first place—one auditor, one engagement at a time.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), is the first major audit
standard to be released since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. No one ever intended these events
to converge like this, but they have: a new fraud standard delivered in the midst of endless
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revelations of corporate malfeasance. The timing is fortuitous because this new standard
provides us with an excellent opportunity to repair some of the recent damage to our
reputation—one auditor, one engagement at a time.
SAS No. 99 has the potential to significantly improve audit quality, not just in detecting fraud, but in
detecting all material misstatements and improving the quality of the financial reporting process.
This is why.

Integrity of the Standard-Setting Process
I have always believed that a high-quality process leads to a high-quality result. Suppose you are
building a house, and you want it to be beautiful and functional, and stand the test of time.
Everything, you do—from the drafting of the plans, to the selection of materials, and on through the
actual construction itself—must be designed to produce that type of quality. Because of that direct
relationship between process and product, we can judge the quality of a finished product before it is
in use by looking at the quality of the process. Thinking of buying a home but have questions about
its quality? Examine the quality of the building process.
As an auditor, I would be skeptical if SAS No. 99 was the product of a hasty process designed solely
as a response to the criticism the profession has received in the wake of high profile business failures.
For that reason, it is important to recognize that SAS No. 99 is not a knee-jerk reaction to recent
events. This new standard was four years in the making. It is the product of a thoughtful, thorough,
and open standard-setting process that constantly seeks to improve audit quality. The new standard
incorporates:
• Results of academic research on how auditors implemented previous standards on fraud and
how those standards might be improved.
• Recommendations of the Public Oversight Board’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness, who
conducted their own detailed study on audit effectiveness.
• Comments from more than 50 groups and individuals representing a wide variety of
stakeholders in the financial reporting process.
Only a handful of engagement teams have adopted the new standard in advance of its effective date,
and it is far too early to determine whether the effective implementation of the new standard will
achieve the desired effect on audit practice. However, because of the care exercised in the
development of the standard, I feel confident that it is a high-quality standard that will improve the
ability of auditors to respond effectively to the potential for fraud.
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Audit Smarter
If you are familiar with the previous audit standard on fraud, you know that a cornerstone of that
standard was a list of “fraud risk factors,” which, though they do not necessarily indicate the
existence of fraud, often have been observed when frauds have occurred. This list of fraud risk
factors was intended to help auditors discover indicia of fraud while performing their engagements.
In practice, this list usually was reduced to a checklist that auditors completed and included in their
working papers.
The academic research that examined the implementation of the previous standard resulted in two
key findings:
• Auditors did a good job of identifying indicia of fraud. However, once those indicia were
identified, they did a relatively poor job of responding appropriately to the perceived risk of fraud.
• Auditors who rely exclusively on checklists to identify fraud risk factors are less effective than
those who supplement checklists with other procedures.
SAS No. 99 is extremely comprehensive and touches on many elements of the audit process. It can
not be reduced to a checklist or form. The effective implementation of SAS No. 99 will require
auditors to audit smarter and think more creatively when they audit. Engagement teams who plan to
implement the new standard by obtaining an updated version of a generic audit program will be
doing themselves and their clients an injustice. The effective implementation of SAS No. 99 will
force you to rethink how you plan and perform your audits.

The New Standard Will Result in Better Audits and Better Client
Service, Not Just in Fraud Detection
Over the years I’ve attended a number of audit training sessions on analytical procedures. One surefire way for the instructor to get a laugh (and make an important point) is to describe some of the
analytical review comments he or she has read on working papers over the years. “Revenues
increased because the client sold more.” Or, “Change in account balance from prior year is
reasonable per discussion with controller.”
What makes these types of comments scary is that they illustrate how an otherwise effective audit
procedure can be rendered ineffective. And analytical procedures are just one of several areas in
which the performance of audit procedures is less than optimal. To reduce audit risk to an acceptable
level, others on the engagement team must revisit the audit area and do additional work, which
makes the engagement less efficient.
The prescription for improving these procedures (and the quality of the audit) is always the same:
• Understand the client’s business.
• Maintain a healthy professional skepticism and corroborate management’s verbal representations.
xi
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• Have the more experienced team members share their knowledge with everyone else.
• Do a more thorough job of audit planning.
You would be hard-pressed to find an auditor to argue that this list will not result in a more effective
and efficient audit.
Recognize that SAS No. 99 emphasizes all of the above. To successfully implement the SAS, you
will have to address each of the bullet points, which in turn will result in a better audit. For example,
the new SAS emphasizes the need for professional skepticism throughout the engagement. Not only
will that attitude help you detect material misstatements caused by fraud, it will help you detect those
that are not caused by fraud.
Paying More Attention to Fraud Can Improve Client Service
Several years ago I was doing some contract work for a small local firm, and two things happened during
the audit season that have stayed with me. At the time, I had just finished working on an implementation
guide for the previous fraud standard, and so I was quite sensitive to issues relating to fraud.
The first thing that happened was the firm’s largest client discovered an embezzlement. The client
called the firm’s engagement partner and read him the riot act. The client was furious—where was their
CPA while all this was going on! Forget the fact that two years earlier the firm had performed a
consulting engagement on internal control that had identified several key weaknesses, which had been
exploited to conceal the theft. The irony is that the firm had never conducted an audit of the client. In
fact, it had never done a review or a compilation. The client was primarily a tax client. And yet the
business owners still had the expectation that their CPA was a frontline defense against employee theft.
Right or wrong, many clients have the expectation that CPAs in general—and auditors in
particular—help guard against and detect fraud.
The second thing that happened during that busy season was on an audit engagement that I was
performing. It was the first time I had done work on that particular client. During the course of the
engagement I discovered that the client’s bookkeeper had the ability to make adjustments and write
off accounts receivable without leaving an audit trail. No credit memo, nothing—the accounting
software just allowed it to happen. Not only did she have that ability, she used it, too, writing off
thousands of dollars of receivables balances right before the end of the period without the knowledge
or approval of the business owner.
Before I had done so much work on the topic of fraud, I probably never would have recognized these
circumstances as indicative of a potential fraud. Because I was sensitized to the fact that fraud could
occur, however, and because I had read case studies of embezzlements that were concealed through
the write-off of receivables, I expanded the scope of our procedures in accounts receivable. I also
adopted a different mindset toward the client and asked more pointed questions in an effort to
discover other indicators of possible fraud.
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In the end, we did not uncover a fraud. We prepared a list of all the adjustments to accounts
receivable and presented this to the business owner. We had a frank discussion about the weaknesses
in his internal control and how that left him vulnerable to fraud.
A week or so later, at the conclusion of the engagement, we presented him with a bill. It was about
30 percent higher than the previous year. I wouldn’t say he was overjoyed, but he did say that he had
no problem paying the higher amount. He had heard from his staff how thoroughly we had
conducted our engagement, and he had appreciated the comments we made to him during our exit
interview. Perhaps he sensed a different mindset and felt that we were really digging hard to find
something. I don’t know what he was thinking when he told me that paying the bill was no problem
and that “this was the best audit we’ve ever gotten.”
Take SAS No. 99 to heart. Use it to change the way you approach the audit, and engage with your
clients. They’ll notice the difference, and I’m betting that they’ll appreciate it.

Looking Ahead
The implementation of SAS No. 99, although important, is only part of a broader initiative to address
fraudulent financial reporting. Efforts also are required to focus not only on the auditor’s role for
fraud detection, but that of management, the audit committee, regulators and others in fraud
prevention and deterrence.
SAS No. 99 is a well-conceived, well-executed document. It is something that all those involved in
its creation—indeed, our entire profession—should be proud of. But it is only an audit standard and
cannot, by itself, achieve its objective of improving the likelihood that auditors will detect material
misstatements caused by fraud. That part is up to us, as we understand and implement the
requirements of this new standard, one auditor, one engagement at a time.
Michael Ramos
October 2002

Postscript: Update to the 2004 Edition
For the last half of 2003 I spent a good portion of my time helping firms implement SAS No. 99 and
the ideas contained in this book. The lessons I learned during this process served as the basis for the
updates made to the 2004 edition.
The true test is yet to come. In the next several months, as firms complete their year-end 2003 audits,
we will at last find out how SAS No. 99 truly affected our profession. And those lessons will serve as
the basis for the next edition.
Michael Ramos
January 2004
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INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE AND
ORGANIZATION OF THIS PUBLICATION

Purpose
In its summary of the exposure draft of what would become Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 316), the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) stated that the new SAS will “improve the
likelihood that auditors will detect material misstatements due to fraud in a financial statement audit.”
This publication shares that objective. It complements the SAS, providing interpretive observations,
suggestions, and tools to help you effectively understand and implement the authoritative standard.
The guidance in this book works on three levels:
1. Explanation. This publication attempts to explain and provide context for the requirements of
the SAS. For example, the standard requires “brainstorming” among audit team members
about how a material fraud might be perpetrated and concealed at the client. This publication
explains in more detail the purpose of that brainstorming session as well as the intent for the
other requirements listed in the standard for the brainstorming session.
2. Implementation. Once you have a good understanding of what the standard requires, questions
will arise about whether your audit practice appropriately considers these requirements.
Before SAS No. 99, your firm probably never had a brainstorming session of the type required
by SAS No. 99. Undoubtedly questions will arise when the time comes to adopt the new SAS,
for example, “What is the best way to conduct a brainstorming session?” and “What special
skills are needed to make this session effective?” This publication addresses those kinds of
questions.
3. Practice Aids. Finally, knowing what it will take to implement the standard, you will need tools to
help you do so effectively and efficiently. For example, many firms have developed practice
niches devoted to specialized industries such as governmental entities, not-for-profit
organizations, or construction contractors. Included in this publication is an appendix to help you
adapt the guidance contained in SAS No. 99 to the needs of specialized industries.

How to Use This Publication
First, this publication should be used by auditors to understand the requirements of SAS No. 99 and
whether your current audit practices effectively incorporate these requirements.
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Also, this publication should be used to supplement the firm’s audit manual. Auditors in the field will
find the suggestions helpful as a means to:
• Understand the reason for performing certain audit procedures relating to fraud.
• Communicate more effectively with management and with each other about fraud-related
matters.
• Identify and assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
• Design audit procedures that effectively address the risks of material misstatement due to fraud.

Organization of the Publication
This publication is divided into three parts.
Part 1: Understanding SAS No. 99 and Its Implications
The two chapters in Part One provide you with a detailed understanding of the requirements of SAS
No. 99. Also included in this section is a discussion of the issues you are likely to face as you
continue to incorporate the standard into your audit practice and firm culture.
Part 2: Detailed Implementation Guidance
The chapters in this section provide in-depth implementation guidance in those areas that
practitioners might find most troublesome, including:
• Applying professional skepticism in planning and performing the audit, including the
evaluation of audit evidence
• Conducting meaningful brainstorming sessions
• Improving the effectiveness of client inquiry
• Linking audit procedures to identified risks
• Performing new audit procedures mandated by the SAS
• Using computer assisted audit techniques to identify indicators of possible material misstatements
due to fraud.
Appendixes
This section contains an appendix that will help you identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud
related to specialized industries (Appendix A). Also included is guidance to help you design audit
procedures for the physical observation of inventory and review journal entries and other adjustments
for signs of possible management override of internal control (Appendixes B and C).
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PART 1
UNDERSTANDING SAS NO. 99 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The first two chapters of this book provide a basic understanding of the requirements of Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). Chapter 1 highlights how the standard differs from
previous guidance and changes audit practice. Chapter 2 offers an in-depth analysis of each major
section of the standard and what it requires.
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CHAPTER 1: HOW SAS NO. 99
CHANGED AUDIT PRACTICE

Your Responsibilities for Detecting Fraud
In a generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) audit you must plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement, including
material misstatements caused by fraud. You have always had that responsibility. Unfortunately,
many auditors remain confused about this issue.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), did not change your overall
responsibility. SAS No. 99 superceded previous guidance, and the reason it was issued was to
substantially improve the likelihood that you will detect material misstatements in the financial
statements caused by fraud.

The Fraud Triangle
As the previous fraud standard did, SAS No. 99 provides a brief discussion of the characteristics of
fraud. Included in that discussion is a framework that is useful for understanding and evaluating
indicators of fraud that you may discover during your audit.
Practice Pointer. The fraud triangle framework is an important conceptual underpinning for a
great deal of SAS No. 99. When you apply the standard on your engagements, you should find
yourself continually returning to this framework, For example, the framework is particularly
helpful when:

• Gathering information to assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
• Analyzing and assessing fraud risk
• Having discussions with engagement team members or the entity’s management about the risk of
fraud at the audited entity
The “fraud triangle” depicts three conditions that generally are present when fraud occurs.
1. Incentive or pressure. Management or other employees may have an incentive or pressure that
provides them with a reason to commit fraud.
2. Opportunity. Circumstances may exist at the entity (for example, weak internal controls or
ineffective board of director oversight) that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated.
3. Rationalization or attitude. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values
that allow them to rationalize committing a dishonest act.
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This overview of the fraud triangle framework was a necessary preliminary to a discussion of the
changes described in this chapter. A more complete discussion of the fraud triangle and how it is
used together with some of the other characteristics of fraud is contained in Chapter 2 .

Professional Skepticism
SAS No. 99 places renewed emphasis on professional skepticism. Arguably, maintaining the appropriate
questioning mindset is the single most important critical success factor for the effective adoption of the SAS.
All the audit procedures in the world will be less than optimally effective if the auditor does not maintain the
proper mindset. A skeptical mind can ask the right questions and analyze audit evidence in a way that
detects material misstatement due to fraud even in the absence of specifically required procedures.
SAS No. 99:
• Requires the audit team to set the proper tone for the audit by having a discussion of the
importance of professional skepticism in planning the audit.
• Reminds you to maintain a questioning mind during the gathering and evaluation of audit
evidence throughout the audit.
Chapter 3 provides detailed suggestions to help you understand more thoroughly what is meant by
professional skepticism and how you can instill this attitude in engagement teams.

The Fraud Risk-Assessment Process
SAS No. 99 requires you to gather and consider a great deal of information to assess fraud risks. The
previous auditing standards assumed that traditional audit planning and internal control procedures
would be sufficient to identify all the information you needed to assess fraud risks. This is not true
under SAS No. 99, which significantly expands the information gathering phase beyond the work the
auditor traditionally performed.
Significant requirements include:
• A required brainstorming session among the audit team members to discuss the potential for
material misstatement due to fraud.
• An increased emphasis on inquiry as an audit procedure that increases the likelihood of fraud
detection.
• Expanded use of analytical procedures to gather information used to identify risks of the
material misstatement due to fraud.
• The consideration of other information, such as client acceptance and continuance procedures,
during the information-gathering phase.
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The standard provides extensive guidance on evaluating this information and identifying the risks
that may result in a material misstatement due to fraud. Included in this guidance is the presumption
that improper revenue recognition is a fraud risk in all entities.
The standard also requires you to take into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and
controls that address the identified fraud risks.
Finally, SAS No. 99 mandates certain audit responses on every engagement. These responses are
designed to specifically address the ever-present risk of management override over internal controls.
Even though you may have performed some or all of these procedures on past audits, you typically
have not performed them in the context of responding to a risk of management override.

Information-Gathering Phase
Audit Team Communications
SAS No. 99 introduces an entirely new audit procedure that must be performed on every
engagement. As part of planning, members of the engagement team are required to discuss the
potential for material misstatement of the entity’s financial statements due to fraud.
The SAS requires certain audit team communications that include the following:
• An exchange of ideas, or “brainstorming,” among the audit team members about the
susceptibility of the entity’s financial statements to material misstatement due to fraud. More
specifically, the discussion should include:
― How and where the entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material
misstatement due to fraud.
― How management could perpetrate and conceal fraudulent financial reporting.
― How assets of the entity could be misappropriated by management or employees.
• An emphasis on the importance of maintaining the proper state of mind throughout the audit—that
is, professional skepticism.
Chapter 2 in this book provide further guidance on the overall objective of the brainstorming session
as well as suggestions for making these sessions as effective as possible.
Inquiries of Entity Personnel
Fraud specialists report that often, when a fraud is committed, people with knowledge or suspicion of
the fraud would have “blown the whistle,” if only someone would have asked. Also, the commitment
and concealment of fraud may be anywhere within the entity, and any employee may have
knowledge that can help detect the fraud.

7

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

For these reasons, SAS No. 99 requires you to make expanded inquiries of management and others
within the entity regarding their knowledge of actual or alleged fraud at the entity. SAS No. 99 also
requires auditors to make inquiries outside the accounting department and the management group. If
the entity has an audit committee or internal audit department, the standard mandates certain
inquiries of each of those groups.
Analytical Procedures
SAS No. 99 reminds you that the results of analytical procedures performed as part of planning the
audit may identify unusual transactions or events, and unexpected amounts, ratios, and trends. You
should consider these results in identifying the risks of material misstatement due to fraud.
You are required to perform analytical procedures related to revenue with the objective of identifying
unusual or unexpected relationships that may indicate a material misstatement due to fraud.
Considering Fraud Risk Factors
During the planning and performance of your audit, you may identify conditions or events that may
indicate the presence of fraud. These conditions or events are referred to as fraud risk factors. Fraud
risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud; however, they often have been present
in circumstances where fraud exists.
SAS No. 99 provides examples of fraud risk factors, and these examples are organized along the
three fraud triangle categories (incentive/pressure, opportunity, and attitude/realization).
For example, management that is struggling to maintain debt covenants has an incentive to misstate
the financial statements to comply with the covenants. A weakness in internal control provides an
opportunity for an employee to embezzle funds and then conceal the action.
SAS No. 99 categorizes the risk factors according to whether they provide opportunity,
incentive/pressure, or attitude/rationalization to perpetrate fraudulent financial reporting or theft of
assets. It is hoped that this reorganization will help you understand and analyze the risk factors when
assessing fraud risks.
Other Information
SAS No. 99 requires you to consider other information that may be helpful in identifying risks of
material misstatement due to fraud. Information from the following sources should be considered:
• Procedures relating to the acceptance and continuance of clients and engagements
• Reviews or compilation of interim financial statements
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Consider Programs and Controls and Assess Fraud Risks
Because fraud prevention, detection, and deterrence are management’s responsibility, SAS No. 99
requires you to determine whether management has designed programs and controls that address
identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud and whether those programs and controls have
been placed in operation.
To help you make this evaluation, a document titled “Management Antifraud Programs and
Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter, and Detect Fraud,” which is an exhibit to the SAS,
discusses and provides examples of programs and controls that management can implement to help
deter, prevent, and detect fraud. Auditors may be able to provide valuable client service by discussing
many of these best practices programs and controls with management and the audit committees of
their audit clients.

Developing an Audit Response
One of the biggest challenges in detecting fraud on an audit is developing appropriate audit responses
to identified risks. SAS No. 99 provides a great deal of detailed guidance in this area that may require
you to perform significant additional audit procedures on most, if not all, of your engagements.
Responding to the Risk of Management Override
In its conducting its research on audit effectiveness, the Public Oversight Board (POB) analyzed
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions related to fraud to determine some
of the common characteristics of fraudulent financial reporting. In its analysis, the POB discovered
that management override of controls was a characteristic of many fraudulent financial reporting
schemes. As the POB report noted, “opportunity is a necessary feature of fraud, and it explains why
management is in a unique position to perpetrate it. As the stewards of the entity, management
possesses the power to manipulate the accounting records and prepare fraudulent financial reports.”
To address the risk of management override, SAS No. 99 provides guidance on how you should
respond and mandates procedures related to:
• Examining journal entries and other adjustments for evidence of possible material
misstatement due to fraud.
• Performing a “retrospective review” of accounting estimates for biases that could result in
material misstatement due to fraud.
• Understanding the business rationale for unusual transactions.
The standard requires that these procedures be performed on every audit.
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Documenting the Auditor’s Consideration of Fraud
Audit documentation should include documentation supporting compliance with substantially all the
major requirements of the Statement.

How Should SAS No. 99 Change Audit Practice?
SAS No. 99 is a comprehensive, far-reaching audit standard. It has the potential to significantly
change the way we think about and perform audits.
As an analogy, consider the business environment in the 1980s, when the personal computer was first
introduced and then widely adopted. At that time, it was predicted that with the new technology,
huge investment companies would reap significant benefits in the form of increased productivity. In
fact, increases in productivity were quite slow to develop, and by the end of the decade business
owners were asking, Where’s the benefit?
Through formal and informal study of the situation, analysts concluded that the anticipated benefits
of the new technology were slow to surface because companies had simply used the technology to
automate existing processes. The more successful implementations occurred when entities used
technology as a basis for rethinking their existing practices and designing new ones.
That same dynamic could be said of the introduction of SAS No. 99. Many firms will undoubtedly
adopt the new standard the same way they have previous ones—by obtaining an updated audit
manual and using the most current checklists. For this standard, there is considerable question
whether that approach will suffice.
The standard’s requirements and their implications for the conduct of audits raise the following
issues, some of which may take several years to resolve.
Firm Culture and Auditors’ Mindset
Some of the requirements of the SAS will require auditors to change their mindset or perspective on
the audit. These changes may affect firm culture and the relationships firms have with their audit
clients. The standard reminds auditors that in planning and performing the audit, they must set aside
their beliefs that management is honest, even though they may have many years of experience with
management.
With its emphasis on professional skepticism, the standard places the onus on audit professionals to
maintain a questioning mind throughout the engagement. Firm leaders will be required to model this
behavior by setting a proper “tone at the top or engagement culture for the audit team.” All firm
members must be aware of both the direct and indirect signals they send to each other and to the
clients, to ensure that these messages convey the proper attitude. In adopting a more skeptical attitude
toward clients, the relationship between the audit firm and management of the audited entity will
undoubtedly change. As with any other relationship, this change must be carefully managed.
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The SAS also requires auditors to bring a new perspective to understanding an entity’s business and
its internal control. In addition to the traditional ways in which auditors understand internal control,
they now must view it in the context of fraud prevention and detection. Similarly, auditors have
always been required to gain an understanding of the entity’s business and the industry in which it
operates in order to plan the audit. Now, that understanding will be broader and deeper. Under SAS
No. 99, auditors’ understanding of the entity’s business should be sufficient to allow them to identify
unusual transactions outside the normal course of business.
Finally, the SAS reminds auditors to maintain a questioning mindset and critically evaluate audit
evidence.
New Skills
The requirements of SAS No. 99 will most likely demand that audit firms develop or acquire new
skills, including:
• Communication. The emphasis on inquiry, in addition to the brainstorming session, will
require auditors to enhance their communication and interviewing skills in order to make these
procedures as effective as possible.
• Technology. The new standard includes commentary and examples that recognize the impact
of both the client’s and the auditor’s use of technology on the risks of fraud. Specifically,
certain of the required or suggested audit procedures (for example, the identification and
review of unusual journal entries) may benefit from the use of computer-assisted audit
techniques,1 such as data extraction. Skills and knowledge of technology matters will be of
great benefit to firms applying the requirements of the SAS.
• Fraud expertise. Many of the larger accounting firms have formally trained fraud specialists
on staff. These individuals are resources for audit engagement teams, who use them as they
would any other in-house specialist. Experience in detecting and investigating fraud may be
necessary to help auditors:
― Assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
― Design audit procedures that respond to the assessed risk of fraud
― Determine when a separate fraud investigation engagement is necessary

Audit Requirements and Their Implication
Table 1-1 summarizes the significant requirements of SAS No. 99 as well as how these changes are
likely to affect practice.

1

You may refer to Chapter 8 for additional guidance on computer assisted audit techniques.
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Table 1-1 Changes to Current Guidance

Change
Professional skepticism

Description
• Emphasize maintaining a
questioning mind throughout
the audit.

Implication
• Engagement leadership,
including the individual with
the final responsibility for the
audit, must set the proper “tone
• Critical evaluation of the audit
at the top.”
evidence.
• Relationships with audit clients
may be altered.

Brainstorming

• Brainstorm among audit team
members about fraud risks at
the entity.

• Communication and
facilitation skills need to be
enhanced to conduct these
sessions effectively.
• Importance of engagement
leadership buy-in on the
brainstorming session.
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Information gathering

• Expand the sources used
to gather information used to
identify risks of material
misstatement due to fraud.

• A checklist of fraud risk
factors (and the “checklist
mentality”) will not be
sufficient.

Inquiries

• Expand the use of inquiries
of management and others
within the organization.

• Interviewing and other
communication skills need to be
enhanced.

Revenue recognition

• Presume that revenue
recognition is a fraud risk.

• Balance sheet audit focus
must be supplemented with
procedures focused on revenue
recognition.

Internal control

• Evaluate entity’s programs
• Auditors must supplement
and controls that address fraud
existing understanding of
risks.
internal control with new
perspective that considers fraud.
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Change
Management override
of controls

Description
Implication
• Require new procedures to
• New audit techniques may
address management override.
need to be developed to perform
procedures.
• Computer assisted audit
techniques may be necessary.
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CHAPTER 2: CONSIDERING FRAUD IN A
FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT

The purpose of this chapter is to take you step by step through Statement on Auditing Standards No.
99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 316). The main topic headings in this publication mirror those in the standard.

Introduction and Overview
In addition to providing a map of this long and comprehensive standard, the introduction makes
several important points.
Auditor’s Overall Responsibility for Fraud Detection
As described in Chapter 1, an auditor’s overall responsibility in a GAAS audit is to plan and perform
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. As pointed out earlier, your responsibility is not to
detect fraud, per se, but rather to detect material misstatements in the financial statements caused by
fraud, within the context of reasonable assurance.
Within this definition of responsibility are two key terms.
1. Reasonable assurance. Reasonable assurance is a high threshold for performance; however, it
stops short of absolute assurance, which is unattainable. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.12)
discusses reasonable assurance and why this is an appropriate threshold for detecting material
misstatements caused by fraud.
2. Materiality. Remember that materiality is not solely a quantitative measure. When planning
and performing your audit to detect material misstatements in the financial statements, you
should consider the qualitative aspects of materiality, including the potential effect of the
misstatement on:
― Financial trends
― Debt covenants
― Other contractual agreements
― Regulatory provisions
A thorough consideration of the qualitative aspects of materiality will require engagement teams
to have a good understanding of the client’s business early in the audit process. For example, to
determine the magnitude and type of misstatements that might be material, the team should have
an understanding of the entity’s debt covenants and how close they are to violating those
covenants. Interpretation No. 4, “Considering the Qualitative Characteristics of Misstatements,”
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of SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 9312.15–.17), provides definitive guidance on the qualitative aspects
of materiality.
Practice Pointer. It is important for you to reach an understanding with the client regarding
your responsibilities for fraud detection. Key issues to discuss are:
• Detection of material misstatements in the financial statements caused by fraud versus the
detection of fraud, per se.
• Reasonable versus absolute assurance.
• Financial statement materiality and what that term means. You also want to discuss with the
client their expectations about what should be considered material. For an owner-managed
business this threshold varies from materiality to the owner personally.
• The primary responsibility for fraud prevention and detection rests with management and not
the auditor.

An Integrated Approach
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.03) describes the auditor’s consideration of fraud as something that should
be integrated into the overall audit process. It is not something that is somehow added to your
existing audit process as a separate checklist component. Rather, the guidance provided in SAS No.
99 should be blended in seamlessly with your current process because assessing fraud risks is an
ongoing process that is continually updated throughout the completion of the audit.
By Way of Analogy…
If you are familiar with the game of basketball, you know that some shots count for two points
and others—those that are launched a good distance from the basket—are worth three points.
What you may not realize is that the three-point shot was not always a part of the game. It wasn’t
until 1980 that the shot was used in both National Basketball Association and college games.
Today, when you watch a game, the three-point shot is an organic part of all aspects of the game.
Players take three pointers in the normal course of action. Offensive strategies have been
developed to take advantage of the three-pointer shot; players practice it.
In the early years, this was not the case. The three pointer was used mostly as a comeback tool,
something you used only at the end of the game when you needed points in a hurry. Teams
played their “normal” game and, if they had to, fired off long three pointers.
The objective of SAS No. 99 is to create an environment in which the consideration of fraud is an
organic part of all elements of the audit process, in the same way the three-point shot has evolved
in the game of basketball.

An Iterative Process
SAS No. 99 describes a process in which the auditor:
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•
•
•
•

Gathers information needed to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud
Identifies risks
Assesses risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and controls
Responds to the results of the assessment

Because of the way the information has been presented (and because of the way we have been
trained to think), the tendency is to assume that these steps are performed sequentially and that once
the final step has been performed, you are done.
In fact, as SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.03) points out, the audit process is nonlinear and iterative. That
is, the standard is not meant to imply that you should perform the steps in the process in any
particular order—the sequence of the requirements of the standard and its guidance may be
implemented differently among audit engagements. Further, the process of gathering, updating, and
analyzing information does not end when you complete the last step. It continues in a circular
fashion—the results of audit procedures become information needed to identify risks, and the process
begins anew (see Illustration 2-1). You do not break out of the cycle until you have gathered
sufficient evidence to reach your conclusion.
Illustration 2-1 The Fraud Risks Assessment Process
Gather
information
Identify and
assess risk

Respond to
assessed risk

Description and Characteristics of Fraud
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.05–.12) describes certain characteristics of fraud. This section of the
standard imposes no requirements on the auditor. Still, it is an important section because the more
you know about the nature of fraud, the better equipped you will be to identify risks, assess the risks
of material misstatement in the financial statements due to fraud, and develop an appropriate audit
response. Additionally, the concepts contained in this section will allow auditors to conduct effective
brainstorming sessions about fraud risks among themselves and to make meaningful inquiries of
entity personnel.
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Misappropriation of Assets Versus Fraudulent Financial Reporting
SAS No. 99 distinguishes between misappropriation of assets (employee theft) and fraudulent
financial reporting. Table 2-1 summarizes the differences between these two types of frauds.
Table 2-1 Misappropriation of Assets Versus Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Misappropriation of Assets
• Involves the theft of an entity’s assets where
the effect of the theft causes the financial
statements to be materially misstated.

Fraudulent Financial Reporting
• Intentional misstatements or omissions of
amounts or disclosures in financial
statements designed to deceive users.

• Usually perpetrated by employees but can
involve management.

• Usually perpetrated by management.

• Typically driven by opportunity.

• Typically driven by incentives or pressures.

• Often a major concern for the ownermanager of a privately held business entity.

• A concern for both public and privately
held entities, including governmental and
not-for-profit organizations.

Practice Pointer. The scope of SAS No. 99 includes only those misappropriations of assets for
which the effect of the misappropriation causes the financial statements to be materially
misstated. You should take steps to ensure that owners of privately held businesses understand
that the materiality of a defalcation will be considered in relation to the fairness of the financial
statements, not the personal net worth of the owner.

The Fraud Triangle
As described briefly in Chapter 1, three conditions are present when fraud occurs.
• Incentive/pressure. Management or other employees may have an incentive or be under
pressure, which provides a motivation to commit fraud.
• Opportunity. Circumstances exist—for example, the absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the
ability of management to override controls—that provide an opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated.
• Rationalization/attitude. Those involved in a fraud are able to rationalize a fraudulent act as being
consistent with their personal code of ethics. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set
of ethical values that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act.
Example 2-1 Sound Machine
Sound Machine is a retailer of high-end consumer electronics. The new owner of the company
accumulated personal wealth as a salesman in another industry. He used a significant portion of
his personal assets to buy the company and then borrowed heavily to embark on an ambitious
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expansion plan. The debt agreement contained a number of loan covenants, and the owner
provided the creditor with a personal guarantee.
On several occasions, the owner was known to give sales personnel “credit” for a sales
transaction before some of the accounting “technicalities” had been completed (for example,
delivery of the product and, signed sales agreement). Because his sales force was paid on a
commission basis, the occasional early recording of revenue allowed the salesperson to be paid
his or her commissions earlier. As a former salesperson, the owner was sympathetic to the
argument that “the deal was essentially done,” and he wanted to help a salesperson who was in a
temporary cash flow crunch and needed the commission check. In the owner’s mind, what he
was doing was granting the employee an “advance,” which was “paid back” when the sales
paperwork was finalized.
Over the course of several years, the owner made about a dozen such advances and each one was
repaid—that is, the sale eventually was finalized. These “advances” were always made known to
the auditor, who would prepare year-end adjustments to make any corrections to the financial
statements. The procedure for authorizing such an advance was simple: The owner presented
unsigned contracts to the bookkeeper and told her to recognize a sale before all the paperwork
was final and to prepare a commission check for the salesperson.
Meanwhile, the company’s expansion plans were not proceeding as expected. The cash flow
generated from the new stores was insufficient to meet the debt payments, and the company was
in danger of violating its loan covenants.
At the end of one reporting period, the owner had a number of sales transactions that he himself
had been working on. None of them was completed, technically speaking, but based on his
experience, he was certain that they would close soon, after the end of the reporting period. The
transactions’ status was similar to what he had used to justify employee advances over the years.
Fearing that the company’s lack of sufficient profitability would put it in default on its loan, the
owner went to the bookkeeper, gave her the unsigned contracts, and told her—as he had on
several previous occasions—to record the sales in advance of receiving the final paperwork even
though he knew the sales should not be recorded under GAAP. He further lead the bookkeeper to
believe that he had already told the auditor of these “advances” and therefore, she should not say
anything to them.

In Example 2-1, the small business owner has committed a financial reporting fraud. All three
elements of the fraud triangle were present.
• Incentive/pressure. The company was in danger of defaulting on its loan agreement, which the
owner had personally guaranteed.
• Opportunity. The company had certain controls in place to prevent the advance recording of
revenues. The owner was able to override these controls by simply telling the bookkeeper to
record the sales in the absence of all required documentation.
• Rationalization/attitude. The owner had done similar things in the past, as a way to help his
employees. In his mind, he was receiving an “advance” from the lender in the same way his
salespeople received advances from him.
Eliminate one of these three characteristics, and the risk of material misstatement in the financial
statements due to fraud diminishes. Conversely, you may add a third side to make a triangle where one
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did not exist previously. For example, the owner of Sound Machine always had the opportunity to
override controls, book revenues in advance, and rationalize the act. It was not until the company was
in danger of defaulting on its loan—providing an incentive—that the fraud occurred. Part of your fraud
risk assessment process should be to consider whether the changes at the client since the last audit
have, in effect, added a “third side” to complete a fraud triangle.
Other Characteristics of Fraud
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.05–.12) describes two other characteristics of fraud that are helpful during
your audit.
• Commitment-conversion-concealment. Frauds can be thought of as a three-step process.
― The fraud is committed. In Example 2-1, the company records revenue prematurely.
― The benefits to the fraud are realized. In the example, the company avoids defaulting on its
loan, and the owner is not required to perform on his personal guarantee.
― The fraud is concealed. In the example, the documentation for the sale is unsigned or
incomplete. Under scrutiny of an audit, the owner or other company personnel may
attempt to conceal the fraud by altering documents in a way to make it appear that the sale
was finalized during the reporting period.
As an auditor, it is unlikely that you will observe someone committing a fraud or recognize
that management or employees have realized a benefit of the fraud. When financial statements
are materially misstated as a result of a misappropriation of assets, what you are most likely to
observe are attempts to conceal the fraud.
• A simple plan. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.06) states that “fraudulent financial reporting need
not be the result of a grand plan or conspiracy.” In Example 2-1, the owner was able to
rationalize the appropriateness of the misstatement as a temporary condition that would
correct itself shortly. The standard goes on to describe other ways in which a fraud starts out
as something relatively simple.
Although not stated in the standard, frauds due to theft have similar characteristics. They typically
do not start as a grand plan, but rather something innocuous that grows bigger over time.

Professional Skepticism
There are several reasons why auditors fail to detect material misstatements in the financial
statements caused by fraud. Some of the more commonly observed include:
• An overreliance on client representations (both oral and written) or a failure to collaborate
those representations with other audit evidence
• A lack of awareness or a failure to recognize that an observed condition may indicate a material
fraud
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• A lack of experience in understanding why frauds occur or what behavior patterns to look for.
This lack of experience can result in a complacent attitude about fraud.
• Personal relationships with clients and a belief that they are honest and conduct themselves with
integrity
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.13) reminds auditors that they need to overcome these natural tendencies
and biases and approach the audit with an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical
assessment of the audit evidence. Also critical is the need for the auditor to set aside past
relationships with the client and to view every audit as an opportunity for management to perpetrate a
fraud. Chapter 3 provides suggestions on how auditors can learn to adopt a more critical, skeptical
mindset on their engagements.

Discussion Among Engagement Personnel
As described in Chapter 1, SAS No. 99 requires the audit team to discuss the potential for a material
misstatement in the financial statements due to fraud before or during the information-gathering
process. This required “brainstorming” session is a required procedure and should be applied with
the same degree of due care as any other audit procedure, such as inventory observation or
confirmation of accounts receivable.
Most businesspeople treat brainstorming as a check box, a threshold variable, such as “Can you
ride a bicycle?” or “Do you know how to tie your shoes?” They overlook the possibility that
1
brainstorming can be a skill or an art, more like playing the piano than tying your shoes.
Practice Pointer. For reasons discussed elsewhere in this publication (for example, Chapter 3),
the brainstorming requirement has the potential to significantly improve the auditor’s ability to
detect material misstatements caused by fraud. The ultimate effectiveness of brainstorming in
achieving this goal hinges on the emphasis and importance placed on it by the engagement
team leaders.

Objective of the Brainstorming Session
There are two primary objectives of the brainstorming session. The first one is strategic in nature.

1

From Tom Kelley, The Art of Innovation (New York: Doubleday, 2001), p. 55.
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By Way of Analogy2…
To the uninitiated, the art of fishing may seem a mysterious and random act. A fisherman casts
his line into the sea in what seems to be an act of pure faith that fish exists below the inscrutable
surface of the sea. And the line hangs for minutes, hours, even days (in the case of Hemingway’s
The Old Man and the Sea, 84 days). To the nonfisherman, it seems to be pure luck when a fish
finally takes the bait, and the pole begins to shimmy and bend.
The experienced fisherman knows the amount of skill and planning that goes into the exercise.
Before setting out on his excursion, the fisherman determines what kind of fish he is trying to
catch. He chooses the equipment he needs. He reviews the habits of the target fish—where they
swim, when they are active, the type of motion that they are attracted to and what will prompt
them to strike. Armed with this information, he then is prepared to cast his line, into the spot
where the fish are likely to be, at the time of day they are hungry, and with a retrieval technique
that is likely to induce a strike.
Detecting a material misstatement in the financial statements caused by fraud should not be
viewed as a random and mysterious act, something the auditor “stumbles upon” while conducting
the audit. Rather, like the experienced fisherman, the auditor should determine what kinds of
frauds (fish) are likely to be present and which tools and techniques are best equipped to find
them.

As a result of the brainstorming session, the engagement team should have a good understanding of:
• Information that experienced team members have about their experiences with the client.
• How a fraud might be perpetrated and concealed at the entity.
• The procedures the team might perform to detect any material misstatement that results.
The second objective of the brainstorming is to set the proper “tone at the top” for conducting the
engagement. Within the context of assessing an entity’s internal control, auditors have long
recognized the importance of the control environment and the proper tone at the top set by
management. Intuitively, we recognize that a proper corporate culture can permeate an entity’s
internal control, making individual controls much more effective in identifying misstatements,
whether due to error or fraud.
SAS No. 99 takes that same approach and applies it to the audit itself. The requirement that the
brainstorming session is to be conducted with an attitude that “includes a questioning mind” is an
attempt to model the proper degree of professional skepticism and set the culture for the engagement.

2

This is not the first publication to use a fishing analogy to describe the search for fraud. Defense attorneys are fond of
using the term fishing expedition to describe an investigation into their client’s activities that seems to lack a welldefined purpose. Fraud and other crime investigators use similar metaphors, for example, describing how their
investigations “cast a wide net.” Experts in fraud and forensic accounting also use fishing analogies to describe the
process of conducting a fraud investigation. Howard R. Davia, CPA, used a fishing analogy in two of his books,
Accountant’s Guide to Fraud Detection and Control (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000) and Fraud 101:
Techniques and Strategies for Detection (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000). This is our version of the fishing
analogy.
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As in a client’s control environment, the belief is that this audit engagement culture will infuse the
entire engagement, making all audit procedures that much more effective.
As a practical matter, many auditors do not encounter material misstatements in the financial
statements caused by fraud during the course of their career in public accounting, and the auditor’s
sensitivity to the existence of fraud possibly could be dulled over time. The mere fact that the
engagement team engages in a serious discussion about the entity’s susceptibility to fraud also serves
to remind the team members that the possibility does exist in every engagement—in spite of any
history or preconceived biases about the honesty and integrity of management.
By Way of Analogy…
In his short story “On the Zaterre,” William Trevor tells the tale of Verity, a 38-year-old woman
who moves back into her father’s house after the death of her mother. In the opening paragraph
we learn that after she moved back home, she “became as her mother had been, her father’s chief
companion and was in time exposed to traits in his nature she had not known existed. Preserving
within the family the exterior of a bluff and genial man, good-hearted, knowledgeable and wise,
her father had successfully disguised the worst of himself.”
In the story the father and daughter go on vacation together to Venice, and during that time, Verity
notices the worst of her father at every turn. He is mean about spending small sums of money. He
tells petty, unimportant lies. He can be boorish beneath his urbane exterior. It is apparent that
now that she has acknowledged the worst of her father, she recognizes it all the time.
As auditors, we may have created certain images of our clients in our mind. One of the objectives
of the brainstorming session is to remove these images and to acknowledge the possibility that
fraud may exist at any entity. Once we become sensitized to that possibility, we will be more likely
to recognize the indicators of fraud when they present themselves.
Practice Pointer. SAS No. 99 does not provide any requirements on who should attend the
brainstorming session other than stating that it ordinarily should involve key members of
the audit team. That would require the participation of those planning, performing, or
supervising key aspects of the audit. In rare situations, if it is not possible for a key member
to be present, important messages and items discussed during the session should be
communicated to that person. SAS No. 99 does not require the discussion to be conducted
face-to-face; however, in-person sessions typically are more effective than those conducted
over the phone or via e-mail.

Continuous Communication

SAS No. 99 does not restrict brainstorming to the planning phase of the audit process. Brainstorming
can be used in conjunction with any part of the information-gathering process. Auditors gather
information continuously throughout the engagement, so look for opportunities to brainstorm
throughout the engagement. Some auditors may choose to conduct a brainstorming session near the
conclusion of the audit in order to consider the findings and experiences of all team members during
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the audit and whether the team’s assessment about and responses to the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud were appropriate.
In addition to brainstorming, SAS No. 99 requires audit team members to communicate with
each other throughout the engagement about the risks of material misstatement due to fraud. In
fact, SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.74) requires the auditor with final responsibility for the audit to
determine that there has been appropriate communication among team members—not just during
the brainstorming, but throughout the engagement.
Suggestions for an Effective Brainstorming Session
Structuring the Session

First, split the session into two parts. The main objective of brainstorming is to generate ideas
about how fraud might be committed and concealed at the entity. That is all that is required by
SAS No. 99. As a practical matter, some engagement teams may choose to discuss how the
engagement team may respond to the identified risks. If you choose to discuss audit responses as
part of a brainstorming meeting, it is important to recognize that the two activities require two
very different processes and mindsets. Generating ideas is a right-brain, intuitive exercise.
Developing an audit plan is just the opposite. One sure way to kill the generation of new ideas is
to critique and analyze them as soon as they are brought up.
For that reason, if you choose to discuss audit responses at your brainstorming meeting, you
should consider dividing the session into two distinct segments. First, get all the ideas out,
without analyzing or commenting on their merit. Take a break, make sure that group members
understand that they are switching gears, and then discuss an audit response.
Then, determine a reasonable time limit. Consultants and business owners who participate
regularly in business brainstorming sessions suggest that a good session lasts about an hour.
After that, the energy begins to fade, and the law of diminishing returns sets in. Plan on
spending about an hour brainstorming ideas on how the entity might be vulnerable to fraud.
The Brainstorming Process

First, consider assigning “homework.” The actual brainstorming session will be much more
productive if all members have a similar level of understanding about the client, the nature of its
business, and its current level of financial performance. In his book The Art of Innovation, Tom
Kelley describes an experiment he performed at his company regarding brainstorming
homework. One group did no homework, a second performed detailed quantitative analysis of
the situation, and the third did research that was more intuitive and impressionistic in nature,
such as visiting stores of the client’s competitors. The group that performed analytical homework
outperformed the group that did no preparation, but the group that performed less structured
research performed best of all.
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For auditors brainstorming about fraud matters, it may certainly be beneficial to perform analytical,
fact-based research before the brainstorming session. Examples might include:
•
•
•
•

Analytical procedures of the most current financial information
Review of prior year’s or interim financial statements
Review of previously issued management letters
Review of selected working papers from the previous engagement that may provide ideas for
possible areas of vulnerability to fraud. Examples of these working papers include: internal
control documentation, summary of audit differences, and summaries of key legal agreements.
• Review of client acceptance and continuance documentation
• Review of press releases, current marketing literature, and other information released by the
entity
• Review information about the industry
In structuring your session it will help to consider the characteristics of the fraud triangle.
For example, you might discuss the incentives/pressures that may exist at the entity or the
opportunities management or employees have to commit fraud. You also may discuss observations
about attitudes or rationalizations that may indicate the presence of a risk of material misstatement
caused by fraud.
If the circumstances of the client permit, engagement teams also may consider preparing for the
brainstorming session by engaging in non-fact-based research. Example 2-1 describes a fraud
committed by a consumer electronics retailer. In a similar situation, it may be instructive for the
auditors to visit a client location and observe the entity’s operating procedures and methods.
Next, during the session, focus on the energy of the group. The energy in a brainstorming session
is like popping popcorn in the microwave. At first there is little activity. This is followed by a
quickly accelerating burst of energy in which a great many ideas are “popped.” Eventually, the
energy plateaus and peters out. In a brainstorming session, this “popping” process will repeat
itself several times.
During the early stages of the session, the facilitator should be patient and encourage the group to
share ideas. Avoid the temptation to have the most senior person in the group express his or her
views to “get the ball rolling,” as this will tend to stifle creativity. No one likes to challenge the boss.
As the energy rises, keep building the momentum. Introduce variations on the main idea being
discussed as a way to push the limits of the idea. For example, if the group is discussing ways to
prematurely record revenue, a question that builds momentum would be, “Side agreements with
customers is one way the entity might improperly recognize revenues. What are some others?”
As the energy begins to plateau, “jump” the discussion to another topic or back to one that was
discussed previously. For example, “We can always come back to revenue recognition. What are
some ways the entity might underreport expenses?”
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Finally, describe the objective of the session in language people can relate to. SAS No. 99
describes the objective of brainstorming to identify “how and where the team believes the
entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material misstatement due to fraud.” This is
wonderful language for an audit standard but not for generating creative ideas. To help generate
creative, practical ideas, pose questions that people can more easily understand:
• If you were the bookkeeper for the entity, how could you embezzle funds and not get caught?
• If you worked on the loading dock, how could you steal inventory?
• If you owned this company, what impression would you want to make on third parties, such as
banks or the IRS? How might you manipulate the financial statements to create this impression?
Practice Pointer. SAS No. 99 does not indicate how a sole practitioner who has no staff
should conduct a brainstorming session. This lack of guidance should not be construed
to mean that a sole practitioner is exempt from the spirit of what the standard requires.
The purpose of the brainstorming session is to cultivate a questioning mindset during the
engagement and to consider how a fraud might be perpetrated at the entity. Introspection
and reflection upon the guidance contained in this Practice Aid and the standard itself
would be one way in which the sole practitioner could comply with the spirit of the
requirement even in the absence of other individuals necessary to conduct a
brainstorming session.
Practice Pointer. Some firms have implemented the brainstorming requirements of SAS
No. 99 by conducting brainstorming sessions at two levels. The first, higher level
brainstorming is performed at the industry or specialized practice area. For example, the
firm might conduct a brainstorming session to discuss fraud in the high-tech or not-forprofit industry. Significant audit efficiencies may be realized by performing brainstorming
at this high level. However, by itself, an industry-wide brainstorming session does not
comply with the requirements of SAS No. 99. To meet the requirements, these general
brainstorming sessions must be followed up with sessions focused exclusively on
individual clients.

Rules of Engagement

You might consider developing and posting brainstorming rules to help you achieve your objective.
Here are some examples.
• There are no dumb ideas or questions. Prejudging questions by labeling them “dumb” is one
sure way to stifle the contribution of ideas. Similarly, you should try to explore even the most
seemingly basic questions. You never know where a “dumb” idea or question might lead.
• Ideas are a work in process. The most effective brainstorming sessions are those in which the
group contributes to the communal building of an idea, similar to the way the members of a
traditional farming community would all participate in a “barn raising.” One of the mistakes
made by a group involved in brainstorming is to inadvertently assume that an idea presented
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by a group member is fully formed and needs only to be “memorialized” by adding it to a list
on a flipchart. This type of approach will result in less effective brainstorming. Group
members should assume that all ideas are a work in process and, once presented, it is their
collective responsibility to add to it, change it, and ultimately “raise” it to a more complete
state.
• No hierarchy. The world of ideas does not recognize rank, experience, or compensation level.
Work to create an environment in which senior members of the team share information
without dominating the discussion, and junior members feel “safe” contributing their own
ideas.
• No excessive note-taking. A brainstorming session is an intuitive, spontaneous process. Excessive
note-taking is a barrier to this process. Those individuals who take notes as if it were the last class
3
period before a biology exam will not be effective contributors to the session.

Obtaining Information to Identify the Risks of Material Misstatement
Due to Fraud
As described earlier, the audit is an iterative process that includes gathering information, identifying
and assessing risks, and responding to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. SAS No. 99
(AU sec. 316.09–.34) provides guidance on obtaining information for the purpose of identifying and
assessing risks from the following sources.
•
•
•
•

Inquiries of management and others within the organization
Analytical procedures
Consideration of fraud risk factors
Other information

Inquiries
The SAS requires you to make the following inquiries.
• Management. The SAS lists several items that you should ask management relating to their
awareness and understanding of fraud, fraud risks, and the steps taken to mitigate this risk at
the entity.
• Others. SAS No. 99 requires you to make inquiries of the audit committee, internal audit
personnel (if applicable), and others within the entity about the existence or suspicion of fraud
and to make possible inquiry about the individual’s views about the risks of fraud within the
3

Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), requires you to document how and when the brainstorming occurred, who
participated, and the subject matter discussed. It does not require you to document in great detail the specific risks
discussed. As a practical matter, the over documentation of risk factors discussed may provide unnecessary litigation
exposure to the firm.
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entity. Even if the entity’s audit committee is not active (which is common in smaller public
companies and many not-for-profit organizations), you are still required to ask the chairperson
about fraud. As discussed later in this section, “others” also includes those individuals who are
outside the financial reporting process.
Inquiries of Management

SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.20) lists the inquiries you should make of management. The required
inquiries are:
• Whether management has knowledge of any fraud or suspected fraud affecting the entity.
• Whether management is aware of allegations of fraud or suspected fraud affecting the entity,
for example, because of communications from employees, former employees, analysts,
regulators, short sellers, or other investors.
• Management’s understanding about the risks of fraud in the entity, including any specific
fraud risks the entity has identified or account balances or classes of transactions for which the
risk of fraud may be likely to exist.
• Programs and controls4 the entity has established to mitigate specific fraud risks the entity has
identified, or that otherwise help to prevent, deter, and detect fraud, and how management
monitors those programs and controls. Exhibit I of SAS No. 99 discusses examples of
programs and controls an entity may implement to prevent, deter, and detect fraud.
• For an entity with multiple locations, (a) the nature and extent of monitoring of operating
locations or business segments, and (b) whether there are particular operating locations or
business segments for which a risk of fraud may be more likely to exist.
• Whether and how management communicates to employees its views on business practices and
ethical behavior.
Some of these inquiries will need little or no explanation. For example, asking whether management
has knowledge of fraud affecting the entity is relatively straightforward.
Other inquiries may require you to “educate” the entity’s management about the
characteristics of fraud (for example, the fraud triangle), the nature of fraud risks, and the
types of programs and controls that will deter and detect fraud. The guidance contained in
SAS No. 99 and this publication provide you with the background necessary to discuss these
matters with most clients.
SAS No. 99 does not define management. As a practical matter, your inquires of management about
fraud should be directed to those individuals within the entity who sign the management
4

SAS No. 55 (AU sec. 319.06 and .07) defines internal control and its five interrelated components (the control
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring). Entity programs and
controls intended to address the risks of fraud may be part of any of the five components discussed in SAS No. 55.
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representation letter. SAS No. 85 (AU sec. 333.09) states that the management representation letter
should be signed:
…by those members of management with overall responsibility for financial and operating
matters whom the auditor believes are responsible for and knowledgeable about, directly or
through others in the organization, the matters covered by the representations. Such members of
management normally include the chief executive officer and chief financial officer or others with
equivalent positions in the entity.

You also should consider making inquiries of the controller and, in an owner-managed business, the
owner.
Practice Pointer. The discussions you have with client management about fraud are tangible
benefits to your clients of the adoption of SAS No. 99. If you make the effort to have a
thoughtful, comprehensive discussion with them, they will ascribe more value to your services.
Some firms are planning to conduct more formal fraud awareness “training” sessions for their
audit clients, which business owners may receive even more favorably.
Practice Pointer. Thorough advance preparation will increase the effectiveness of your
inquiries. Chapter 4 of this Practice Aid provides further suggestions on how to prepare for and
conduct inquiries of entity personnel regarding fraud matters.
Practice Pointer. Inquiries about fraud may involve the discussion of relatively sensitive
matters that will require auditors to exercise discretion and judgment in balancing their need to
obtain information with a desire to maintain a relationship of mutual trust with the client. Audit
teams should carefully consider which team member is most qualified to conduct these inquiries.

Inquiries of Others Within the Entity

For the most part, auditors tend to restrict their inquiries of the client to personnel directly involved in
the financial reporting process. This approach is appropriate for matters that accounting personnel
have direct knowledge of, such as how transactions are processed or controlled. However, it is less
effective to ask accounting personnel about matters for which they do not have first-hand knowledge
(for example, the procedures used to examine, count, and receive items into inventory, or the terms
of certain contracts). Critics of the audit process frequently cite the auditor’s reluctance to make
inquiries outside of the accounting department as a reason for the lack of in-depth understanding
necessary to plan and perform an effective and efficient audit.
SAS No. 99 is the first standard that requires auditors to make inquiries of “others within the entity”
(for example, nonaccounting personnel). The SAS suggests making inquiries of:
• Operating personnel not directly involved in the financial reporting process
• Individuals with knowledge of complex or unusual transactions
• In-house legal counsel
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Further, you should not restrict your inquiries to senior management. The standard suggests making
inquiries of personnel at various levels within the organization.
There are two primary objectives in making inquiries of others within the organization.
• To obtain first-hand knowledge of fraud. Fraud can happen in any department, at any level
within the organization. Anyone in the entity may have observed first-hand someone
committing or concealing a fraud. Oftentimes, those with knowledge of a fraud have stated,
after the fact, that they would have told someone, “but nobody asked.” SAS No. 99 increases
the likelihood that the auditor will now be that “someone” who asks.
• To corroborate or lend perspective to representations of others. Operating personnel can
corroborate representations made by others or provide a different perspective on how things
“really work.” For example, accounting department personnel may be able to provide you with the
recommended control procedures relating to the safeguarding of inventory. Operational personnel,
in this case, those who work in the warehouse, can tell you how the control procedures are applied
in practice and when, if ever, those controls are overridden or circumvented.
The standard allows you to use considerable judgment in determining to which individuals within the
organization you should direct your inquiries and what you should ask.
By Way of Analogy…
Drop a rock into a still, glassy pool and watch the water ripple in an ever-widening circle.
In an audit, the focus of activity is the accounting department and entity management. You start
there, asking questions to gain a preliminary understanding of the entity. To improve that
understanding and corroborate what you have learned, you must expand the reach of your
inquiries to those outside the first group. The tight, initial circle widens, until you have gathered
enough reliable, persuasive evidence to form an opinion.

Other Inquiries

SAS No. 99 lists certain specific inquiries that you are required to make of management and others in
the entity. However, the statement does not restrict you to making only those required inquiries. In
fact, inquiry can be an effective procedure to help you gather or corroborate a wide variety of
information that can help you identify or assess risks of material misstatement due to fraud. For
example, you may wish to use inquiries to:
• Identify incentives/pressures, opportunities, or attitudes/rationalizations that can lead to
material misstatements caused by fraud.
• Understand the policies, procedures, and controls at the entity for recording journal entries or
other adjustments directly to the financial statements.
• Identify circumstances under which management has or may override internal control.
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• Understand policies and procedures related to revenue recognition.
• Understand the business rationale for significant unusual transactions.
Many of the inquiries related to these matters should be asked of personnel outside of management or
the accounting department. Asking the same question of different people can increase the
effectiveness of your inquiries, as you can compare answers to identify consistencies or anomalies in
the responses. The following table provides examples of inquiries you might consider making of
entity personnel. These inquiries are not required by SAS No. 99.
Objective of Inquiry
Example Inquiries
Identify
• Describe the current threats
incentives/pressures
affecting the financial stability or
that can lead to
profitability of the entity.
material
• How do these threats create
misstatements
pressure on the entity to report
caused by fraud.
improved financial results?

Direct Inquiries to
• Management
• Sales personnel
• Production personnel

• What expectations do third parties
have regarding entity performance
and reported financial results?

• Management

• Describe significant provisions of
management and/or board
compensation.

• Management

• Investor relations

• Human resources

• Has management made any
personal guarantees on behalf of
the company?
• Describe the nature of any
significant investment management
has made in the company.
• Describe the way in which
financial targets are used to
motivate employee performance.
• What is the nature and magnitude
of the pressure felt by employees to
achieve these targets?

• Management
• Human resources
• Employees affected by the
financial target incentives

(continued)
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Example Inquiries
Objective of Inquiry
Identify
• Describe any industry
opportunities that
conditions that allow the
can lead to material
entity to dictate terms or
misstatements
conditions to suppliers or
caused by fraud.
customers.
• Describe any significant
turnover of personnel in
accounting, information
technology, or internal
audit.

Direct Inquiries to
• Sales personnel
• Purchasing personnel

• Human resources
• Accounting
• Information technology
• Internal audit

• How does the entity’s turnover
experience compare with others of
its size in the same industry? With
companies of a different size or
different industry?
• How active is management in the
oversight of the financial reporting
process?

• Accounting
• Management

• Is this involvement effective?
Identify
• Describe the entity’s values and
attitude/rationalization
ethical standards.
that can lead
• How are these communicated,
to material
supported and enforced?
misstatements
caused by fraud.
• To what extent does nonfinancial
management participate in the
selection of accounting principles
or determination of significant
estimates?
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Objective of Inquiry

Example Inquiries
• Do any accounting policies seem
overly aggressive or inappropriate?

Direct Inquiries to
• Accounting

• To what extent is “materiality”
used to justify marginal or
inappropriate accounting policies?
Identify fraud risk
factors relating to
the misappropriation
of assets.

• Are there any adverse or
strained relationships between
employees and the company?

• Management
• Human resources
• Employees

• Are there any recent or planned
• Management
layoffs or changes to employee
• Human resources
compensation or benefit plans that
could create resentment among
the employees?
• Are there any recent or planned
• Management
bonuses, promotions, or other actions • Human resources
that were/will be inconsistent with
expectations and could create
resentment among the employees?
• How involved is management in
overseeing employees with access
to cash and other assets susceptible
to misappropriation?

• Management

• What is the attitude of management
and employees toward internal
control and established policies and
procedures?

• Management

• Have you observed any unusual or
unexplained changes in behavior or
lifestyle of management or
employees?

• Management

• Employees

• Employees

• Employees

(continued)
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Example Inquiries
Direct Inquiries to
Objective of Inquiry
Understand policies, • What is the process for recording
• Accounting
procedures, and
nonstandard journal entries or other
controls related to
adjustments directly to the financial
journal entries and
statements, including:
other adjustments to
― Description and purpose
the financial
― Individuals responsible
statements.
― Timing
― Review and approval process
Identify instances of
management
override of internal
control.

• Under what circumstances will
members of management waive or
bypass established policies or
procedures?

• Management
• Accounting

• Describe the policies or procedures
that management has waived or
bypassed during the past year.
Understand policies
and procedures
related to revenue
recognition

• See Chapter 5 of this Practice Aid

• Management
• Accounting
• Sales and marketing personnel
• Shipping personnel

Understand business
rationale for
significant, unusual
transactions.

• Has management discussed the
nature and accounting for these
transactions with the audit
committee or board of directors?

• Management
• Audit committee
• Board of directors

• Have transactions involving
unconsolidated related parties
been reviewed and approved by
the board?
• Does management seem to place an • Audit committee
unusual emphasis on the need for a • Board of directors
particular accounting treatment
• Accounting
rather than on the underlying
economics of the transaction?
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Practice Pointer. For further guidance on formulating follow-up questions, please refer to the
following.
• Questions relating to incentives/pressures, opportunities, or attitudes/ rationalizations, see
the Appendix to SAS No. 99, which provides example fraud risk factors.
• Questions relating to nonstandard entries and other adjustments to the financial statements,
see SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.58–.62) and PITF Practice Alert 03-2, Journal Entries and Other
Adjustments (included as Appendix C to this book).
• Questions relating to the business rationale of significant unusual transactions, see SAS No.
99 (AU sec. 316.67).

Planning Analytical Procedures
Example 2-2
XYZ Investment Partnership owned several commercial office buildings. One of these buildings
was managed by an onsite property manager, who managed to embezzle several rent payments
received from tenants. To conceal the fraud, the property manager credited rental income,
knowing that the XYZ asset manager focused solely on the property’s income statement and
would not notice any difference in rental income. To balance the credit to income, the property
manager debited accounts receivable.
The fraud was detected when the audit engagement senior reviewed interim financial statements
and noticed an odd relationship between receivables and rental income. The balance in rental
income receivable represented approximately four months of rental income. Given the nature of
the property—a commercial office building where tenants paid on a monthly basis—it did not
make sense that four months of income would go uncollected. That observation prompted a
series of questions and extended procedures that quickly discovered the fraud.

One of the reasons auditors fail to detect material misstatements caused by fraud is a
tendency to look at current numbers in isolation from the past or other relevant information.
For that reason, SAS No. 99 states that the auditor should consider the results of analytical
procedures in identifying the risks of material misstatement caused by fraud. Example 2-2
illustrates how the result of an analytical procedure performed during planning was effective
at identifying a fraud. The example analytical procedure was performed during the overall
review stage of the audit process, but it could just as easily have been performed during the
planning phase of the engagement.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.72) provides a good list of example analytical procedures that may
indicate a risk of material misstatement due to fraud.5 This paragraph also notes that some
analytical relationships are more effective than others at identifying fraud risks because
management or employees generally are unable to manipulate certain information to create
seemingly normal or expected relationships. For example, management may be able to
5

These examples are provided within the context of the overall review stage of the audit; however, they can just as
easily be performed during the information gathering phase to help identify and assess fraud risks.
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manipulate earnings, but it cannot manipulate cash flow. Thus an unusual relationship between
reported earnings and cash flow may indicate a risk of material misstatement due to fraud. The
standard also provides limited examples of analytical procedures related to revenue that may be
helpful in identifying material misstatements caused by fraud. Here are some other analytical
relationships you might use.
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention6 describes the results of an
academic study based on companies identified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as
earnings manipulators during a 10-year period. The purpose of the study was to develop quantitative
fraud warning signs by analyzing a series of ratios that might be used as predictors of material
misstatements caused by fraud.7
The research identified a group of financial statement variables that may be helpful in identifying
material misstatements caused by fraud. These variables are:
• Day’s sales in receivables index. Calculate day’s sales in receivables for the current period.
Compare that to the same calculation for the immediate prior period. A ratio of 1:1 indicates
that the day’s sales in receivables has held steady between the two periods. Receivables that
are beginning to become large in relation to sales may be a sign of fraudulent revenue
recognition.
• Gross margin index. Compare gross margin for the current period to that for the immediate
prior period. In this instance, look for a ratio that is less than 1:1, which indicates gross
margins are deteriorating for the entity. As indicated in the list of fraud risk factors included as
the Appendix to SAS No. 99, declining margins may indicate a lack of financial stability or
profitability, providing management with an incentive to fraudulently misstate the financial
statements.
• Asset quality index. Asset quality is the ratio of noncurrent assets exclusive of property, plant,
and equipment to total assets in any given year. The asset quality ratio measures the ability of
the company to produce reliable earnings in the future. The higher the proportion of
noncurrent assets to total assets, the greater the risk to the company of future earnings growth.
A ratio of current year asset quality to prior year asset quality that is greater than 1:1 means
more costs are being capitalized and deferred, which could be a sign of fraudulent earnings
manipulation.
• Sales growth index. This is the ratio of current year sales to prior year sales.

6

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention, Avey et al. (New York: AICPA, 2002).
The study was conducted by Messod D. Beneish, an associate professor at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana
University. The results were published in “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,” Financial Analysts Journal 24
(1999): 24–36.

7
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• Total accruals to total assets. This is a measure of changes in noncash working capital to total
assets at the end of the current period. Start with working capital excluding cash. Determine yearto-year change in this amount. Divide this amount into total assets at the end of the period. A large
result indicates that a growing percentage of the entity’s working capital is composed of noncash
items, which is a sign of possible fraudulent financial reporting.
The following table summarizes the results of the research. The findings indicate that financial
statement “manipulators” exhibit certain financial statement characteristics that are detectable and
different from “nonmanipulators.”
Characteristic
Measures
DSRI

Manipulators
Mean
1.460

Nonmanipulators
Mean
1.030

Difference
0.430

Difference
(%)
42

GMI

1.190

1.010

0.180

18

AQI

1.250

1.040

0.210

21

SGI

1.610

1.130

0.480

42

TATA

0.031

0.018

0.013

72

Of course, you should not automatically assume that entities that exhibit unusual, unexplained ratios
have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting. The information presented here is intended only to
alert you to the possibility of fraud under certain circumstances.
Fraud Risk Factors
A fraud risk factor is an event or condition that indicates:
• An incentive or pressure to perpetrate fraud
• Opportunities to carry out the fraud
• Attitudes or rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action
Note that this definition of fraud risk factors tracks with the three conditions of the fraud risk
triangle. Although fraud risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud, they often
are present in circumstances where fraud exists.
The Appendix to SAS No. 99 lists examples of fraud risk factors. Although these examples
cover a broad range of situations, they are only examples. You may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors, especially those that are unique to specialized industries.
Appendix A to this publication provides examples of fraud risk factors for a number of
specialized industries.
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Practice Pointer. Even though you are allowed some flexibility in determining which risk
factors to consider, use caution when deciding that some of the risk factors listed do not apply.
Expect questions to be raised if a material misstatement due to fraud is discovered in the
entity’s financial statements or several of the example fraud risk factors listed in SAS No. 99
were identified during the course of your audit, but you decided not to consider them as
possible indicators of fraud.
Practice Pointer, redux. On the flip side, you should consider the presence of risk factors that
are not listed as examples in SAS No. 99. As indicated earlier in this publication, research found
that auditors who used checklists that also required them to consider other risk factors
outperformed those who just relied on a checklist.

Designing Audit Procedures to Identify Fraud Risk Factors

SAS No. 99 states:
When obtaining information about the entity and its environment, the auditor should consider
whether the information indicates that one or more fraud risk factors are present.

As a practical matter, the application of SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), relating to audit planning; SAS No. 55,
Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), as amended, relating to internal controls; and the other sections
of SAS No. 99 should allow you to identify the broad categories of fraud risk factors related to
incentive/pressure and opportunity.
Regarding fraud risk factors relating to attitude/rationalization, the Appendix to the standard
acknowledges that these risk factors may not be susceptible to observation by the auditor related
to the attitude/rationalization condition. In other words, you cannot possibly know with certainty
an individual’s ethical standards and beliefs. However, during the course of your engagement,
you may become aware of some of the circumstances described in Appendix A and should
consider the possible presence of a fraud risk factor.
Other Information
SAS No. 99 requires you to consider other information that may be helpful in identifying the risks of
material misstatement due to fraud. This other information includes that obtained during:
•
•
•
•
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The engagement team brainstorming session.
Client acceptance and continuance procedures.
Reviews of interim financial information.
Consideration of inherent risks at the account or transaction level.
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Practice Pointer. Looking back on their implementation of the previous fraud standard, some
firms reported that it was common for engagement teams to document the existence of very
few, if any, fraud risk factors on their engagements, even though several factors were present.
The most common explanation for this lack of documentation was that auditors tended to
collapse the three distinct steps of the fraud risk assessment process into one. The thinking
went something like this: “Yes, fraud risk factor XYZ is present, but it is not a big risk, and
besides we already do audit procedures to look for it, so I’ll just check ‘n/a’ on the form.”

Combining the three risk assessment steps into one decision can lead to a loss of audit effectiveness.
Try to keep the three steps separate and distinct from each other. During the first phase of the
process, focus only on gathering information and documenting your observations. Later, once you
have obtained sufficient information, you will assess risk and then plan your audit response.

Identify and Assess Fraud Risks
By Way of Analogy…
All the President’s Men is a true account of how Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and
Carl Bernstein investigated and reported the Watergate scandal. At one point early in the
investigation the two are frustrated, for their work is not leading anywhere productive. Woodward
meets with a secret source high up in the Nixon administration. During that meeting he explains
that he and Bernstein have collected various bits and pieces of data. They are like pieces of a
puzzle, but the two of them cannot even begin to determine how they might fit together or what
the picture looks like.
Woodward’s source tells him, “Follow the money.” The source is unwilling to tell him any of the
details he knows of the crime and its cover-up. The best he can do is give Woodward an overall
guiding principle on how to analyze the pieces of the puzzle to develop clues on how they might fit
together.
As an auditor, you gather information that may be relevant to detecting a material misstatement
caused by fraud. These are the pieces of the puzzle. Like Woodward, you will become stuck,
unsure how the pieces might begin to fit together and how you are to proceed. What you need is
advice that can get you back on track, a device that allows you to organize and understand the
bits and pieces you have assembled.
SAS No. 99 provides that advice.

After the release of the previous SAS on fraud, the AICPA sponsored academic research to
determine the effectiveness of that guidance. One of the most significant findings was that auditors
were very good at identifying the presence of fraud risk factors. However, they were not very good at
designing audit tests that responded to those identified risk factors.
The key to designing effective audit tests is to perform an effective synthesis of the identified risks.
The following illustration maps the audit process from risk identification to audit test design.
“Synthesis” is the element that links the two ends of the process.
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Risk
Identification

Risk
Synthesis

Auditor
Response

Eliminate risk synthesis from the process step, and the chain is broken—there is no link to risk
identification.

Risk
Identification

Risk
Synthesis

Auditor
Response

Once that link between risk identification and audit test design is eliminated, it is not surprising that
the design of audit tests does not respond effectively to identified risks.
The example describes the process as one of synthesis, which can be defined as “the assembling of a
complex whole from originally separate parts.” That is what you must do after you identify risks.
Previous auditing standards (and to a lesser degree, the current one) use the term assessment, which
caused some confusion in practice. As auditors, we have ascribed a certain specific meaning to
assessing risk—we typically take this to mean that we should describe it as high, medium, or low.
That is not how the term is meant to be interpreted in SAS No. 99. Auditors are not required to, nor
should they, “assess” fraud risks as high, medium, or low.
Instead, what is intended is for you to synthesize the identified risks as a way to determine where the
entity is most vulnerable to material misstatement due to fraud, the types of frauds that are most
likely, and how those material misstatements are likely to be concealed.
To help you do a more effective job synthesizing identified risks and providing that necessary link,
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.35–.42) provides the following guidance.
Build a Fraud Triangle

Remember the three elements of the fraud triangle: incentive/pressure, opportunity, and attitude/rationalization. The risk of material misstatement due to fraud generally is greater when all three are present.
Example 2-3 Sound Machine, Continued
An earlier example described a fraud at Sound Machine, a retailer of high-end consumer
electronics. The owner-manager of the business always had the ability to override controls, which
gave him an opportunity to commit fraud. Within his personality were the seeds of rationalization.
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Without an incentive, no fraud was committed. However, once the company overextended itself
and was in danger of defaulting on its debt, the owner felt a great deal of pressure—the missing
third element of the triangle—and he committed fraud.

As an auditor, use your intuition, judgment, and experience to look for patterns in the identified fraud
risks.
Using the fraud triangle framework is not foolproof. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.35–.36) reminds you
that that the failure to observe one of the elements of the triangle does not guarantee that no fraud has
been committed. For example, it usually is difficult to identify attitude/rationalization. For that
reason, you should not conclude that the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is absent simply
because you did not observe the necessary attitude/rationalization. Stated another way, it has been
observed that auditors have a tendency to identify incentive and opportunity but mistakenly decided
not to pursue the issue because they have not observed an attitude/rationalization that is conducive to
fraud.
You also should be aware that some elements of the triangle may weigh more heavily than others in
certain situations. Nevertheless, the fraud triangle framework can be helpful in synthesizing
identified fraud risks.
Pervasive or Specific

It also helps to consider whether the identified risks are related to either:
• Specific accounts or transactions, or
• To the financial statements as a whole.
Example 2-4
Suppose that a company manufactures semiconductors, which are small, easy to transport, and
extremely valuable. For these reasons, the company is vulnerable to theft. Now suppose that
recent layoffs and budget cuts at the company have left the employees extremely angry
(rationalization), and that you discover that the company does not have very effective physical
control over its inventory (opportunity). Under these circumstances, finished goods inventory
would be the specific account that is the most directly related to the identified fraud risks.

Once you can link the identified risks to a specific account (or the financial statements taken as a
whole) you can then design and perform more effective procedures. In Example 2-4, the auditors
would want to modify the nature, timing, or extent of procedures relating to inventory shrinkage.
Chapter 7 provides detailed examples of audit procedures you may consider that address risks of
fraud for specific accounts or groups of transactions.
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Accounting Estimates and Soft Information

SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.39) reminds us that estimates and other “soft” accounting information may
present risks of material misstatement due to fraud because of the high degree of management
judgment involved. Chapter 6 provides guidance on auditing techniques for accounting estimates.
Attributes of Risk

When assessing information about potential fraud risks, consider:
• The type of risk that may exist, that is, whether it involves fraudulent financial reporting or
misappropriation of assets.
• The significance of the risk, that is, whether it is of a magnitude that could lead to a possible
material misstatement of the financial statements.
• The likelihood of the risk, that is, the likelihood that it will result in a material misstatement in
the financial statements.
• The pervasiveness of the risk, that is, whether the potential risk is pervasive to the financial
statements as a whole or specifically related to a particular assertion, account, or class of
transactions.
Required Risk Assessments
When synthesizing risks, SAS No. 99 has two additional requirements. You should:
• Presume that improper revenue recognition is a fraud risk. In its report, the Public Oversight
Board observed that the vast majority of fraudulent financial reporting schemes involved
improper revenue recognition. This observation was consistent with the findings of other
groups and individuals who examined fraudulent financial reporting. Because of these
problems, SAS No. 99 states that you should ordinarily presume that there is a risk of material
misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition. The key threshold is “should
ordinarily,” which stops just short of requiring the presumption on every audit engagement. If
you do not identify improper revenue recognition as a risk of material misstatement due to
fraud, you should document the reasons supporting this conclusion (see SAS No. 99 [AU sec.
316.83]).
• Identify the risks of management override of controls. Those who have studied fraudulent
financial reporting have noted that the risk of management override is unpredictable, and therefore
it is difficult for auditors to design procedures to identify and assess it. Therefore, the risk of
management override of controls should be considered a fraud risk on every audit. For that reason,
auditors should perform tests in response to the risk of management override in every audit.

42

Chapter 2: Considering Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit

Evaluating the Entity’s Programs and Controls
Once you have identified specific risks of fraud, you should consider the entity’s programs and
controls that mitigate or exacerbate identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud.
A document titled “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent,
Deter, and Detect Fraud” is included as an exhibit to SAS No. 99. This document, which was issued
by the AICPA and other distinguished organizations, discusses and provides examples of programs
and controls that management can implement to help deter, prevent, and detect fraud. The following
is a brief summary of the guidance contained in that document.8
The guidance in the document is based on the presumption that entity management has both the
responsibility and the means to take action to reduce the occurrence of fraud at the entity. To fulfill
this responsibility, management should:
• Create and maintain a culture of honesty and high ethics.
• Evaluate the risks of fraud and implement the processes, procedures, and controls needed to
mitigate the risks and reduce the opportunities for fraud.
• Develop an appropriate oversight process.
In many ways, the guidance offered in “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls” echoes the
concepts and detailed guidance contained in the COSO report. The primary difference is that the
antifraud document reminds management that it must be aware of and design the entity’s internal
control to specifically address material misstatements caused by fraud and not limit its efforts to the
detection and prevention of unintentional errors.
A Culture of Honesty and Ethics

A culture of honesty and ethics includes the following elements:
• A value system founded on integrity
• A positive workplace environment in which employees have positive feelings about the entity
• Human resource policies that minimize the chance of hiring or promoting individuals with low
levels of honesty, especially for positions of trust
• Training─both at the time of hire and on an ongoing basis─about the entity’s values and its
code of conduct
• Confirmation from employees that they understand and have complied with the entity’s code
of conduct and that they are not aware of any violations of the code
• Appropriate investigation and response to incidents of alleged or suspected fraud

8

From How to Comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, by Michael J. Ramos, published by John Wiley & Sons, 2004,
pages 104–105.
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Evaluating Antifraud Processes and Controls

The entity’s risk assessment process should include the consideration of fraud risk. With an aim
toward reducing fraud opportunities, the entity should take steps to:
• Identify and measure fraud risk.
• Mitigate fraud risk by making changes to the entity’s activities and procedures.
• Implement and monitor an appropriate system of internal control.
Developing an Appropriate Oversight Process

The entity’s audit committee or board of directors should take an active role in evaluating
management’s:
• Creation of an appropriate culture
• Identification of fraud risks
• Implementation of antifraud measures
To fulfill the audit committee’s oversight responsibilities, audit committee members should be
financially literate and each committee should have at least one financial expert. Additionally, the
committee should consider establishing an open line of communication with members of
management one or two levels below senior management to assist in identifying fraud at the highest
levels of the organization or investigating any fraudulent activity that might occur.
In addition to the guidance provided by the exhibit to SAS No. 99, consider the following.
The Entity’s Environment and Culture (“Tone at the Top”)
It seems that virtually every organization or individual who has studied the effects of internal control
starts the discussion by describing the importance of establishing a proper “tone at the top.” Culture
and values are a critical element of control because these are the mindset from which all other
controls are applied. Culture drives behavior.
By Way of Analogy…
In traditional Hawaiian culture, there was no private ownership of land. The land belonged to the
gods—as humans, we were just its caretakers. In the middle of the 19th century the Western
concept of private land ownership was introduced, and by-and-large, that system is fully
functional in Hawaii today.
Important vestiges of the traditional culture remain, however. Many state laws exist to ensure
that beaches remain open to the public and that private citizens cannot block access to those
beaches. Hike to a waterfall, and you are likely to see a fellow hiker take a rock from
somewhere deep in the pool, wrap that rock in a ti leaf, and place it in a crevice high up on
the face of the waterfall. That is a sign of respect for the land, a token of appreciation to its
real owner. The official state motto, translated into English, is “The life of the land is
perpetuated in righteousness.”
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And so it goes. The values of the culture drive the behavior of those who are part of it.
Business entities have their own culture and values. Postmortems on famous (or infamous)
frauds inevitably describe a corporate culture that had a direct bearing on the fraud that was
committed. When assessing the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, auditors that fail to
consider an entity’s culture do so at their own peril.

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention compares the environment and
culture of high fraud potential entities with those of lower potential.9
Variable
Management style

High Fraud Potential
• Autocratic

Lower Fraud Potential
• Participative

Management orientation

• Low trust

• High trust

• Power driven

• Achievement-driven

Distribution of authority

• Centralized; reserved by top
management

• Decentralized, dispersed to all
levels, and delegated

Planning

• Centralized

• Decentralized

• Short range

• Long range

Performance

• Measured quantitatively and
on a short-term basis

• Measured both quantitatively
and qualitatively and on a
long-term basis

Business focus

• Profit

• Customer

Management strategy

• Management by crisis

• Management by objectives

Reporting

• Reporting by routine

• Reporting by exception

Policies and rules

• Rigid and inflexible; strongly
policed

• Reasonable; fairly enforced

Primary management
concern

• Capital assets

• Human, then capital and
technological assets

Reward system

• Punitive

• Generous

• Penurious

• Reinforcing

• Politically administered

• Fairly administered

(continued)
9

From The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention, 15.
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Variable
Feedback on performance

High Fraud Potential
• Critical

Lower Fraud Potential
• Positive

• Negative

• Stroking

Interaction mode

• Issues and personal
differences are skirted or
repressed

• Issues and personal differences
are confronted and addressed
openly

Payoffs for good behavior

• Mainly monetary

• Recognition, promotion, added
responsibility, choice
assignments, plus money

Business ethics

• Ambivalent; rides the tide

• Clearly defined and regularly
followed

Internal relationships

• Highly competitive; hostile

• Friendly, competitive, and
supportive

Values and beliefs

• Economic, political, and selfcentered

• Social, spiritual, and groupcentered

Success formula

• Works harder

• Works smarter

Human resources

• Burnout
• High turnover

• Not enough promotional
opportunities for all the talent

• Grievances

• Low turnover
• Job satisfaction
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Company loyalty

• Low

• High

Major financial concern

• Cash flow shortage

• Opportunities for new
investment

Growth pattern

• Sporadic

• Consistent

Relationship with competitors • Hostile

• Professional

Innovativeness

• Copy cat; reactive

• Leader, proactive

CEO characteristics

• Swinger, braggart, selfinterested, driver, insensitive
to people, feared, insecure,
gambler, impulsive, tightfisted, numbers- and thingsoriented, profit-seeker, vain,
bombastic, highly emotional,

• Professional, decisive, fastpaced, respected by peers,
secure risk-taker, thoughtful,
generous with personal time
and money, people-, productsand market-oriented, builderhelper, self-confident,
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Variable

Management structure,
systems and controls

High Fraud Potential
partial, and pretentious

Lower Fraud Potential
composed, calm, deliberate,
even disposition, and fair;
know who they are, what they
are, and where they are going.

• Bureaucratic

• Collegial

• Regimented

• Systematic

• Inflexible

• Open to change

• Imposed controls

• Self-controlled

• Many-tiered structure; vertical • Flat structure; horizontal
• Everything documented; a
rule for everything

• Documentation is adequate but
not burdensome; some
discretion is afforded

Internal communication

• Formal, written, stiff,
pompous, and ambiguous

• Informal, oral, clear, friendly,
open, and candid

Peer relationships

• Hostile, aggressive, and
rivalrous

• Cooperative, friendly, and
trusting

Most Common Control Failures at Small Business Entities
The “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter, and Detect
Fraud” exhibit to SAS No. 99 discusses and provides examples of programs and controls, some of
which apply only to larger entities. Here are some examples of weak control environments in small
10
business entities that can directly affect the entity’s vulnerability to fraud.
• Poor physical access controls. Most business owners acknowledge the need to control
physical access to assets and information. In practice, these controls may be lax. Many frauds
require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset being
misappropriated or the related asset records (or computer terminal to access those records)
used to conceal the fraud.
• Lack of formal job descriptions. As auditors, we recognize the need to have a proper
segregation of duties. We also acknowledge that entity personnel perform important control
functions. Yet, when it comes to formally segregating duties or describing how control
functions are to be performed, the typical small business owner is loathe to perform this task.
It is not the written job description, per se, that is important, but rather the disciplined process
10

Adapted from The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention.
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that requires the owner to decide who should perform what and how that can reduce the
entity’s vulnerability to fraud.
• Proper supervision. The approval and review of key information processing procedures are
important controls that may be overlooked by small entities that believe they lack necessary
resources.
Additional Resources
Chapter 7 describes specific fraud prevention control procedures for individual accounts or classes of
transactions.

Responding to the Assessed Risks
You will respond to the risks of material misstatement due to fraud in the following three ways:
• A response that has an overall effect on how the audit is conducted
• A response to identified risks involving the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures
• A response to address management override of controls
Overall Responses
Judgments about the risks of material misstatement due to fraud have an overall effect on how the
audit is conducted in the following ways.
Assignment of personnel and supervision. SAS No. 99 provides relatively straightforward guidance
on this matter that is easy to understand and implement. Essentially, the guidance says that the
greater the risk of material misstatement, the more experienced personnel and the greater amount of
supervision required on the engagement.
Practice Pointer. SAS No. 99 acknowledges that engagement teams may want to consider
whether the judgments about fraud risks might require the addition of a fraud specialist to the
engagement team. Firms should consider setting formal policies or informal guidelines on
circumstances that require or encourage teams to add fraud specialists to the audit team.

Accounting principles. The standard audit report expresses an opinion about whether the financial
statements “present fairly … in accordance with GAAP.” Some auditors and others involved in the
financial reporting process have questioned whether the “present fairly” criterion has become
subordinate to “in accordance with GAAP.” That is, the issue may be whether some entities make a
case that “since GAAP does explicitly not prohibit a particular accounting, it must be acceptable,”
without considering whether the accounting will result in a “fair presentation” of the financial
position, results of operations, and cash flows.
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Thus, the choice of accounting principles, in addition to their application, becomes crucial for auditors to
consider. SAS No. 99 requires you to consider management’s selection and application of significant
accounting principles as part of your overall response to the risks of material misstatement.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.50) focuses your attention on accounting principles related to subjective
measurements and complex transactions. In addition, given the presumption of revenue recognition
as a fraud risk, you should consider the entity’s revenue recognition policies and whether these
policies are consistent with key revenue recognition concepts, such as:
• Completion of the earnings process
• Realizability of the sales proceeds
• Delivery of the product or service
Chapter 5 provides additional suggestions for performing audit procedures related to revenue
recognition.
To help you assess management’s selection and application of accounting policies, consider asking
the following questions.11
Reserves and Estimates
• How are reserves and estimates determined and subsequently monitored?
• How are previously established reserves disposed of when the events that caused their creation
are no longer applicable?
• In those cases where an estimate involves a range of possible outcomes, where does the
estimate reported in the financial statements fall within that range?
• What criteria does management use to determine whether there is a continuing need to
maintain a reserve when the matters to which the reserve relates (for example, litigation or
environmental remediation) are “slow moving”?
• In general, how are changes in the balances of reserves perceived by financial statement
users?
• Are the company’s disclosures of its reserves adequate, particularly the entity’s exposure to losses
in excess of recorded amounts?

These questions were adapted from PITF Practice Alert 00-2, Quality of Accounting PrinciplesGuidance for
Discussions with Audit Committees. PITF Practice Alerts are prepared by the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA. The
alerts are intended to provide auditors with information that may help them improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
their audits. The alerts are based on the experiences of the individual members of the SEC Professional Issues Task
Force and matters arising from litigation and peer reviews. A complete set of PITF alerts can be downloaded from the
AICPA Web site at www.aicpa.org. They are also available electronically as part of the AICPA’s reSOURCE collection
of literature (either online or on CD) and in print format as part of the Technical Practice Aids.
11
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Asset and Liability Carrying Values
• How does management determine useful lives and salvage values for its assets?
• How does management determine discount rates used to make present value calculations?
• How does management determine carrying values of other assets and liabilities?
Evolving Issues and Unusual Transactions
• What was management’s process for evaluating and selecting accounting policies for:
― Emerging and rapidly evolving accounting issues
― Special structures, including:
― Off-balance-sheet financing
― Research and development activities
― Special purpose financing structures that affect ownership rights (such as leveraged
recapitalization, joint ventures, and preferred stock of subsidiaries)
― Unusual transactions and arrangements, including:
― Bill-and-hold transactions
― Self-insurance
― Multi-element arrangements contemporaneously negotiated
― Sales of assets or licensing arrangements with continuing involvement of the enterprise
Predictability of auditing procedures. Successful perpetrators of fraud are familiar with the audit
procedures external auditors normally perform on their engagements. With this knowledge, they can
then conceal the fraud in accounts where auditors are least likely to look. For that reason, SAS No.
99 requires you to incorporate an element of unpredictability into your procedures from year to year.
This is important in auditing because these tests are not performed based on risk or materiality.
Here are some tips for implementing this requirement:
• Consider tests aimed at the misappropriation of assets, because procedures to detect
immaterial defalcations (which may be material to the owner-manager) usually are not
performed. Explain to the owner-manager that you have expanded your test work (make sure
the owner-manager also understands the limits of your test work), and how the performance of
additional procedures benefit him or her directly.
• Use the brainstorming session to identify transactions or accounts that you normally would not
examine and that lend themselves to concealing a fraud.
• Use Chapter 7 of this book to identify common frauds and specific procedures that address
these frauds.
• If you think of too many tests you want to perform, set a two- or three-year implementation
plan and do a different set of procedures each year.
• Use computer assisted audit techniques (as described in Chapter 8) to help you perform these tests
more effectively.
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Procedures to Address Specific Accounts or Classes of Transactions
SAS No. 99 provides general guidance on modifying the nature, timing, and extent of audit
procedures you will perform to address identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud. In
addition to the guidance contained in the standard, you also should consider the suggestions
provided in Chapter 7, which describes common frauds by audit area and example audit
procedures that address them.
Three other audit areas merit special mention in SAS No. 99: revenue recognition, inventory
quantities, and accounting estimates. Besides the guidance contained in the standard, you also may
want to consider the suggestions included in this Practice Aid.
• Revenue recognition, please refer to Chapter 5.
• Inventory quantities, please see Appendix B to this Practice Aid for a copy of PITF Practice
Alert 94-2, Auditing Inventories—Physical Observations.
• Accounting estimates, please refer to Chapter 6.
Addressing the Risk of Management Override
SAS No. 99 requires you to perform certain procedures to address the risk of management override
of internal controls. Those procedures are explained below.
Examining Journal Entries and Other Adjustments
Management can perpetrate financial reporting frauds by overriding established control
procedures and recording unauthorized or inappropriate journal entries or other postclosing
adjustments (for example, consolidating adjustments or reclassifications). For example, SEC
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1287 (Guilford Mills, Inc.) describes a
situation in which the controller entered false journal entries debiting accounts payable and
crediting purchases (cost of sales). The effect was to understate payables and significantly
increase earnings.
To address situations such as these, SAS No. 99 requires you to test the appropriateness of
journal entries recorded in the general ledger and other adjustments.
Understanding the financial reporting process. To effectively implement this required
procedure, you will need to obtain a good understanding of the entity’s financial reporting
process. This understanding is important because it allows you to know what should happen in a
“normal” situation so you can then identify anomalies. The following table describes example
inquiries you may consider making of entity personnel. Adjacent to each inquiry is a description
of how the information learned from the answer can help you identify and select journal entries
and other adjustments for testing.
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Example Inquiry
What are the sources of significant debits and
credits to a given account? For example, is the
account posted automatically as a normal part of
transaction processing, or is it posted directly
through a journal entry?

Identify and Select Items for Testing
Look for account activity being posted from
unexpected sources (for example, a journal
entry where none is expected).

Who has the ability (for example, logical or
physical access to the necessary records) to make
journal entries or other adjustments?

Look for the information to be an
“opportunity” within the fraud triangle
framework. Look for incentives and the ability
to rationalize related to the same individuals.

Who is responsible for initiating journal entries or
other adjustments?

Look for transactions initiated from
unexpected sources.

What approvals are required for journal entries or
other adjustments?

Look for unapproved transactions.

Your understanding of the financial reporting process also should include knowledge of how
journal entries are initiated, recorded, and processed (for example, directly online or in batch
mode from physical documents), the design of any controls over journal entries and other
adjustments, and whether those controls have been placed in operation. This information will
help you design suitable tests.12
Brainstorming

As part of your brainstorming session, you should consider discussing how journal entries may be
used to perpetrate or conceal a fraud. For example, you might discuss:
• The various ways in which management could originate and post inappropriate journal entries
or other adjustments.
• The kinds of unusual combinations of debits and credits that the engagement team should be
looking for.
• The types of journal entries or other adjustments that could result in a material misstatement that
would not likely be detected by standard audit procedures.

12

Note that SAS No. 55, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), as amended, already requires you to obtain an understanding of the entity’s internal
control, including journal entries. The requirements of SAS No. 99 place an even greater premium on auditors
understanding their clients’ financial reporting process.
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Inquiries

As part of your inquiries of management and others about fraud-related matters, you should consider
asking accounting, data entry, and IT personnel about whether they have observed any unusual
accounting entries during the audit period.
Identifying journal entries and other adjustments for testing. Your assessment of the risk of material
misstatement due to fraud, together with your assessment of the effectiveness of controls, will
determine the extent of your tests. SAS No. 99 requires that you inspect the general ledger to identify
journal entries to be tested and examine the support for those items. This procedure is required even
if you determine that controls over journal entries and other adjustments are operating effectively.
When testing journal entries and other adjustments, it is vital that you identify and consider the entire
population of journal entries and other adjustments. Be aware that some entries and adjustments may
be made outside of the general ledger. For that reason, you will need to obtain a complete
understanding of how the various general ledgers are combined and the accounts are grouped to
create the financial statements.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.61) provides the following guidance on what to consider when selecting
items for testing.
Characteristics of Fraudulent Entries or Adjustments
• Entries made to unrelated, unusual, or seldom-used accounts
• Entries made by individuals who typically do not make journal entries
• Entries recorded at the end of the period or as postclosing entries that have little or no
explanation or description
• Entries made either before or during the preparation of the financial statements that do not
have account numbers
• Entries that contain round numbers or a consistent ending number
The Nature and Complexity of the Accounts
•
•
•
•
•
•

Accounts that contain transactions that are complex or unusual in nature
Accounts that contain significant estimates and period-end adjustments
Accounts that have been prone to errors in the past
Accounts that have not been reconciled on a timely basis or contain unreconciled differences
Accounts that contain intercompany transactions
Accounts that are otherwise associated with an identified risk of material misstatement due to
fraud

In addition to these items, you should consider journal entries and other adjustments that are
processed outside the normal course of business (“nonstandard” entries and adjustments).
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Considering CAATs

Computer assisted audit techniques may be required to identify entries that only exist electronically.13
CAATs may be necessary to identify the complete population of journal entries and other
adjustments to be tested. In addition, CAATs may be used to detect:
• Entries made at unusual times of day, for example outside regular business hours
• Entries made by unusual users, blank or nonsensical user names, senior management, or the IT
staff
• Electronic entries that, through management manipulation, are not documented in the general
ledger
• One-time or otherwise nonrecurring transactions
Testing Journal Entries and Other Adjustments

Once you identify journal entries and other adjustments for testing, you should examine documentary
evidence indicating that they were properly supported and approved by management. Because
fraudulent journal entries often are made at the end of a reporting period, your testing ordinarily
should focus on the journal entries made at that time. However, you should not completely ignore
journal entries made throughout the period.
PITF Practice Alert No. 03-2, Journal Entries and Other Adjustments, provides additional
guidance on the procedures you should consider to review journal entries and other adjustments
for signs of management override of internal control. That Practice Alert is included as Appendix
C to this book.
Retrospective Review of Accounting Estimates

Accounting estimates are particularly vulnerable to manipulation because they depend so heavily
on judgment and the quality of the underlying assumptions. For that reason, SAS No. 99 requires
you to perform a retrospective review of prior-year accounting estimates for the purpose of
identifying bias in management’s assumptions underlying the estimates.
This review is not intended to call into question your professional judgments made in prior years that
were based on information available at the time. Rather, this retrospective review should be
considered within the context of its implications for the current year audit, and the facts and
circumstances that currently exist. Although this procedure is included in that section of the standard
used to describe responses to management override, it might also have been included as part of the
information-gathering phase of the engagement. That is, the information you gain from a
retrospective review of management’s assumptions underlying key estimates may be used to identify
risks of material misstatement due to fraud.

13

You may refer to Chapter 8 for additional guidance on computer assisted audit techniques.
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Example 2-5
XYZ company designs and manufactures men’s casual sportswear. One of the entity’s significant
estimates is the amount of sales returns. In FY 20X1, the estimated sales returns were $100,000,
which seemed reasonable given the information available at the time. In fact, actual sales returns
related to 20X1 sales were $175,000.
Further, the total sales for 20X1 were $8 million—$1 million of which were recorded in the last
month of the fiscal year (holiday shopping season), which presumably would be the items most
likely to be returned after the balance sheet date.
During 20X2, the company reported an increase to $9 million in sales, $1.5 million of which
were recorded in the last month. For FY 20X2 the entity has estimated sales returns to be
$60,000 and has provided the auditors with documentation supporting the assumptions
underlying the estimate.
Given the relationship between estimated sales returns and actual sales for the past two years,
together with the actual sales returns for the prior year, the auditor should question whether
management’s assumptions are overly biased. Additionally, the auditor will want to perform additional
tests to corroborate management’s estimate and the key assumptions used to form that estimate.
Business Rationale for Significant Unusual Transactions

Many financial reporting frauds have been perpetrated or concealed by using unusual transactions that are
outside the normal course of business. For that reason, SAS No. 99 requires auditors to understand the
business rationale for these types of transactions. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.67) provides an excellent list
of items you should consider when understanding the business rationale for unusual transactions.
As indicated in SAS No. 99, entities intent on fraudulently reporting financial results may use related
party transactions to perpetrate or conceal the fraud. The most common related party transactions
used for these purposes include the following.
• Property sales and exchanges
— Sales of property (including real estate) at prices that differ significantly from their
appraised value
— Exchanges of property for similar property in a nonmonetary transaction
— Sales without substance, for example when the seller provides funds to the buyer, which
allow the buyer to fully remit the sales price
— Sales with a commitment to repurchase that, if known, would preclude recognition of all or
part of the revenue
— Sales at below-market rates to an unnecessary “middle man” related party, who in turn
sells to the ultimate customer at a higher price, with the related party (and ultimately its
principals) retaining the difference
— Purchase of assets at prices in excess of fair market value
— Sales arrangements in which the seller has a concurrent obligation to the buyer to purchase
goods or services or provide other benefits
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― Sale of land with arranged financing
― Sales of marketable securities at a significant discount from quoted market prices
• Lending activity
― Borrowing or lending on an interest-free basis or at a rate of interest significantly above or
below market rates
― Making loans with no scheduled terms for when or how the funds will be repaid
― Loans to parties that do not possess the ability to repay
― Advancing company funds that are subsequently transferred to a debtor and used to repay
what would otherwise be an uncollectible loan or receivable
― Loans advanced ostensibly for a valid business purpose and later written off as uncollectible
• Purchase of services
― Services or goods at little or no cost to the entity
― Payments for services never rendered or rendered at inflated prices
― Engaging in other transactions (for example, leases) at more or less than market value
― Agreements under which one party pays expenses on behalf of another party
As indicated in SAS No. 99, these types of related party transactions, per se, do not constitute
fraudulent financial reporting. However, if these transactions were entered into without proper
approval, or if entity management did not identify these transactions for you, there may be
indications that fraudulent financial reporting is being concealed.
Practice Pointer. The auditing standard requires you to gain an understanding of the business
rationale for significant transactions that are “outside the normal course of business for the
entity or otherwise unusual.” As a prerequisite for performing this required procedure, the
engagement team’s understanding of the entity and its environment must be sufficient to allow
it to recognize an unusual transaction. When implementing SAS No. 99, firms may wish to
consider whether current audit planning procedures are sufficient for engagement team
personnel to obtain this depth of understanding.

Evaluating Audit Evidence
Earlier in this chapter we described the process of fraud as one that involves “commitmentconversion-concealment.” As auditors, we are most likely to observe attempts at concealment or the
lack of concealment. Signs of concealment (or lack thereof) include:
• Discrepancies in the accounting records. For example, transactions that lack supporting
documentation may indicate that a perpetrator failed to adequately conceal a fraud.
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• Conflicting or missing evidential matter. For example, missing documents may be the attempt
to conceal a fraud by destroying incriminating documents.
• Problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and client. For example, unusual delays
by the entity in providing requested information may indicate that the information never existed in
the first place because the purported transaction did not occur.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.68) provides comprehensive examples of conditions you may identify during
fieldwork that may be indicative of fraud. This paragraph reiterates that the assessment of the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud is an iterative process that continues throughout the engagement. In a
similar vein, SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.69–.73) reminds auditors that analytical procedures conducted as
substantive procedures or as part of the overall review stage of the audit may also uncover previously
unrecognized risks of material misstatement due to fraud. The standard provides several examples of
unusual or unexpected analytical relationships that may indicate a risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
Practice Pointer. Brainstorming sessions conducted near the end of the audit can help the audit
team evaluate the magnitude and collective significance of conditions that may be indicative of fraud
that are identified during the audit. Conditions that may seem inconsequential in isolation may take
on added significance when considered within the context of all other observed conditions.

Misstatements That May Be the Result of Fraud
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.75–.78) describes how you should respond when you determine that a
misstatement is, or may be, the result of fraud. Note the key threshold is “is or may be.” You do not
have to know for certain the misstatement is caused by fraud or even be able to say the misstatement
is probably the result of fraud. This threshold is considerably lower than “probable.”
If you believe that a misstatement is or may be the result of fraud, but the effect of the misstatement
is not material to the financial statements, you still are required to evaluate the implications of your
belief, especially those dealing with the organizational person(s) involved. For example, if you
discover that a member of senior management has fraudulently overstated his or her expenses for
reimbursement, you will want to reevaluate the integrity of that individual and the impact that a
nontrustworthy person in that position could have on the financial statements and your engagement.
In those instances where the misstatement is or may be the result of fraud, and the effect is either
material or cannot be determined, you are required to take the following steps.
• Attempt to obtain additional evidential matter.
• Consider the implications for other aspects of the audit.
• Discuss the matter and the approach for further investigation with the client. These discussions
should be conducted at a level that is at least one level above those involved and also should
include senior management and, if applicable, the audit committee.
• If appropriate, suggest the client consult with legal counsel.
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Note that one of the key factors in determining your response is the materiality of the misstatement.
As stated earlier in this chapter, an auditor’s consideration of materiality should consider the
qualitative aspects of the misstatement and should not be limited to quantitative measures.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.78) provides guidance on the auditor’s course of action when the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud is such that he or she is considering withdrawing from the
engagement. The circumstances under which you would withdraw may depend on the implications
about the integrity of management and their cooperation in investigating the circumstances and
taking appropriate action. It is impossible to definitively describe when withdrawal is appropriate,
but in any event you probably will want to consult with your legal counsel.

Communication About Fraud Matters
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.79) states that “whenever you have determined that there is evidence that a
fraud may exist, that matter should be brought to the attention of an appropriate level of
management. This is appropriate even if the matter might be considered inconsequential, such as a
minor defalcation by an employee at a low level in the entity’s organization.”
Thus, the threshold for communication is “evidence that a fraud may exist.” The mere presence of a
fraud risk factor or some other condition that has been observed when fraud is present generally does
not meet this threshold.
Example 2-6
Assume that a single employee at a company has the authority to sign checks and also the
responsibility to reconcile the bank account(s). Absent other controls, this lack of segregation of
duties may provide an opportunity for that employee to commit fraud. However, by itself, the
condition is not required to be communicated by the auditor to the entity, except within the
context of reportable conditions and internal control weaknesses.
However, suppose that there is a delay of several weeks before the employee is able to provide the
auditor with a year-end bank reconciliation. When testing the reconciliation, the auditor discovers that
certain canceled checks are missing. The employee is unable to offer an explanation.
At this point, the auditor has evidence that a fraud may exist—namely, that the employee has stolen cash and
attempted to conceal it by destroying the canceled check. Even though the theft may be immaterial to the
financial statements, you should still bring the matter to the attention of management.

In addition, you also should consider whether the absence of or deficiencies in programs and controls
to mitigate specific risks of fraud or to otherwise help prevent, deter, and detect fraud represent
reportable conditions that should be communicated to senior management and the audit committee.
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Documentation
The documentation requirements of SAS No. 99 significantly extend the requirements of the
previous standard, requiring documentation supporting compliance with substantially all the major
requirements of the standard. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.83) provides a complete, easy-to-understand
list of documentation requirements.
According to the standard, you are required to document the following.
• The discussion among engagement personnel in planning the audit regarding the susceptibility of the
entity’s financial statements to material misstatement due to fraud, including how and when the
discussion occurred, the audit team members who participated, and the subject matter discussed.
• The procedures performed to obtain information necessary to identify and assess the risks of
material misstatement due to fraud.
• Specific risks of material misstatement due to fraud that were identified and a description of
the auditor’s response to those risks.
• If the auditor has not identified, in a particular circumstance, improper revenue recognition as
a risk of material misstatement due to fraud, the reasons supporting the auditor’s conclusion.
• The results of the procedures performed to further address the risk of management override of
controls.
• Other conditions and analytical relationships that caused the auditor to believe that additional
auditing procedures or other responses were required and any further responses the auditor
concluded were appropriate, to address such risks or other conditions.
• The nature of the communications about fraud made to management, the audit committee, and
others.
Practice Pointer. It is not necessary to document the brainstorming session in great detail. The
requirement to document “the subject matter discussed” has been interpreted in practice to
mean a listing and brief description of the topics discussed, not an exhaustive recap of all that
was said during the discussion.
Practice Pointer. For your review of significant unusual transactions, consider documenting
the following:
•
•
•
•
•

The nature of the transaction
The counterparty(ies) to the transaction
How the transaction was accounted for, presented, and disclosed in the financial statements
The process followed by the entity to approve the transaction and its accounting treatment
Management’s stated business rationale for the transaction
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PART 2
DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), touches on a great many elements of the audit
process. These six chapters explore some of those areas in more detail, providing extended
implementation guidance on professional skepticism, inquiries of entity personnel, and revenue
recognition. Chapter 7 provides detailed examples of common frauds, organized by financial
statement account or transaction type, together with audit procedures and control procedures that
directly address the risk.
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Professional skepticism is one of the cornerstones of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 316). The Statement provides as much guidance as a professional auditing standard possibly can
on a topic that essentially is an exploration of human psychology. The standard does a thorough job
of highlighting the importance of professional skepticism, defining it, and pointing out those areas of
the engagement where a questioning mind is particularly apt.
What exactly is “a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence?” If we can define it,
then how do we instill this mindset in our staff? The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issue of
professional skepticism in more depth as a way to implement the spirit of what SAS No. 99 requires.

The Attitude Found It
By Way of Analogy…
In his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert Pirsig tells a story that many of
us can relate to. He was having problems with his motorcycle and so he took it to a mechanic.
In a series of blunders, the mechanic actually made the situation worse, each time telling Pirsig
that the motorcycle was fixed. After taking his bike into the shop three times, Pirsig got fed up
and got his bike back, even though it was barely running. “Just don’t touch anything else,” he
told them.
He knew nothing about motorcycle maintenance but pulled off the engine cover and poked
around to see what he could find. Lo and behold, he soon discovered that a small pin had been
sheared and was preventing oil from reaching the engine at high speeds. His “crackerjack”
mechanic failed to spot this problem on three tries, and that was why the mechanic was unable
to fix the problem.
The question that bothered Pirsig was, Why? Why did a so-called expert miss something so
obvious, but a novice catch it? He writes:
And it occurred to me there is no manual that deals with the real business of motorcycle
maintenance, the most important aspect of all. Caring about what you are doing is considered
either unimportant or taken for granted.…[Emphasis in original]
When you want to hurry something, that means you no longer care about it and want to get on
to other things. I just want to get at [this story] slowly, but carefully and thoroughly, with the
same attitude I remember was present just before I found that sheared pin. It was the attitude
that found it, nothing else. [Emphasis added]

Pirsig’s conclusion about his motorcycle is an apt reminder for auditors as it relates to the
detection of material misstatements due to fraud. The attitude found it.
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SAS No. 99 embraces the idea that an auditor’s attitude can find misstatements, that the mindset one
brings to the performance of a task can improve the effectiveness of the task. Some would argue that
an appropriate mindset can even make up for a poorly designed procedure. Conversely, it is difficult
for even the best procedure to maintain its effectiveness if the person performing it does not really
care about how it is performed.

Attitude Is a Filter
By Way of Analogy…
You are snow skiing on a cloudless day. The white, crystalline snow dazzles in the sunlight.
Unfortunately, you have lost your sunglasses.
As you start down the mountain, the fine details of the terrain blend and merge beneath the
glare. You squint, trying to anticipate the bumps and imperfections in the snow. But you are
moving too fast, the sun is too bright, and you simply cannot see very well. You ski poorly.
Imagine the exact same day, only this time you have your sunglasses. They are polarized to
filter out the glare. You put them on, and all the details of the trail now become apparent. As
you head down the mountain you are much better prepared to respond; you ski better because
now you can see.
Professional skepticism is like a filter. The mindset we bring to an engagement is a filter
through which we view audit evidence and other information we gather during the audit. Like a
pair of tinted ski goggles, the skeptical mind allows us to “see” what’s before us and react
accordingly.

Professional literature requires us to have a neutral position, neither trust nor distrust of an entity’s
management. This neutral mindset is described in the following diagram.

Complete

Complete

distrust

trust

Neutrality

Most auditors tend to rely too much on what management tells them. This was the conclusion of the
Public Oversight Board’s report, which stated:
The Panel’s findings suggest that auditors do not always pursue sufficiently conditions discovered
during an audit or corroborate adequately management representations made to them.

In other words, we have weighed in on the right-hand side of the diagram and lost our balanced
position. As a practical matter, this is understandable because most firms have thorough client
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acceptance and continuance procedures to screen out dishonest clients. Nevertheless, the standard
reminds us that we should not assume management is always honest.
Current
Complete

mindset

distrust
Neutrality

Complete
trust

What is clear is that the mindset of the auditors must shift left toward the middle of the spectrum, to
bring us back to a position of neutrality.

Lessons From Psychology
The ultimate goal of adding a discussion of professional skepticism to SAS No. 99 is to change
auditor behavior. But how do we change an individual’s attitude? We may describe someone’s
attitude as cheerful, surly, helpful, abrupt, and self-centered. How do we change that?
Self-awareness is an important early step in modifying any behavior—especially a behavior that is
done subconsciously. In that context, the objective of these next few pages is relatively simple—to
increase your awareness of how the mind processes information in the belief that self-awareness can
ultimately lead to a change in attitude.
In examining the role of professional skepticism on an audit, several questions come to mind,
including:
• Auditors reach a conclusion based on information they receive during the engagement—
information that is filtered through a particular mindset. How does that mindset affect our
conclusions? In short, how do auditors “know” what they think they know?
• What assumptions or biases are embedded in an auditor’s attitudes toward his or her client?
• How can these assumptions or biases be overcome or set aside so we may assume a more
neutral position?
To begin exploring the answers to these questions, we need to look to the field of cognitive
psychology to gain a basic understanding of how the mind works to process information and reach
conclusions about the world we live in.
Assumptions Allow Us to Self-Select What We See
In a well-known experiment, a psychologist asked a group of individuals to look at individual playing
cards and describe what they saw. Mixed in with “normal” cards were some “abnormal” cards in
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which the colors of the suits were switched. For example, instead of a red ace of hearts, the deck had
a black ace of hearts. What the researchers found was that the observers self-corrected the abnormal
cards. They reported the black ace of hearts as an ace of clubs. What the researchers concluded was
that the observers’ assumptions about a situation (“a black suit is for clubs and spades”) limit their
1
awareness.
This is not to say that assumptions are bad. In fact, they are absolutely essential if we are to function
in the real world. We assume that the floor we are standing on is more or less level, that the ceiling
runs parallel to it, and the walls rise at a 90 degree angle. Can you imagine how difficult it would be
to live in a world where every time we entered a room we challenged that assumption? Assumptions
allow us to conserve effort and to gain a measure of stability in our understanding of the world. The
trade-off is that we often are resistant to new information that conflicts with our assumptions.
Example 3-1
The controller for a company involved in one of the most infamous financial reporting frauds
tells the story of how the auditors almost caught him.
To conceal nonexistent transactions, the controller created fictitious supporting documents. If
the auditors asked for support for one of these transactions, the controller would say that it
must have been misfiled, would return to his office, and would create the needed document.
One time the auditors told the controller that they had been unable to locate a check supporting a
particular transaction. Assuming that the transaction probably had never occurred, the controller
excused himself and went to create the required document. He returned sometime later and
handed the check to the engagement manager. At that moment, the staff accountant entered with
the real check in question—the transaction was valid, and the check truly had been misplaced.
Now the auditor had two checks supposedly in support of the same transaction. In the
controller’s mind, he had been caught red-handed, and as he tells the story, was ready to
confess everything.
Instead of asking the controller to explain how such a thing was possible, however, the auditor
provided his own explanation, describing how it was possible for the system to generate two
different checks for the same item. The auditor’s assumptions about the situation—the client is
honest, the accounting system is faulty—prevented him from seeing the true situation.

It is human nature to screen out much of our surroundings because we do not believe that certain
events occur. If stimulus reaches us that does not fit our assumptions, we may ignore it, just the way
that observers in the card experiment self-corrected the abnormal playing cards. This happens to
auditors. Information reaches us, but if it does not fit with what we “know,” we find a way to make it
fit.
1

This experiment was conducted by Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman and was first published in the Journal of Personality
(1949) in their article “On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm.”
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Where do these assumptions come from? Past history and personal experience play a big role, as do
the culture of the societies or organizations we are part of and our professional training. Once these
assumptions are part of us, we tend to not challenge them. Edward de Bono, author of Lateral
Thinking, maintains, “It is historical continuity that maintains most assumptions—not a repeated
assessment of their validity.”2
We Construct Reality
Many psychologists and philosophers have come to the conclusion that what we know as “reality” is
actually something we construct from the information we receive. What we know is not reality per se
but a personal approximation of reality. In his book The Psychology of Consciousness, the
psychologist Robert Ornstein describes the process this way.
Our biological inheritance determines that we select the sensory personal consciousness from the
mass of information reaching us. This is done by a multilevel process of filtration. From this, we are
ultimately able to construct a stable consciousness in coordination with the filtered input.…
Each of us selects and constructs a personal world in several simultaneous procedures. Sense organs
gather information that the brain can modify and sort. This heavily filtered input is compared with
memory, expectations, body movements, and preparations for motor output until, finally, our
consciousness is constructed as a “best guess” about reality. These “best guesses” are the formations
of our assumptive world; they offer stability at the cost of exclusion.3

For auditors, once we accept that what we “know” about our clients (and their integrity, for example)
is a construct, we also can accept the idea that what we “know” is just one of several possibilities. For
example, we may “know” that our clients are honest, but in reality, there are other dimensions to our
clients that we don’t know. We might not be aware of what sort of personal pressures or incentives
may motivate them to commit fraud or the nature of their personal ethics that may allow them to
rationalize it. As auditors, we should recognize that our perceptions of our clients may be incomplete
or biased.
Once we accept that what we “know” about our clients is a personal construction, we can adopt a
more skeptical mindset by changing the way in which we construct this reality. The point is that
by understanding how we come to know what we think we know, we have the insight necessary
to change.

2
3

From Edward de Bono, Lateral Thinking (New York: HarperTrade, 1990), 91.
Robert Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness (New York: Viking Penguin, 1975), 43 and 44.
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Habituation and Categories
Up until the mid-1950s, an elevated train ran along Third Avenue in New York City. As you might
imagine, late at night, when the street was otherwise quiet, the sound of the train rattling was quite
noisy. After the train was torn down, police began receiving calls late at night from citizens close to
the old train tracks who noted “something strange” occurring. The police later determined that calls
were coming at about the time the old train used to run. What people were reporting as strange was
the absence of a noisy train.
Psychologists have concluded that we human beings quickly adapt to constancies in our world. As
long as the train runs every night at the same time, the noise doesn’t bother us. As soon as that
routine is changed, we “hear” it. This phenomenon is known as habituation, and it explains why, if
we view the same object over and over again, we begin to look at it in the same way each time.
Categories of information are a psychological response we develop to organizing and interpreting
information. Over time, we develop certain “buckets” for interpreting information. For example, as
an auditor, we may create a bucket called “reliable, virtually unassailable audit evidence,” which tells
us that we can accept the evidence at face value and draw a conclusion without further investigation.
Through experience, we come to associate certain items as being a part of a particular category. A
signed confirmation from a third party may fall into our category of reliable audit evidence.
The system of categorization becomes a shortcut for analysis and interpretation. We are presented
with information and perform some quick checks to determine which category to assign it. At that
point we no longer experience the original item itself (the confirmation), but its category. We ascribe
the in-depth characteristics of the category (convincing audit evidence) to the individual item, even
though we only did a quick, superficial test of it (the confirmation was signed) in order to assign it to
our category.
Recap
Ornstein summarizes how the mind works.
Our normal personal consciousness is not a complete, passive registration of the external
environment; rather it is a highly evolved, selective, personal construction constrained primarily for
individual biological survival.…
Let us trace this process: The sensory organs discard most of the input information reaching us. The
brain further limits input by selectively inhibiting sensory activity.…We quickly learn to “habituate”
to the constancies of the world. Further, we sort the input into categories that depend on transitory
needs, language, our past history, our expectations, and our cultural biases. Finally, we must
construct a stable consciousness.4

4

Ornstein, page 69.
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As human beings we solve the problem of information overload by selecting what information we
pay attention to. We adopt shortcuts to process that information more efficiently. All of these
processes are heavily influenced by past experience and cultural expectations. Given that, in the vast
majority of cases, client personnel are honest and that the firm culture emphasizes client service and
audit efficiency, it is little wonder that auditors have drifted away from a position of neutrality.

Implications for Auditors
The preceding brief overview of how the mind processes information has several important
implications for auditors.
• Acknowledge our assumptions. It is human nature to form assumptions and carry biases into a
given situation. The first step toward eliminating these biases and assuming a neutral mindset
is to acknowledge their existence. Label assumptions so they can be easily spotted when they
arise and start to cloud your judgment. For example, a young staff accountant may work
closely with client personnel to understand certain accounting procedures. The client knows
these procedures backward and forward—everything he or she says about the way the system
works proves to be true. Under those conditions, you would expect the staff accountant to
develop an assumption that everything that particular individual said was true—which may
not be the case. By becoming aware of this bias, the staff accountant at least has a chance to
adopt a questioning mind toward the individual. One thing is certain, if the staff accountant is
not aware of the bias, he or she stands very little chance of correcting it.
• Periodically challenge assumptions. Remember that most assumptions persist out of habit, not
because we regularly confirm their validity. Rather than take information and try to determine
which category it belongs to, take that same information and ask whether it confirms or
contradicts assumptions you have about the entity, its owner, or employees.
For example, a duplicate check may not mean that the accounting system is in error because
management has high integrity. It may mean that the system has integrity and management is
falsifying documentation. SAS No. 99 reminds auditors to challenge your assumptions when
evaluating audit evidence. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.68) provides an extensive list of conditions
you might identify during fieldwork that could lead you to challenge assumptions about the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud at the entity. For example, missing documents may not have
been inadvertently lost (assumption). Documents may be “missing” because the transaction
selected by the auditor for testing is fraudulent—the documents never existed.
• Explore alternative categories. As an expedient, we drop things into preassigned categories.
Once an item makes it to a category, we make additional assumptions about patterns that we
know to exist within that category. In Example 4-1, the audit manager put “canceled check”
into the “reliable audit evidence” category. Once categorized, it never left that original
category. Alternative patterns or categories (for example, “multiple checks for the same item”
is a pattern for the “possible fraud” category) can lead us to breakthrough insights.
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• Provocative stimulation can be a catalyst for insight. As de Bono says, “Insight is brought
5
about by alterations in pattern sequence brought about by provocative stimulation.” By
“alterations in patterns” he means the process we have of putting information into preformed
categories for analysis. That is, he agrees with the conclusion reached in the previous bullet
point, but he takes it one step further by stating that “provocative stimulation” can be a
catalyst for considering alternative patterns. How can auditors create “provocative
stimulation?” Enter brainstorming.
The Value of Brainstorming
SAS No. 99 requires an engagement team brainstorming session be conducted for every audit.
Chapter 2 of this publication provides suggestions for implementing that requirement.
The brainstorming session is the perfect venue for addressing auditor assumptions about the client
and for sensitizing the engagement team to alternative realities (for example, that fraud can occur in
every entity). For example, in your brainstorming session you might:
• Ask engagement team members to describe the assumptions they have about the entity, its
owner, management, and employees, and its financial performance.
• Identify conditions that lead the engagement team to believe that management is honest and
has integrity. Set these aside. For the purposes of the brainstorming session, these assumptions
are no longer valid.
• Discuss whether all remaining assumptions continue to be true.
• Discuss common frauds in the entity’s industry as a way to sensitize the team to alternative
ways to organize audit evidence.
Applied Professional Skepticism
The value in adopting a skeptical attitude is that it can lead to additional or more effective audit
procedures. SAS No. 99 requires auditors to apply professional skepticism in gathering and
evaluating audit evidence, which in turn, can lead to changes in your audit. For example, your
skepticism may lead you to:
• Design additional or different auditing procedures to obtain more reliable evidence. Chapter 7
of this publication provides detailed examples of auditing procedures that are designed to
respond to specifically identified risks of material misstatements due to fraud.
• Obtain additional corroboration of management’s explanations or representations concerning
material matters. Examples include:

5

De Bono, page 47.
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―
―
―
―
―

Third-party confirmation
Use of a specialist
Analytical procedures
Examination of documentation from independent sources
Inquiries of others within or outside the entity

Implementation Tips
When asked about his approach to arms control with the Soviets, President Reagan summed up his
philosophy by saying that we must “trust but verify” their compliance. That phrase is a good
summary of how audit teams should approach their engagements—trust the clients, but verify what
they say.
How do we do that? The following table summarizes some of the reasons why we lose our
professional skepticism and what we can do to get it back.
How We Lose Skepticism
Personal relationship. We have a personal
relationship with the client, who has never lied
to us before. To question the client’s integrity
seems like a violation of the friendship.

How We Can Get It Back
Make it clear that investigation and corroboration
is part of your engagement. It is nothing
personal—professional audit standards require
you to gather evidence.

Past history. We rationalize. No one at this
client has tried to commit fraud before, why
should things be different now?

Things change. Management or employees might
have a change in personal circumstances that
provide an incentive for fraud. Changes in
controls may provide opportunities. What
happened in the past is not audit evidence for the
current period.

Lack of experience in detecting fraud. It is rare
that independent auditors experience a fraud at
one of their clients. For this reason, we can “let
our guard down” and fail to see the warning
signs.

Become familiar with the most common frauds
in your client’s industry, how they are concealed,
and the signs that they have occurred. When
brainstorming, think from the “fraudster’s” point
of view. If you wanted to commit and conceal a
fraud, how would you do it?

We only talk to the accountants. Most of our
inquiries are made of the accounting personnel,
who only reinforce our assumptions and
“categories.”

Get outside of the accounting department. Talk to
operational personnel to corroborate
management’s responses to your questions. Get a
different point of view that challenges your
assumptions.
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Note: Chapter 2 of this publication provides an understanding of the requirements of Statement
on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), relating to inquiries of management
relating to fraud. That chapter also offers suggestions for implementing those requirements of the
SAS. This chapter provides additional suggestions for making inquiries of entity personnel about
fraud matters, and these suggestions are intended to supplement what SAS No. 99 requires.

Introduction
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has conducted research on improving
1
the effectiveness of audit inquiry. In its research report, the CICA notes that traditional
evidence-gathering techniques, such as confirmation, observation, or examination of supporting
documents, may not work for “soft” information. That type of information includes an
understanding of an entity’s information systems, the business, and how information can be
manipulated within the system. Because traditional audit procedures are not appropriate for
gathering this kind of information, inquiry is the only way to obtain evidence about these
matters. Thus, it is essential that auditors improve the effectiveness of their inquiry techniques.
The information-gathering phase of SAS No. 99 requires you to gather a great deal of “soft”
information about the entity. The standard significantly expands the audit requirement and
guidance regarding the inquiries of management and others. The purpose of this chapter is to
provide additional suggestions on how you can make those inquiries more effective.
By Way of Analogy…
Suppose that you were assigned to conduct an inventory observation at a client. It is the first time
you have ever done an inventory observation.
Would you “wing it”?
Probably not. Most likely you would do a fair amount of preparation. Among other things, you
would become familiar with the objectives of your assignment and the procedures you would
perform to achieve those objectives. You would prepare an audit program to structure your
procedures to make sure you cover everything you should. The pressure you have to perform is
even greater than normal because there are no “do-overs” in an inventory observation.
1

The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) published the results in Audit Enquiry: Seeking More Reliable
Evidence From Audit Enquiry. This is an excellent source of information for auditors wishing to improve the effectiveness of
their inquiries. This report can be ordered directly from the CICA.
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Inquiry of entity personnel is every bit as “legitimate” an audit procedure as a more traditional
procedure, such as observation. As with an inventory observation, we may have only one chance
to “get it right.”
And yet, most auditors prepare very little for an inquiry, even the most crucial ones that can affect
the entire engagement. They wing it. An inquiry is not a conversation. It is a structured process
designed for a specific purpose.

Your Role as Interviewer
Before performing the interview, you should prepare and understand your role as the interviewer.
• Have a clear objective. Make sure you know what you are looking for. Do you just want
information about the way a process works? For example, how do journal entries and other
adjustments get posted to the general ledger? Or are you asking for thoughts and impressions?
For example, where is the entity most vulnerable to fraud? Have a clear understanding of how
the information you gather will be used. Are you trying to corroborate the representations of
other entity personnel? To design your audit procedures? Clearly defined objectives will help
you probe for additional information after the person you are interviewing has answered the
first question.
• Understand the client’s business. The better you understand the client’s business—such as its
business model, the key operational processes, and how it compares to its peers—the better
the inquiry. An in-depth understanding of the entity leads to more relevant and perceptive
questions, and to a more insightful understanding of the responses.
• Be prepared to listen and guide. As CPAs we are accustomed to giving expert advice. Clients
come to us for answers, and we provide them. We also receive expert advice from others. We
have a question and ask someone for “the answer.” This is the type of professional
conversations we most often engage in—hierarchical, linear, solutions-driven. Inquiries about
fraud tend to be more intuitive. As the interviewer, look to ask questions and step aside. Don’t
interrupt and think that you’ve found the “right answer.” There may not be one. Recognize
that in an interview, a lot of pertinent information is volunteered. Create situations in which
the person being interviewed feels comfortable volunteering information without being cut off
or dismissed.
• Check your assumptions at the door. Chapter 3 of this Practice Aid describes how all of us
bring a set of assumptions to any given situation. Before conducting an interview, review the
assumptions and biases you bring to the situation. This review will accomplish two important
things: (1) you will “deframe” your frame of reference, guarding against a biased
interpretation, and (2) you will convey an unbiased attitude toward the person being
interviewed, which will make him or her more open.
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Starting the Interview
During the introductory phase of the interview, you will want to make sure that the person being
interviewed feels at ease. Establish a nonthreatening tone. Make sure that the two of you are free
from distractions and in a private setting.
Early on in the interview you should state its purpose. For example, “I’m hoping you can help
me understand the procedures you follow to close the books and post journal entries to the
general ledger.” Note that this explanation of purpose includes a description of the subject’s role
in the interview (“I need you to help me understand.…”). Throughout the interview, it is useful
to include the interviewee as part of the process. A general description of the purpose of the
interview is better than a more specific description. Explain that the inquiries you are making are
routine and, if possible, provide an estimate of how long you think the interview will last. Avoid
sensitive questions or questions phrased in a way that may generate a defensive response.

Structuring Questions
After the introductory phase of the audit, you will move into the information-gathering phase of
the interview. The exact circumstances of each interview will vary, which will affect the way you
phrase your questions. In its research, the CICA noted that effective questions, regardless of their
circumstances, share the following characteristics.
• They make sense to the respondent.
• They use vocabulary that is common to both you and the respondent.
• They elicit the information required.
As you move through the information-gathering phase, you will want to move from the broad to
the specific, from trying to elicit information indirectly to more direct questions. SAS No. 99
requires you to ask some rather direct questions of entity personnel regarding their knowledge of
fraud or possible fraud. Asking these direct and sensitive questions right away may not be
effective at gathering the information you need. Instead, work toward the direct questions by
asking broader questions first. Make sure that you provide the proper context for asking the
direct kinds of questions required by SAS No. 99. An example might be:
Auditor:

Part of my job is to identify material misstatements due to fraud and
areas of the company that are vulnerable to fraud. You understand
that, don’t you?

Client:

Yes.

Auditor:

I’m curious about your observations. Where do you think the
company is most vulnerable to someone stealing assets?
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Periodically, the participant will provide an answer that requires follow-up. In those situations, it
is helpful to use the respondent’s words and phrases to ask for additional information:
Client:

I’ve never liked the way we handle those postclosing adjustments.

The auditor may ask several follow-up questions:
Auditor:

Tell me about the adjustments.

Auditor:

How do you handle postclosing adjustments?

Auditor:

What is it you don’t like?

Auditor:

Who likes the way the company handles postclosing adjustments?

In this exchange, note that the auditor has followed the general rule of proceeding from the
broad, nonthreatening, to the specific and possibly sensitive.
In his training course Fraud Examination: Investigation Methods, Joseph Wells offers the
following tips for asking questions during the information-gathering phase of an interview.2
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2

Ask questions in a manner that will develop the facts in a systematic order.
Ask only one question at a time, and frame the question so that only one answer is required.
Ask straightforward and frank questions.
Give the respondent ample time to answer. Do not rush.
Try to help the respondent remember, but do not suggest answers. Be careful not to imply a
particular answer through facial expressions, gestures, methods of asking questions, or types
of questions asked.
Repeat or rephrase questions, if necessary, to get the facts.
Be sure that you understand the answers. If they are not perfectly clear, have the respondent
interpret them at that time instead of saving this for later.
Provide the respondent an opportunity to qualify his or her answers.
Separate facts from inferences.
Have the respondent give comparisons by, for example, percentages, fractions, and
comparisons to last year, to ascertain accuracy.
Get all the facts. Almost every respondent can give you information beyond what was initially
provided.
Some interviewers give the respondent an opportunity to provide a “free narrative” of the
situation at the beginning of the interview. Once the respondent has given this narrative
account, ask questions about every item.

This course is published and available from the AICPA. The questions cited here appear on pages 1 through 7 of the materials.
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Signs of Deception
Fraud experts are trained to spot clues that the person being interviewed is not being truthful.
SAS No. 99 does not anticipate that auditors performing a generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS) audit will be similarly trained in these advanced interrogation skills, but the following
information may be helpful.
Practice Pointer. Early in the interview, try to establish a “baseline” for the interviewee’s
reactions to relatively factual, nonthreatening questions. Later in the interview, when asking
more sensitive questions, be alert for changes from this baseline response.

Nonverbal Clues
The Institute of Internal Auditors conducted studies designed to help internal auditors perform
more effective interviews. Their monograph Conducting Internal Audit Interviews3 concluded
that over 50 percent of a person’s message is communicated nonverbally. Most nonverbal clues
come in clusters. Here are some things—usually in combination with each other—that might
indicate the person you are interviewing is trying to deceive you.
• Barriers. When someone being interviewed feels uncomfortable with a particular line of
questioning, he or she may put up nonverbal barriers to try to keep the interviewer at a
comfortable distance. Barriers such as the following may indicate that the person being
interviewed would rather avoid discussing the topic.
― Blocking their mouth, for example with their hands, pens, or pencils, or chewing on hair or
corners of papers or folders.
― Crossing their arms and legs. The higher the arms are crossed, the greater the barrier.
― Making distracting noises, such as finger tapping or drumming.
― Leaning away from the interviewer, usually toward the door or a window, in an effort to
create spatial distance.
• Signs of stress. In most people, lying will produce stress, which can manifest itself physically.
Here are some nonverbal signs of stress.
― Neck and face turning red and blotchy
― Yawning outside of drowsiness or boredom, particularly among younger individuals.
― Changes in the person’s normal pattern of eye contact.
― Excessive eye blinking or closing the eyes for extended periods of time
― Wobbling or bouncing knees up and down quickly
― Shuffling the feet or crossing them at the ankles and putting them beneath the chair.
3

J. W. Harmeyer, S. P. Golden, and G. E. Summers, Conducting Internal Audit Interviews (Altamonte Springs: Institute of
Internal Auditors Research Foundation, 1984).
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Verbal Clues
In his training course Fraud Examination: Investigation Methods, Joseph Wells offers the
following verbal clues that the person being interviewed may be either avoiding your question or
4
answering it dishonestly.
• Changes in speech patterns, such as speeding up or talking louder.
• Stalling for time. For example, repeating the question or complaining about the physical
environment where the interview is taking place.
• Attempts to add credibility. For example taking an oath such as “I swear to God,” or “To tell
you the truth.” Another way to add credibility is tell the interviewer to check his story with
another party.
• Selective memory, for example, the use of the phrase “I can’t recall.”
• Overqualified responses, for example, the use of the phrase “To the best of my memory.”
• Reluctance to end the interview. Someone who has been honest and totally candid generally is
ready to terminate the interview. Those who have been trying to deceive you may try to keep
you a little longer to try to convince you they were telling the truth. Those who have withheld
information may want you to keep asking questions so that they may “come clean.”
• Tolerant attitudes. The dishonest individual typically has a relatively tolerant attitude toward
someone who may have committed fraud. For example, suppose you asked the question,
“What should happen to someone who intentionally recorded false journal entries to boost
profits?” The person with nothing to hide usually will make a strong statement, such as, “They
should be fired or prosecuted.” Another person with knowledge of a similar fraud might
provide a softer answer such as “It depends on the circumstances.”

Concluding the Interview
At the end of the interview, review the key points covered and ask the respondent if the
information you have is correct. Consider asking if there is any other information the two of you
should discuss. Examples of questions that can be used for this purpose include:
• If you were trying to…[understand how a fake journal entry could be entered into the general
ledger], what would you do?
• Is there anything we haven’t covered that you think we should have?
• Do you have anything else to say?

4

This course is published and available from the AICPA. The questions cited here appear on pages 1 through 7 of the materials.
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CHAPTER 5: RESPONDING TO THE RISK OF
IMPROPER REVENUE RECOGNITION

As described in Chapter 2, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316),
includes a presumption that improper revenue recognition is a fraud risk. The objective of this
chapter is to provide additional suggestions and guidance on revenue recognition issues.1
Revenue recognition focuses on when revenue can be reported in the financial statements. An
entity’s revenue recognition policies describe the conditions that must be met before it can
recognize revenue in the current period.

Revenue Recognition Accounting Concepts
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial
Statements, defines revenue as:
Inflows or other enhancements of assets of an entity or settlements of its liabilities (or a
combination of both) from delivering or producing goods, rendering services, or other
activities that constitute the entity’s ongoing major or central operations.

Conceptually, companies create economic value continually throughout this operating cycle.
Theoretically, revenue could be recognized incrementally and continuously at many different
points in the process. As a practical matter, the continuous recognition of revenue is impossible.
Thus, for accounting purposes, we choose one event—the recognition event—to recognize
revenue (and the corresponding expenses).
When does that event occur? In his essay “Revenue Recognition,” Professor David Hawkins
describes the results of his analysis of revenue recognition practices:
An analysis of revenue recognition practices seems to indicate that revenue is typically
recognized when the event that reduces the risk of ultimately receiving a determinable amount
of revenue is reduced to a minimum level considered product by those issuing and using
financial statements…Determining [this] critical event in novel situations can require
management judgment which must be exercised in the light of a thorough, objective analysis of
the particular circumstances and the generally accepted accounting principles applicable to
analogous situations. [Emphasis added]2

1

The auditing of revenue transactions is inextricably linked to the accounting guidance. At the time this book was written,
certain elements of generally accepted accounting principles related to revenue recognition were being revisited. The
completeness and effectiveness of the auditing procedures described in this chapter ultimately will depend on the changes
made to the accounting literature.

2

David F. Hawkins, “Revenue Recognition” (Harvard Business School Publishing, 1995).
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In assessing an entity’s revenue recognition practices, two important questions to consider are:
1. Is its designation of the recognition event appropriate?
2. Are its accounting policies consistent with this designation?

The Accounting Literature
Conceptual Basis
FASB Concept Statement No 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of
Business Enterprises provides the conceptual basis for revenue recognition. Paragraph 83 of FASB
Concept Statement No. 5 states that recognition of revenue involves consideration of two factors:
1. Being realized or realizable.
2. Being earned.
Paragraph 84(a) of FASB Concept Statement No. 5 states that revenues from manufacturing and
selling activities are commonly recognized at the time of sale, usually meaning delivery.
The rest of this chapter explores in detail the meaning of the key terms in italics.
Individual Pronouncements
Individual accounting pronouncements have been developed to provide guidance on revenue
recognition for specific industries or transactions. For example, guidance on revenue recognition
for sales of software is provided in Statement of Position (SOP) 97-2, Software Revenue
Recognition (as modified by SOP 98-9, Modification of SOP 97-2, Software Revenue
Recognition, With Respect to Certain Transactions).
In general, the purpose of these individual pronouncements is to describe how the revenue
recognition concepts described in FASB Concept Statement No. 5 should be applied to certain
transactions. If an entity is involved in these transactions, it should follow the guidance in the
relevant pronouncement. Otherwise, it should follow the conceptual guidance contained in FASB
Concept Statement No. 5.
The Securities and Exchange Commission

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101, Revenue
Recognition in Financial Statements, represents the SEC staff’s views on how the FASB
conceptual guidance on revenue recognition should be applied. The SAB reflects the basic
principles of revenue recognition in existing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
and does not supersede any existing authoritative literature.
Financial statement preparers of public companies are most directly affected by SABs. However,
those who work for nonpublic companies may find the information contained in SAB No. 101 useful.
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Revenue Recognition Criteria—Realizable
The general revenue recognition criteria state that revenue is recognized when realized or
realizable. A sale has not taken place until there exists an actual, firm agreement between the
seller and buyer. Contingent payment terms indicate that the revenue is not realizable because
there is no firm agreement about sales price.
Indications that there is a lack of agreement between the buyer and seller include the following.
• The use of letters of intent in lieu of signed contracts or agreements
• Sales merchandise that is shipped in advance of the scheduled shipment date without evidence
of the customer’s agreement or consent or documented request for such shipment
• Sales recorded upon shipment of a product to customers who have been given a free tryout
period after which the customer can return the product with no obligation
• Recognition of sales when customers have unilateral cancellation or termination provisions
Sales to distributors (rather than to end-users) may raise additional concerns. It is not unusual for
sellers to offer incentives or concessions to distributors that normally are not offered to retail,
end-user customers. If your company sells to distributors, a firm sales agreement does not exist
(and therefore revenue should not be recognized) in those circumstances in which the
distributor’s obligation to pay for the product is contingent on the following:
• Resale to another (third) party (for example, the end user)
• Receipt of financing from another (third) party
The SEC
In SAB No. 101, the SEC clarifies that an agreement does not exist until it is executed by both
parties. If it is the entity’s normal business practice to require a written sales agreement, a verbal
agreement between the parties or the premise that the contract will be signed shortly does not
constitute an agreement between the parties.
The interpretative response to question 2 in SAB No. 101 also provides guidance on consignment
sales and other situations in which revenue should not be recognized even when delivery of the
product has occurred.

Revenue Recognition Criteria—Earnings Process
The general revenue recognition criteria state that revenue is recognized upon completion of the
earnings process. The earnings process is complete when the entity has “substantially
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenues.”
Circumstances that indicate that the earnings process may not be complete include the following:
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• There are sales that require substantial continuing seller involvement after delivery of
merchandise.
• There are sales in which evidence indicates the customer’s obligation to pay for the
merchandise depends on fulfillment by the seller of materially unsatisfied conditions.
• Goods are preinvoiced while still in the process of being assembled.
• Shipments are sent to and held by freight forwarders pending return to the company for
required customer modifications.
The SEC
Determining when the earnings process is complete is especially difficult when the customer
pays an up-front fee for products or services that are delivered or performed over time. At issue
is whether the company should recognize the initial fee as revenue when it is paid or as the
services or goods are performed or delivered. Consider the following examples, which the SEC
provided in question 10 of the frequently asked questions in SAB No. 101.
• A company charges users a fee for nonexclusive access to its Web site that contains
proprietary databases. The fee allows access to the Web site for a one-year period. After the
customer is provided with an identification number and trained in the use of the database,
there are no incremental costs that will be incurred in serving this customer.
• An Internet company charges a fee to users for advertising a product for sale or auction on
certain pages of its Web site. The company agrees to maintain the listing for a period of time.
The cost of maintaining the advertisement on the Web site for the stated period is minimal.
• A company charges a fee for hosting another company’s Web site for one year. The
arrangement does not involve exclusive use of any of the hosting company’s servers or other
equipment. Almost all of the projected costs to be incurred will be incurred in the initial
loading of information on the host company’s Internet server and setting up appropriate links
and network communications.
In each of these cases, revenue should be recognized over time. Even though the majority of the
cost and effort is incurred by the seller at the front-end of the agreement, the SEC staff believes
that the substance of the transaction is that the buyer is paying for a service that is delivered over
a period of time. The earnings process is completed as the service is provided—that is, revenue
should therefore be recognized over the same time period.
Multiple-Element Arrangements
Many companies now offer complete, packaged solutions to their customers, which may involve
the delivery or performance of multiple products, services, and/or rights to use assets, and
performance may occur at different points in time or over different periods of time.
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Some arrangements are accompanied by initial installation, initiation, or activation services and
generally involve either a fixed fee or a fixed fee coupled with a continuing payment stream.
The continuing payment stream generally corresponds to the continuing performance and may
be fixed, variable based on future performance, or composed of a combination of fixed and
variable payments.
The issue is how to account for these so-called “multiple-element arrangements.” For example, is
it acceptable to allocate a portion of the total fee to each element? Or should you defer the entire
fee until all the elements are delivered?
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 00-21, Revenue Arrangements with Multiple
Deliverables, provides the primary guidance on accounting for multiple-element arrangements.
That consensus position addresses the following issues:
• How should an entity determine whether an arrangement with multiple deliverables has
“multiple units of accounting,” which would allow revenue to be recognized in stages, as the
revenue recognition criteria were met for each separate unit?
• If the entity does have multiple units of accounting, how should the total fee be allocated
among the units?
• What effect, if any, do customer rights due to nonperformance have on the recognition of
revenue?
• What is the impact, if any, of the following:
— A customer’s ability to cancel a contract and incur a cancellation penalty
— Consideration that varies as a result of future customer actions
— Consideration that varies as a result of future seller actions
Separate Units of Accounting
When accounting for revenue transactions with multiple deliverables, the first, most fundamental
determination is whether the arrangement has more than one unit of accounting. For example, an
entity may have to determine whether the arrangement is composed of one unit (which would
require revenue to be recognized only after the delivery of all components of the arrangement) or
multiple units (which would allow for partial revenue recognition as each unit was delivered).
Illustration 5-1 summarizes the guidance contained in EITF Issue No. 00-21 relating to
determining whether the arrangement has multiple units of accounting.
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Illustration 5-1 EITF 00-21: Determining Separate Units of Accounting
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As indicated in the flowchart, for a delivered item to be considered a separate unit of accounting,
all the following conditions must be met:
• The delivered item has value to the customer on a standalone basis. This condition is met if it
is sold separately by any vendor or the customer could resell it on a standalone basis.
• There is objective and reliable evidence of the fair value of the undelivered item. In general,
the price of a deliverable when it is sold regularly on a standalone basis is the best evidence of
fair value. The price of the element in the multiple-element arrangement sales contract is not
considered objective and reliable.
• If the customer has a general right of return, the delivery or performance of the undelivered
item is probable and substantially in control of the seller.
Measurement and Allocation of Consideration
The amount of total arrangement consideration must be fixed or determinable, other than with
respect to the customer’s refund rights. Refund rights consist of:
• General rights of return within the scope of FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition
When Right of Return Exists
• Contractual provisions that provide the customer with the right to return a delivered product
for a refund or other concessions only if the seller fails to deliver any undelivered elements.
In determining the total amount of consideration, the seller should assume that customer actions
will not result in any incremental consideration.
In general, the total consideration of a multiple-element arrangement should be allocated to
individual elements based on their relative fair values. The amount allocable to a delivered item
is limited to that amount that is not contingent upon the delivery of additional items or meeting
other specified performance conditions.
The SEC

SAB No. 101 provides additional guidance on accounting for multiple-element arrangements that
generally is consistent with that provided in EITF Issue No. 00-21. In question 4 of the FAQs on
SAB No. 101, SEC staff stated that it will not object to a method of accounting for multipleelement arrangements that includes the following conditions:
• To be considered a separate element, the product or service in question represents a separate
earnings process. The best indicator that a separate element exists is that a vendor sells or
could readily sell that element unaccompanied by other elements.
• Revenue is allocated among the elements based on the fair value of the elements. The fair
values used for the allocations should be reliable, verifiable, and objectively determinable.
The allocation of revenue among the elements based solely on cost plus a profit margin that is
not specific to the particular product or service is not acceptable because, in the absence of
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other evidence of fair value, there is no objective means to verify what a profit margin should
be for the particular element(s).3
If sufficient evidence of the fair values of the individual elements does not exist, revenue
would not be allocated among them until that evidence exists. Instead, the revenue would be
recognized as earned using revenue recognition principles applicable to the entire arrangement
as if it were a single-element arrangement.
• If an undelivered element is essential to the functionality of a delivered element, no revenue
allocated to the delivered element is recognized until that undelivered element is delivered.

Revenue Recognition Criteria—Delivery
To recognize revenue, the product or service sold must be delivered. The general revenue
recognition criterion states that revenue typically is recognized upon delivery, but the term
delivery encompasses more than the physical shipment of the product. For a product to be
considered delivered, the seller should substantially complete or fulfill the terms specified in the
arrangement. When a partial shipment is made in which the portion not shipped is a critical
component of the product, revenue should be deferred.
Other circumstances in which revenue should be deferred due to lack of delivery include the
following.
• Sales are billed to customers before the delivery of goods and held by the seller (known as
“bill and hold” or “ship in place” sales). However, as discussed in the following section,
revenue from some bill-and-hold sales may be recognized if certain conditions are met.
• Shipments are made after the end of the period. Books that are kept open to record revenue for
products shipped after the end of the period do not satisfy the delivery criterion for the current
period.
• Shipments are made to a warehouse or other intermediary location without the instruction of
the customer.
• Goods are preinvoiced before or in the absence of actual shipment.
• Purchase orders are recorded as completed sales.
For companies that provide services rather than products, revenue generally is recognized as the
service is provided.

3

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff makes reference to Statement of Position (SOP) 81-1, Accounting for
Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Contracts, paragraphs 35 through 42, and SOP 97-2,
Software Revenue Recognition, paragraphs 9 through 14 (as modified by SOP 98-9, Modification of SOP 97-2, Software
Revenue Recognition, With Respect to Certain Transactions), for guidance on allocating among elements.
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Bill-and-Hold Sales
In a bill-and-hold transaction, a customer agrees to purchase the goods but the seller retains
physical possession until the customer requests shipment to designated locations. Normally, such
an arrangement does not qualify as a sale because delivery has not occurred. Under certain
conditions, however, when a buyer has made an absolute purchase commitment and has assumed
the risks and rewards of the purchased product but is unable to accept delivery because of a
compelling business reason, bill-and-hold sales may qualify for revenue recognition.
The interpretative response to question 3 of SAB No. 101 specifies certain conditions or criteria
that a bill-and-hold transaction of a public company should meet to qualify for revenue
recognition. In addition, it specifies certain factors that should be considered in evaluating
whether a bill-and-hold transaction meets the requirements for revenue recognition.
Although accounting and auditing enforcement release (AAER) No. 108 is not binding on
nonpublic companies, they may find it useful in analyzing bill-and-hold transactions.
The SEC
SAB No. 101 clarifies that delivery occurs when the customer:
• Takes title to the product
• Assumes the risks and rewards of ownership
The SAB also states that a seller should substantially complete or fulfill the terms specified in the
4
arrangement for delivery or performance to have occurred. If revenue is recognized upon
substantial completion of the arrangement, all remaining costs of performance or delivery should
be accrued.
Customer Acceptance Provisions
Customer acceptance provisions may be included in a contract for a variety of reasons, including:
• To allow the customer to test the product
• To require the seller to perform additional services
• To identify other work necessary to be done before accepting the product
After delivery of a product or performance of a service, if uncertainty exists about customer
acceptance, revenue should not be recognized until acceptance occurs.

4

According to the Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB), only inconsequential or perfunctory actions may remain incomplete such
that the failure to complete the actions would not result in the customer receiving a refund or rejecting the delivered products
or services performed to date. In addition, the seller should have a demonstrated history of completing the remaining tasks in a
timely manner and reliably estimating the remaining costs.
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Other Guidance
SAB No. 101 provides additional guidance on when delivery of a product or performance of a
service has been performed for the following revenue transactions:
• Delivery or performance of multiple deliverables (see interpretative response to questions 3
and 6 of SAB No. 101)
• Licensing arrangements (see interpretative response to question 3 of SAB No. 101)
• Layaway sales (see interpretative response to question 4 of SAB No. 101)
• Nonrefundable up-front fees (see interpretative response to question 5 of SAB No. 101)

Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists
It is not unusual for companies to provide their customers with the right of return—in fact, some
would argue that the rights of customers to return merchandise are a part of our shared cultural
values. For sellers, the sale of products with the right of return poses an accounting issue,
namely, should revenue be recognized, and if so, how the possible sales returns should be
accounted for.
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 48, Revenue Recognition When Right of
Return Exists, provides guidance for sales of a product when the buyer has the right to return it.
Certain transactions and industries are excluded from the Statement.
According to FASB Statement No. 48, revenue from sales transactions that provide the customer with
the right to return the product should be recognized at time of sale only if certain conditions are met. If
revenue is recognized at time of sale, a liability for expected returns also should be recognized.
If the conditions for immediate revenue recognition are not met, sales recognition should be
postponed until the right of return substantially expires or until such time that the conditions are met.
The key to applying FASB Statement No. 48 is in determining whether the conditions for
immediate revenue recognition have been met. When a sales transaction includes a right of
return, FASB Statement No. 48 lists six conditions, all of which must be met in order to
recognize revenue at the time of sale.
The most subjective of these conditions is the requirement that the amount of future returns can
be reasonably estimated. FASB Statement No. 48 provides specific guidance on a number of
factors that may impair, but not necessarily preclude, the ability to make a reasonable estimate.
These are:
• The susceptibility of the product to significant external factors, such as technological
obsolescence or changes in demand.
• Relatively long periods in which a particular product may be returned.
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• Absence of historical experience with similar types of sales of similar products, or inability to
apply such experience because of changing circumstances, for example, changes in the selling
enterprise’s marketing policies or relationships with its customers.
• Absence of a large volume of relatively homogeneous transactions.
The SEC
In the interpretative response to question 9 of SAB No. 101, the SEC provided a list of other
factors that may preclude an entity from making a reasonable and reliable estimate of product
returns. These factors are:
• Significant increases in or excess levels of inventory in a distribution channel (sometimes
referred to as “channel stuffing”).
• Lack of “visibility” into or the inability to determine or observe the levels of inventory in a
distribution channel and the current level of sales to end users.
• Expected introductions of new products that may result in the technological obsolescence of
and larger-than-expected returns of current products.
• The significance of a particular distributor to the entity’s business, sales, and marketing.
• The newness of a product.
• The introduction of competitors’ products with superior technology or greater expected market
acceptance.
• Other factors that affect market demand and changing trends in that demand for the entity’s
products.

Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition
Many audits take a “balance sheet” approach, tying down the numbers at the beginning and end
of the reporting period. This approach is fine, but you cannot overlook revenue recognition
issues. On a fundamental level, you have to understand the client’s earnings process. With that
information, you can critically assess whether the client’s revenue recognition procedures are
appropriate.
Audit Planning Considerations
In planning your audits, you should obtain a sufficient understanding of the client’s industry and
business, its products, its marketing and sales policies and strategies, its internal control
structure, and its accounting policies related to revenue recognition. During the planning phase of
the audit, you should seek to identify conditions that increase the risk of misstatement. Those
conditions may include:
• New product or service introductions or new sales arrangements
• Sales to distributors or resellers
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•
•
•
•

Substantial sales at the end of the accounting period
Individually significant sales
Unusual or complex revenue transactions
Control environment considerations, such as:
― Aggressive accounting policies or practices
― Pressure from senior management to increase revenues and earnings
― Lack of involvement by the accounting or finance department in sales transactions or in
the monitoring of arrangements with distributors

Because material misstatements due to fraudulent financial reporting often result from an
overstatement or understatement of revenues, SAS No. 99 states that you should ordinarily
presume that there is a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition.
Brainstorming
As described in Chapter 2 of this Practice Aid, engagement teams are required to have a
brainstorming session prior to or in conjunction with the information-gathering phase of the
audit. One of the main objectives of that session is to sensitize engagement team members to the
possibility that fraud may exist at the client and to help the team exchange ideas about how and
where they believe the entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material
misstatements due to fraud.
Knowledge of common frauds related to improper revenue recognition can help engagement
teams conduct more effective brainstorming sessions. Typical revenue recognition frauds include:
• Recording fictitious sales. This may be accomplished by recording sales to nonexistent
customers, or recording phony sales to legitimate customers. The latter schemes include
double billing, or billing for items not shipped or ordered. A variation on this theme is to ship
the goods to a warehouse that is undisclosed to the auditors, which creates a legitimate
shipping document the entity can use to mislead the auditor into thinking that the goods were
actually shipped to a customer. Fictitious sales schemes usually occur near the end of an
accounting period and are concealed by issuing credit memos or other credit adjustments to
accounts receivable in the period immediately following the balance sheet date.
• Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not meet the revenue recognition criteria. These
include improper revenue recognition when the right of return exists, “bill and hold”
transactions, or other transactions for which the earnings process is not complete. Rights of
return and other sales terms that would preclude revenue recognition often are concealed
through the use of written side agreements or oral agreements not disclosed to the auditors.
• Sham transactions. These include, for example, selling assets at inflated prices to an outside
entity, while simultaneously buying assets at inflated prices from that same entity. These types
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of transactions are particularly difficult to detect because they involve collusion with a
coconspirator outside the entity.
• Recognizing revenue in the improper period. The most common of these types of frauds is to
recognize revenue on future, anticipated sales. This may be accomplished by altering dates on
shipping documents or holding the books open until after the shipment has occurred.
Many fraud schemes are designed to accelerate the recognition of revenue; however, you should
be alert for conditions that may motivate management to delay revenue recognition. For
example, when sales estimates for a subsequent year are soft and management has met their
earnings target for the current year, they may be tempted to improperly delay revenues into the
next year. Additionally, an owner of a privately held entity may be motivated to improperly
delay revenue recognition as a means of minimizing taxable income.
Nature of Business and Accounting for Revenue
In gaining an understanding of the nature of the entity’s business, you might consider questions
that are relevant to the entity’s revenue recognition, such as the following.
• What products does the company sell? Do any characteristics of the product itself pose
revenue recognition issues? Characteristics might include:
― The bundling of products with services may make it difficult to determine when the
earnings process is substantially complete.
― New products are sold with concessions such as liberal cancellation provisions or free trials.
― Products are shipped in components.
― Products require substantial continuing seller involvement after delivery of merchandise.
• What are the company’s current marketing campaigns? Does the company provide sales
incentives that raise revenue recognition, measurement, or presentation issues?
• What are the company’s policies and procedures relating to revenue transactions? Could these
relate to:
― Receiving and accepting orders
― Extending credit
― Relieving inventory, billing, and recording sales transactions
― Receiving and recording sales returns
― Authorizing and issuing credit memos
― Determining proper cut-off of sales at the end of the accounting period
• What are the company’s standard shipping methods and terms? Examine:
― When does title to the goods pass to the buyer?
― Are shipments sent directly to customers or third-party warehouses?
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― How are shipments of nonsale items (for example, products shipped for demonstration
purposes) separated from sales?
― Have there been recent changes to the entity’s shipping policies?
• Does the company enter into transactions that require special audit consideration, including but
not limited to:
― Barter transactions
― Transactions involving side agreements
• What are the company’s revenue recognition policies? Are they an appropriate application of
accounting principles in the context of the industry in which it operates?
• Has there been a change in the company’s revenue recognition policy and, if so, why?
• What is the company’s practice with regard to sales and payment terms? Are there any
deviations from industry norms or from the entity’s own practices? These include:
― Sales terms that do not comply with the company’s normal policies
― The existence of longer-than-expected payment terms or installment receivables
― The use of nonstandard contracts or contract clauses with regard to sales
• Do the results of preliminary analytical procedures indicate anomalies that suggest revenue
recognition issues? Examples of anomalies that may require follow-up include:
― Significant sales volume at or near the end of the reporting period
― Unusual volume of sales to distributors
Identifying Risks of Material Misstatement Due to Fraud
Be alert for the following, which may indicate incentives/pressures to fraudulently misstate
revenues, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify the fraud.
The Appendix to SAS No. 99 provides examples of fraud risk factors relating to fraudulent
financial reporting, almost all of which may be relevant to revenue recognition.
In addition to those items provided in SAS No. 99, you may also want to be alert for the
following.
• Excessive credit memo and other credit adjustments to accounts receivable after the end of the
accounting period.
• Customer complaints and discrepancies in accounts receivable confirmations, for example
disputes over terms, prices, or amounts.
• Unusual entries to the accounts receivable subledger or sales journal.
• Missing or altered source documents (for example, invoices or shipping documents) or the
inability of the client to produce original documents in a reasonable period of time.
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• Unusual reconciling of differences between the sales journal and the general ledger.
• Sales to customers in the last month before the end of the accounting period at terms more
favorable than previous months.
• Sales with affiliates and related parties.
• Predated or postdated transactions.
• Journal entries made to the sales or revenue account directly, that is, not posted from the
accounts receivable subledger or sales journal.
• Large or unusual adjustments to sales accounts made just before or just after the end of the
period.

Other Issues to Consider
• Side agreements. Side agreements are used to alter the terms and conditions of sales as a way
to entice customers to accept the delivery of the goods or services. These agreements may
include terms (such as relieving the customer of some of the risks and rewards of ownership,
or creating post-sale obligations) that preclude revenue recognition. Frequently, side
agreements are hidden from the entity’s board of directors and independent auditors, and only
a very few individuals within the entity are aware of their existence.
• Channel stuffing. Channel stuffing (also known as trade loading) is a marketing practice that
suppliers sometimes use to boost sales by inducing distributors to buy substantially more
inventory than they can resell promptly. Inducements to overbuy may range from deep
discounts on the inventory to threats of losing the distributorship if the inventory is not
purchased. Channel stuffing without appropriate provision for sales returns is an example of
booking tomorrow’s revenue today in order to window-dress financial statements. Channel
stuffing also may be accompanied by side agreements that provide for the return of unsold
merchandise beyond the normal sales return privileges. Even when there is no evidence of
side agreements, channel stuffing may indicate the need to increase the level of anticipated
sales returns above historical experience.
• Related-party transactions and significant unusual transactions. Related-party transactions
require special consideration because related parties may be difficult to identify, and relatedparty transactions may pose significant “substance over form” issues. Undisclosed relatedparty transactions may be used to fraudulently inflate earnings. Examples include the
recording of sales of the same inventory back and forth among affiliated entities that exchange
checks periodically to “freshen” the receivables, and sales with commitments to repurchase
that, if known, would preclude recognition of revenue.
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions resulting in revenue recognition that are
executed with customers who are not related parties similarly require special consideration
because they also may pose “substance over form” questions and may involve the collusion of
the entity and the customer in a fraudulent revenue recognition scheme.

93

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

Audit Response
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.54) provides examples of responses to identified risks of material
misstatements relating to fraudulent financial reporting. In addition to the procedures described
in the standard, you also might consider the following.
• Examine inventory reports or other correspondence from distributors and reconcile this
information with the company’s records.
• Vouch all large or unusual sales made at quarter end and year end to original source
documents.
• Perform a detailed review of the entity’s quarter-end and year-end adjusting entries and
investigate any that appear unusual as to nature or amount.
• Scan the general ledger, accounts receivable subledger, and sales journal for unusual activity.
• Check the clerical accuracy of the revenue journal or similar record and trace the postings of
the totals to the appropriate account in the general ledger.
• Check the reconciliation of revenue journals during the audit period to the general ledger
control account, or check the postings to the general ledger control account from sources other
than the revenue journal for unusual or unexpected activity.
• Analyze and review deferred revenue accounts at end of the period for propriety of deferral.
• Analyze and review credit memos and other accounts receivable adjustments for the period
subsequent to the balance sheet date.
• Scan the general ledger or subsidiary ledgers, as appropriate, for a period subsequent to year
end for reversals of sales or large sales returns.
• Review significant year-end contracts for unusual pricing, billing, delivery, return, exchange,
or acceptance clauses. Perform post-year-end specific review for contract revisions or
cancellations and for refunds or credits issued.
• As part of the accounts receivable confirmation effort, confirm with customers the terms of
sales agreements, including the absence of right of return and terms that might preclude
immediate revenue recognition.
• Compare operating cash flow to sales; analyze by salesperson, location, or product.
Confirmations and Management’s Representations
Standard confirmation requests, which typically confirm only the outstanding balance, may not
always provide sufficient audit evidence to determine whether revenue transactions have been
recorded. You should consider designing your confirmations to obtain information from customers
about payment terms, right-of-return privileges, continuing obligations on the part of the seller, and
other significant risks retained by the audit client. You also may wish to confirm the terms of
individually significant sales and the absence of any side agreements. Because of concerns about
fictitious sales, contract terms, and undisclosed side agreements, you should consider addressing the
confirmation to a specific individual and obtaining additional oral confirmation from that individual.
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Additionally, when performing alternative procedures for nonresponding confirmation requests,
you should consider whether the evidence obtained from these procedures is as reliable as the
evidence gained from direct confirmation from third parties.
Representations from management are not a substitute for the application of audit procedures. A
management representation letter merely confirms in writing representations that management
made to you during the course of the engagement. Examples of representations you may wish to
obtain from management relating to revenue recognition include:
• The absence of any contingencies that affect the obligation of customers to pay for
merchandise purchased.
• The disclosure of all side agreements with customers
In addition to obtaining representations from management, you also should consider making
inquiries of others familiar with the transaction, for example, sales personnel.
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Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), recognizes that, because
of their highly subjective nature, accounting estimates are susceptible to abuse and can be used to
facilitate fraudulent financial reporting or possibly cover up a defalcation. SAS No. 99 (AU sec.
316.54) provides some guidance on auditing estimates (with a reference to the guidance
contained in SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU sec. 342]). The purpose of this chapter is to offer suggestions on auditing estimates that
are in addition to those currently contained in the auditing literature.2

The Auditor’s Responsibilities
It is the auditor’s responsibility to assess the evidence supporting management’s estimate and to
draw a conclusion about whether management’s estimate and related assumptions are reasonably
supported. As an auditor you are not trying to conclude that any given outcome is expected.
What you are trying to do is determine whether certain assumptions are supportable and in turn
provide a reasonable basis for the development of the estimate. This will allow you to form a
conclusion about the reasonableness of the resulting estimate in the context of the financial
statements takes as a whole.

Characteristics of Accounting Estimates
The characteristics of accounting estimates are fundamentally different from more objective
information. It’s important for you to understand these differences because the underlying
characteristics of an accounting estimate dictate your auditing procedures. These procedures will
be much different from the ones you use to audit more objective information.
Table 6-1 highlights some of the differences between an accounting estimate and a more
objectively determined, “hard” amount.
1

This chapter was adapted from Auditing Estimates and Other Soft Accounting Information, by Michael Ramos (New York:
AICPA, 1998).

2

Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), refers to accounting estimates in two different contexts. The first focuses on
examples of auditor responses to identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud. This chapter provides suggestions on
additional audit responses related to accounting estimates that go beyond the guidance contained in SAS No. 99. The standard
also requires you to perform a retrospective review of significant accounting estimates to look for a possible bias on the part of
management and their override of internal control. Chapter 2 of this Practice Aid describes this procedure—required on every
engagement—in greater detail.
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Table 6-1 Characteristics of Hard Information and Accounting Estimates

Hard
Based on past transactions

Estimates
Based on future events

Actions or intentions?

Based on management’s
previous actions

Based on management’s
intentions about future actions

Available audit
evidence?

Can confirm or observe

Difficult to confirm or observe

Precision of measure?

Measurements are more precise.

Measurements are less precise.

Past or future?

By Way of Analogy…
When we audit a “hard” number, it is like we are affirming the winner after the race has already
been run. We can see the results of the race, perform our tests, and declare who “appears to have
won” and by how much.
Auditing an estimate is more like calling the winner of a race while it is still being run. We do not
know who will win the race but must look at the facts that exist during the performance to come
to a conclusion about the winner. Experts at racing have certain benchmarks to gauge the
performance of the runners and how the race is progressing. For example, an experienced analyst
may tell us that if Jones gets off to a fast start, she almost certainly will win. Jones’s start then
serves as a benchmark for developing a conclusion about the outcome.
Similarly, the audit of an accounting estimate forces us to come to a conclusion about the
reasonableness of an amount before the transaction has been completed. For example, we must
assess the reasonableness of an estimated return allowance before all the items have been
returned. Our task in this chapter is to help you develop the expertise you need to be able to
establish touchstones for “calling the race” while it is still in progress.

Audit Approach for Accounting Estimates
During the planning phase of the audit, you will identify significant accounting estimates and
focus your attention on those that have the highest risk for potential misstatement. Once you’ve
accomplished that, you will need to gather and assess the audit evidence supporting the estimate.
When auditing an accounting estimate, you will focus on assessing the quality of the process and
the reasonableness of the inputs to that process.
By Way of Analogy…
If you take a golf lesson, your instructor will dissect your swing. He or she probably won’t even
need to watch the flight of the ball. Instead, the instructor will observe how you set up—your grip,
the position of your body, your posture. Next, he or she will focus on the swing, how you take the
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club away from the ball, enter into a back swing, then transition forward, striking the ball and
following through.
Most instructors don’t even have to watch the ball to tell you where it went. Based solely on what
they observe about your set up and swing, they can tell you with reasonable accuracy how well
you struck the ball and how it flew.
When we audit an objectively determined amount, it is like we tracked the flight of a golf shot,
went out to the fairway (or into the woods, as the case may be), saw where the ball landed, and
reported the position back to the golfer. When we audit an estimate, we are acting like a golf
instructor, carefully observing the quality of the inputs (set-up) and the integrity of the process
(the swing) to make an educated guess as to where the ball most likely landed.

Characteristics of a Quality Process
A high-quality estimation process is characterized by two important features:
• Good faith effort. A client makes a good faith effort to develop an estimate when they:
― Make a diligent effort to develop appropriate assumptions
― Exercise care not to mislead the financial statement users
― Develop information that is consistent with their plans
• An appropriate model. A model is simply a representation of the situation to be analyzed, for
example the number of customers that will return a given product. To be appropriate, a model
must accurately represent the situation to be analyzed.

Quality Inputs and Significant Assumptions
Remember the old saying, “garbage in, garbage out.” The quality of your client’s accounting
estimate is only as good as the quality of the underlying assumptions used to make the estimate.
When auditing an estimate, you therefore need to assess the quality of the entity’s assumptions.
Your first step should be to identify the assumptions that are most significant to the estimate. Pay
particular attention to those assumptions that are:
• Sensitive to variation
• Inconsistent with historical patterns
• Subjective and susceptible to misstatement and bias
Beware of Hidden Assumptions
Be on the lookout for assumptions that are built into the client’s estimation process. For example,
suppose an estimate of the allowance for doubtful accounts is based on individual allowances for
the various categories of aged receivables: 1 percent for current receivables, 5 percent for
99

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

receivables over 30 days, and 25 percent for receivables over 60 days. These percentages are
based on the company’s past experience. The following are two frequent situations that create
built-in assumptions:
• Same as last year. Circumstances change, and the assumptions used previously may no longer
be appropriate.
• Global assumptions for nonhomogeneous populations. The example in the preceding
paragraph used fixed percentages for certain categories of receivables. The underlying
assumption is that all items in the category are similar. If the population is not constructed
carefully, that assumption might not be valid.
Characteristics of Quality Assumptions
Garbage in, garbage out—not all assumptions are created equal. How can you tell a high-quality
assumption from a wild guess? Consider the following.
• Consistency. The assumptions need to be consistent with each other, the historical data, and
any other relevant information, such as industry data.
• Known changes or trends. The assumptions should consider planned changes or trends in the
business or industry. For example, deteriorating economic conditions should be considered
when assessing assumptions relating to the allowance for doubtful accounts.
• Management’s plans. The assumptions must reflect management’s plans for the future. A plan
is something management intends to do, not merely an option of something they could do.

Two Techniques for Gathering Audit Evidence
Up to this point, we’ve stressed the need for you to focus on the client’s estimation process and
underlying assumptions as a way for you to get “comfortable” with the client’s accounting
estimate. This approach assumes that if you have high-quality input and a good process, the
output (the estimated amount) will be reliable.
You cannot ignore completely the final estimated amount, however. You should perform some
substantive procedures directed at the amount itself to make sure it seems reasonable. Techniques
that can help you make this determination include:
• Hindsight. Use post-balance sheet information to refine estimates and corroborate
reasonableness of assumptions and estimates.
• Ranges. Develop a range of what you consider to be a reasonable amount and determine
whether the client’s estimate falls within that range.
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Management’s Ability and Intent
Management’s future plans and their positive intent and ability to carry out those plans are key
assumptions underlying the development of almost all accounting estimates.
In assessing management’s ability and intent keep in mind that management’s plans are different
from management’s options. When assessing ability and intent, be sure that the client’s future
plans are based on management’s positive intent to take action.
The positive intent to take action is not the same as the lack of intention to take a contrary action.
For example, the mere absence of management’s intent to sell a debt security is not the same
thing as management’s positive intent to hold that security to maturity.
Suggestions for assessing management’s ability and intent include the following.
Inquiry. Make inquiries of the client regarding the specific details of their plan. Table 6-2
provides suggestions for making inquiries of the client regarding their intended future plans.
Table 6-2 Making Inquiries of the Client

Suggestion
Corroborate management’s
answer with other inquiries.

Description
• Extend inquiries to people outside of management and
outside of the accounting department.
• Try to corroborate management’s statements about the
existence of a plan.
• Assess whether field personnel believe the plan is
achievable.

Be skeptical and disciplined.

• Look for inconsistencies between what management say and
what they do.
• Understand the who, what, when, where, why, and how of
the plan.
• Lack of details may indicate the “plan” is merely an option
of what might be done.

History. Management’s past history and behavior in similar situations can provide you with
strong evidence about their intended future actions. Here are some questions you should consider
when analyzing management’s past behavior:
• What actions has management taken in the past under similar situations? Are those actions
consistent or inconsistent with management’s stated future plans?

101

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

• If previous actions are consistent with future plans, are the internal and external conditions in
the future expected to be similar to the conditions in the past? For example, if your client was
able to successfully restructure a debt obligation in the past, will it be able to do so in the
future, given the existing capital market and other economic conditions?
• Does the company have a history of successfully implementing previous plans? Or do stated
plans rarely materialize?
Written plans. Management may be able to provide you with written plans and other
documentation to support their assumptions about future actions. Table 6-3 provides suggestions
for obtaining and analyzing these documents.
Table 6-3 Obtaining and Analyzing Documentation

Suggestion
Sources of information

Description
Documentation about future plans may include:
• Budgets
• Marketing plans or surveys
• Sales backlog orders
• Minutes of the board
• Engineering studies

What to look for

The mere existence of written documentation is not sufficient for
you to reach a conclusion about the reasonableness of
management’s plans. You still should consider:
• Is the documentation relevant?
• What other information is available to corroborate the
conclusions in the documentation?

Business reason. As an auditor with an appropriate level of professional skepticism, you should
ask yourself why management is undertaking the plan they have presented to you. Are they
presenting this plan as a way, however well-intentioned, of resolving an existing audit issue? Or
does the plan have a real business purpose? What economic benefits will accrue to the company
if it follows this plan?
You should take some “comfort” in management’s plans and intentions when they coincide with
the company’s business strategy. Be skeptical of plans that seem to lack a clear business purpose.
Ability. It’s not enough for management to have a plan of what they intend to do. As an auditor,
you also should assess management’s ability to carry out their plan. In assessing management’s
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ability to carry out their plan, it helps to separate the risk factors into those internal to the
company that management can exercise some control over, and those factors external to the
company over which management has no such control. In general, plans that rely significantly on
external factors and the actions of others are riskier than plans that can be controlled mostly by
management. Here are some suggestions for assessing internal factors.
• Consider length of time. Projects that take an extended period of time may require significant
financial and other resources. Does management have the resources to “stay the course” and
stick with their plan?
• Assess the need and availability of financing. When plans require significant amounts of
financing, you should consider the source, availability, and cost of that financing.
• Consider the need for specialized knowledge. Some plans require specialized knowledge, such
as engineering, sales and marketing, production, or labor. If this knowledge is not available
currently, what plans have been made to acquire it?

Fraud Risk and Accounting Estimates
The vast majority of all financial statements include an accounting estimate of some sort.
Auditors are accustomed to gathering and assessing evidence supporting these estimates. SAS
No. 99 serves as a reminder that, because of their subjective nature, accounting estimates are
vulnerable to manipulation and perpetration of fraudulent financial reporting. The standard draws
your attention to several estimates that are particularly vulnerable to manipulation, including:
• Asset valuations (including asset impairment issues)
• Estimates related to specific transactions (for example, acquisitions, restructurings, or
disposals of a segment of the business)
• Significant accrued liabilities
Chapter 2 of this Practice Aid describes the approach required by SAS No. 99 as an iterative
process that involves several phases, including brainstorming, gathering information, identifying
and assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud, and responding to identified risks.
In planning your audit approach for accounting estimates, you should be sure that it is fully
integrated into this process described by SAS No. 99. For example, you should consider adding a
discussion of estimates to the brainstorming session.
Beware of Bias
This chapter focuses on assessing the integrity of the entity’s estimation process. However,
because of the highly subjective nature of many of the assumptions underlying an estimate, a bias
held by one making the assumptions can subvert even the best estimation process. Further, as
described in Chapter 3, it is typical for us to be unaware of our biases, which means that auditors
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will have a difficult time approaching this issue “head on.” That is, asking entity personnel to
describe their biases relating to an assumption will likely be met with a blank stare.
Chapter 3 also briefly describes the psychology of bias. Based on that description, here are some
questions you might consider for detecting possible bias of entity personnel.
• What information does management tend to screen out? What events do they believe will not
occur?
• What events have occurred recently that management interpreted in such a way that it seemed
counterintuitive? (For example, the business failure of an important customer, typically a
negative development, was interpreted as a positive opportunity for the company.)
• What is the history of the entity or its management (for example, never had a problem
generating revenue, always able to find financing, and a surplus of demand for its product or
services)? How might this past history create a bias?
• What biases are part of the culture of the organization or the personality of its members?
• What “shortcuts” does entity management take in processing information? What “categories”
are implied by these shortcuts?
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The purpose of this chapter is to help you design extended audit procedures whenever you believe
planned audit procedures are insufficient to respond to the assessed risk of material misstatement due to
fraud. This chapter is organized according to audit area, and within each area you will find:
• A description of the typical fraud schemes you might discover in that area. As described in
Chapter 3, it is relatively unusual for auditors to encounter a fraud and thus, they can become
lulled into believing that the risks of material misstatement due to fraud may be negligible at
their client. One of the keys for overcoming this assumption and developing a more skeptical
attitude is for auditors to become familiar with the types of fraud that might occur. The
descriptions included in this chapter are designed to do just that. You should consider
discussing these common frauds as part of your brainstorming session.
• A listing of what you may discover during the information-gathering and risk assessment
phase of the audit that may indicate the existence of the specified frauds.
• A description of audit procedures that may help you detect material misstatements resulting
from those frauds. As indicated in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU sec. 316), your response to address specifically identified risks of material misstatement
due to fraud may include changing the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures. The
example procedures in this chapter go beyond the example procedures included in SAS No. 99
(AU sec. 316.53).
For fraud schemes relating to the misappropriation of assets, a listing of supplemental internal control
questions helps you and your clients identify control deficiencies that leave them susceptible to fraud.
(Note: Fraudulent financial reporting usually is perpetrated by management, who has the ability to
override most internal controls. For this reason, the sections dealing with fraudulent financial reporting
do not include a discussion of controls.)
This chapter, like the entire book, is written for auditors performing an audit in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). When you extend your audit procedures, you should
continuously evaluate whether the procedures you perform are part of a GAAS audit or part of a fraud
examination consulting engagement.
The material presented in this chapter consists of the author’s observations and recommendations. The
example audit procedures are not required by SAS No. 99.
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Extended Audit Procedures
Misappropriation of Assets
Accounts Receivable

Typical Frauds
Most frauds relating to the misappropriation of collections on accounts receivable involve the
diversion of payments received from customers. The scheme is fairly simple to perform, for
example, an employee opens a bank account with a name similar to that of the company (Acme
Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer payments can then be taken by the employee and
deposited into this bogus bank account.
What varies in accounts receivable frauds is how the frauds are concealed. Common techniques include
the following:
• Lapping. The payment from customer A is diverted by the employee. To keep customer A
from complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A’s account.
Customer C’s payment is applied to customer B’s account, and so on.
• Posting bogus credits to the account. To conceal the fraud, the employee posts credit memos
or other noncash reductions (for example, representing a sales return or the write-off) to the
customer account from whom the funds were diverted.
• Altering internal copies of invoices. The company’s copy of the sales invoice is altered to
report an amount lower than that actually billed to the customer. When payment is received,
the “excess” amount is diverted by the employee.
Another accounts receivable fraud involves the diversion of payments from written-off accounts. Most
companies do not monitor the activity on accounts that have been written off, which provides the
employee with the opportunity to divert payments from these customers and not be detected. For
example, an employee will work with a customer to collect an overdue receivable. As the customer is
about to pay, the employee writes off the account, removing it from the books.
Finally, the author is aware of one fraud committed by an employee who made an arrangement with
customers to “manage” their past-due accounts. The employee took steps to make sure these customers’
accounts were always shown as current in the company’s books and records. This effectively gave the
customers an unlimited amount of time to pay their bills and avoid late fees and interest charges. In
exchange for this service, the employee received a kickback from the customers.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are occurring or have
occurred.
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• Unexplained differences noted by customers on their accounts receivable confirmations.
• Significant delays between the time when the customer states a payment was made and the
payment was recorded as received by the company.
• A significant number of credit entries and other adjustments made to the accounts receivable
records.
• Unexplained or inadequately explained differences between the accounts receivable subsidiary
ledger and the general ledger.

Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. Depending on your
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed as part
of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the
scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their
extent, for example, by selecting more items.
• Confirm account activity (not just the balance) with the customers directly. Be sure to confirm
credit memo and sales return activity, as well as the date payments on account were made.
• Perform analytical reviews of credit memo and write-off activity, for example, by comparing
to prior periods. Look for unusual trends or patterns, such as large numbers of credit memos
pertaining to one customer or sales person, or those processed shortly after the close of an
accounting period.
• Vouch credit memos and other write-offs to receiving records for returned goods,
correspondence with customers, and other documentation supporting the transaction.
• Investigate all differences between the payment date reported by the customer and the payment
date recorded by the company. Do not rely on company-generated activity summaries—
review both sides of the original checks or check copies.
• Analyze recoveries of written-off accounts.
• Obtain an understanding of how the accounts receivable aging is prepared and who has access
to the data used to prepare the aging.

Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying the client’s vulnerability to
the misappropriation of accounts receivable. Make sure the person completing the questionnaire
understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service
matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the
lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions
Related to Fraud
Accounts Receivable
Yes
1. Are different employees responsible for preparing invoices, receiving
payment, and maintaining accounts receivable records?
2. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized accounts
receivable records and processes?
3. Are employees with accounts receivable responsibilities required to take
vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform those
functions when an employee is absent?
4. Are credit memos approved and reviewed by management?
5. Does the entity have a method for tracking and monitoring customer
complaints related to billing? Are these complaints periodically reviewed
by management?
6. Is the accounts receivable subsidiary ledger reconciled to the general ledger
account balance on a regular basis?
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Extended Audit Procedures
Misappropriation of Assets
Inventory

Typical Frauds
One of the more common inventory frauds is the theft of inventory for personal use. This is more likely
to happen when inventory items are small and easy to steal, and the items have value to an employee as
a consumer. For example, computer chips are small and easy to steal, but they have no value to the
employee as a consumer. A laptop computer has the physical characteristics that make it susceptible to
theft, plus the employee can use it immediately. The computer is more likely than the computer chip to
be stolen for personal use.
A more lucrative inventory fraud is the theft of inventory for sale. For these frauds, it’s not necessary
for the inventory to have value to the employee as a consumer, since the goods won’t be used for
personal use. A common scheme is for the receiving personnel to steal the goods right from the
receiving dock, before physical custody is established by the warehouse. For example, the employee
signs a receiving report stating that 100 units were received, but only 90 are stocked in the warehouse
and 10 are placed in the trunk of the employee’s car. The missing units will not be discovered until the
year-end physical inventory count.
For larger inventory items that are more difficult to transport, the receiving personnel may collude with
the vendor’s delivery personnel. The delivery personnel diverts 10 units of inventory to another location
and delivers the remaining 90 units. The receiving personnel prepares a receiving report indicating that
all 100 units were received. The stolen merchandise is then sold and the proceeds split between the two.
Theft of scrap is another common fraud. For example, a hospital employee was convicted of stealing
used x-rays, then recovering and selling the silver. In most companies, inventory scrap is not recorded
or well-controlled, which makes it easy to steal. These thefts can be significant, especially in situations
where the embezzler has the ability to inappropriately designate good inventory as scrap.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are occurring or have
occurred.
• Large differences between the physical inventory counts and perpetual inventory records.
• Unexpected or unexplained increases in inventory turnover accompanied by decreases in gross
profit percentages.
• Unexplained entries in the perpetual inventory records.
• Key inventory ratios (for example, shrinkage, turnover, or gross profit) that vary significantly
from industry norms or between company locations or inventory types.
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• Shipping documents (that is, showing goods were shipped from the company) without
corresponding sales documentation.

Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described here. Depending on your
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed as part
of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the
scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their
extent, for example, by selecting more items.
• Analyze inventory shortages by location or product type. Compare key inventory ratios to
industry norms. Look for unusual concentrations, patterns, or trends as a way to direct further
inquiries and investigations.
• Review receiving reports and look for indication of alternative shipping sites.
• Review supporting documentation for reductions to the perpetual inventory records.
• Compare shipping documents to corresponding documentation.
Because of the nature of inventory theft, it may be difficult to detect using traditional audit
techniques. If your client has reason to believe inventory is being stolen, a fraud examination
may be required. For example, a fraud examiner might perform surveillance of receiving
personnel or make surprise counts of items received into inventory.

Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s vulnerability
to the misappropriation of inventory. Make sure that the person completing the questionnaire
understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service
matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the
lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.

110

Chapter 7: Typical Frauds and Common Responses

Internal Control Questions
Related to Fraud
Inventory
Yes

No

1. Does the client maintain adequate safeguard controls (for example, locked
warehouses) over inventory susceptible to misappropriation?
2. Is there proper segregation of duties between persons responsible for
inventory recordkeeping and those responsible for its physical custody?
3. Are employees with inventory, shipping, and receiving responsibilities
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform
those functions when an employee is absent?
4. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized inventory
records?
5. Are physical inventory counts performed regularly? Are the count procedures
adequate to ensure an accurate count?
6. Is scrap inventoried and controlled?
7. Is there a proper segregation of duties between those with
the authority to sell scrap and those with the responsibility
for doing so?
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Extended Audit Procedures
Misappropriation of Assets
Purchasing and Payroll

Typical Frauds
The purchasing function is particularly vulnerable to fraud. For many small businesses it
represents the largest area of the risk of embezzlement.
The most common fraud scheme is the payment of invoices to a fictitious company. To
perpetrate this scheme, the embezzler establishes a fake entity (often with a P.O. box for an
address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate company) and gets the fake entered into
company records as a legitimate vendor. The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake
vendor, which get processed by the accounts payable system. Sometimes the embezzler is
responsible for authorizing payment; other times not. The scheme may also require collusion
between various people, such as receiving (doctoring a receiving report to indicate something
was received) and accounts payable (approving the invoice for payment).
Another common fraud is a kickback paid by vendors to the company’s purchasing agent. In collusion
with suppliers, a purchasing agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities, including:
• Allowing the vendor to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment. Examples of
fraudulent billing practices include billing for goods or services never performed or received,
billing more than once for the same item, substituting lower quality items than the ones billed,
or overbilling for the items delivered.
• Excess purchasing of property or services.
• Bid-rigging.
Kickbacks are “off-the-book” frauds, that is, their concealment is not recorded on the books of the
company. For that reason, it is often difficult for auditors to detect the presence of kickbacks.
The most common payroll fraud is the use of ghost employees, where the embezzler enters fictitious
employees into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll checks. A variation on this scheme
is to keep terminated employees on the payroll several pay periods after they leave their job. The
embezzler then receives the paycheck for the terminated employee.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are occurring or have
occurred.
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• Fictitious vendors
― Photocopied invoices or invoices have obviously been tampered with (for example,
sections have been “whited out” and typed over).
― Invoice numbers from the same vendor occur in an unbroken consecutive sequence.
― Invoices from companies have a P.O. box address or no phone number.
― Invoices from companies have the same address or phone number as an employee.
― The amount of each invoice from a particular vendor falls just below a threshold for review.
― Multiple companies have the same address and phone number.
― Vendor names appear to be a “knock-off” of well-established businesses.
• Kickbacks
― Purchasing agent handles all matters related to a vendor even though it might be outside or
below his or her normal duties.
― Vendors who receive an inordinate amount of business from the company for no apparent
business reason.
― Vendor salesmen make frequent, unexplained visits to purchasing personnel.
― Prices from a particular vendor are unreasonably high when compared to others.
― Quality of goods or services received is low.
― Tips or complaints are received from other employees or honest vendors.
― Key contracts are awarded with no formal bid process.
• Ghost employees
― Employees with duplicate addresses, checking accounts, or Social Security numbers.
― Employees with no withholding taxes, insurance, or other normal deductions.

Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described in the previous list.
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS.
Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are
already being performed, consider expanding their extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Review selected invoices and look for evidence that the invoice has been doctored.
• Perform a computerized search of the vendor list and look for P.O. box addresses, duplicate
addresses, and vendors with no phone number.
• Perform a computerized match of the vendor list with a list of employees and look for matches
of addresses or phone numbers.
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• Perform a computerized sort of invoices by vendor and look for unusual sequencing or amount
(indication of possible fictitious company). Look for unusual pricing and volume trends
(indication of possible kickback).
• Review selected invoices and examine supporting documentation indicating goods or services
were received.
• Perform a computerized search of payroll records to identify duplicate addresses, Social
Security numbers, or bank accounts.
• Review personnel files and look for those that contain little or no evidence of activity, for
example, a lack of performance evaluations, requests for changes to withholdings, or
retirement plan options.
Because kickbacks are conducted off the books, they may be difficult to detect using traditional
audit techniques. If your client has reason to believe a purchasing agent is accepting kickbacks, a
fraud examination may be required.

Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s
vulnerability to the misappropriation of assets in the purchasing and payroll functions. Make sure
that the person completing the questionnaire understands the implication of these questions.
“No” responses may not change your control risk assessment or your assessment of the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service matter, however, you should consider
discussing these items with your client and explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the
company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions
Related to Fraud
Purchasing and Payroll
Yes

No

1. Is there adequate segregation of duties between purchasing, receiving, and
the accounts payable function?
2. Are employees with purchasing and accounts payable responsibilities
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform
those functions when an employee is absent?
3. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized vendor,
accounts payable, and payroll records?
4. If the company chooses suppliers based on competitive bids, are all bids
date stamped when received, and opened at the same time under dual control?
5. Does the accounts payable system include controls to avoid duplicate
payments?
6. Are new vendors reviewed by management before being added to the list of
qualified vendors?
7. Does the company have a written policy on the amount and type of gifts an
employee can accept from suppliers and customers? Is that policy
communicated to employees, customers, and suppliers?
8. Does the company include a “right to audit” clause in its contracts with
major suppliers?1
9. Are new employees approved by management before being added to the
payroll records?
10. Are there controls in place to ensure that terminated employees are removed
from payroll records in a timely fashion?
11. If the size of the entity permits it, does the owner-manager periodically
review the payroll records to determine if every employee listed is personally
known to him or her?

1

“Right to audit” clauses can be included in contracts or printed on the back of all purchase orders. Under a right-to-audit
clause, the company reserves the right to audit the vendor’s books at any time. Vendors who know their records are subject to
examination generally are reluctant to make bribery payments.
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Extended Audit Procedures
Misappropriation of Assets
Cash

Typical Frauds
The most common way in which a company (particularly a small business) is defrauded of cash
is through fraudulent disbursements. Under these schemes, the employee uses company checks to
either (1) withdraw cash directly for their own benefit or (2) pay personal expenses. For example:
• An employee wrote checks payable to cash and posted the debit to various expense accounts.
When the bank statement came back with the canceled checks, she simply discarded the ones
she had cashed then proceeded to perform the bank reconciliation.
• An employee used company checks to pay personal credit card bills. Each month, he had a credit
card bill approximately equal to the company’s required payroll tax withholding. Instead of
making the payroll tax deposit, he wrote a check to the credit card company. He discarded these
checks when they were returned with the bank statements. He also discarded the notices received
from the IRS stating that the company’s payroll withholding deposits had not been made.
There are infinite variations on these types of frauds.
People who commit these kinds of frauds are faced with two tasks. First, they must post a debit
somewhere in the general ledger to disguise the disbursement. The clever embezzler will post
this debit to an expense account (which is closed out at the end of the year, thus eliminating the
audit trail), or to inventory (where differences between the books and the physical count flow
through cost of sales, thus eliminating the audit trail). Second, the embezzler must have a way for
avoiding detection during the bank reconciliation process. In a small business, this usually is
possible because of a lack of segregation of duties. It might also involve collusion.
Companies that handle large amounts of cash are also susceptible to theft of cash on hand. Industries
such as retail sales or restaurants are particularly susceptible to these kinds of frauds. It would be rare
that the theft of cash on hand would be material to an entity’s financial statements, but as a client
service matter, you should be alert to the possibility. Common schemes include:
• Skimming. Cash is “skimmed” before it enters the accounting system. For example, the
employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt, or prepares a receipt for less than the
amount taken.
• Substituting personal checks for cash. The employee takes money from the cash register and
substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always “in balance,” but the
employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank account. In that
way, the employee receives free use of the cash.
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• Fictitious refunds and discount. The employee records a refund and removes cash as if a
refund had occurred, but no merchandise was returned or discount given.
• Altered credit card receipts. This is a problem in the restaurant business where the waitperson
will increase the tip on a credit card receipt.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above are occurring or have
occurred:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Large, unexplained reconciling items in the bank reconciliations.
Bank statements that do not include canceled checks.
Some canceled checks are missing.
Disbursements are unsupported by invoices or other documentation.
Customer complaints.
Altered or missing cash register tapes.

Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. Depending on your
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed as part
of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the
scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their
extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Examination of bank reconciliations. A thorough review of bank reconciliations is one of the
best ways to detect fraud relating to cash.
• Review bank statements and canceled checks. Look for checks made out to cash or to
employees. Compare endorsement to payee. Make sure all canceled checks are accounted for.
• Obtain a bank cut-off statement. Cut-off statements are ordered from the bank and delivered
directly to the auditor who reconciles them.
• Search for and examine unusual expense account activity close to the end of an accounting
period. The theft of cash usually is concealed with a debit to an expense account because
expenses are closed to retained earnings at the end of the accounting cycle. The clever
embezzler will concentrate his or her theft at the end of the cycle to limit the amount of time
the theft remains on the books.
• Surprise cash counts. These will sometimes turn up embezzlement of petty cash.
• Analyze sales discounts and returns. Compare current period to prior periods or breakdown
activity by employee. Look for unusual patterns or trends.
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Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s
vulnerability to the misappropriation of cash. Make sure that the person completing the
questionnaire understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change
your control risk assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
As a client service matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client
and explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions
Related to Fraud
Cash
Yes

No

1. Are all bank accounts reconciled on a timely basis?
2. Is the person who reconciles the bank accounts different from the person
responsible for cash disbursements?
3. Does the company receive canceled checks along with its bank
statements?
4. Do the bank reconciliation procedures include accounting for all
canceled checks?
5. Are employees with cash disbursement and bank reconciliation duties
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to
perform those functions when an employee is absent?
6. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized cash
disbursement records?
7. Does the company limit the physical access to negotiable assets, such as
blank checks?
8. Does the owner review and sign all checks? If not, do disbursements over
a certain dollar amount require dual signature or other control procedure?
9. If company employees process a significant amount of cash transactions,
does the company adequately control and monitor these transactions?
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Extended Audit Procedures
Misappropriation of Assets
Computer Schemes

Typical Frauds
The most common types of computer schemes involve input tampering. This can be accomplished by
altering, forging, or fabricating computer input documents. In an entity without adequate logical access
control (which is not uncommon for small businesses), input tampering is quite easy to accomplish.
The more common computer input schemes include:
• Entering false transactions. For example, entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts
payable system or recording false credit memos to accounts receivable.
• Entering bogus file maintenance transactions. File maintenance activities include such
transactions as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. Bogus
file maintenance transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example,
the use of ghost employees to embezzle funds.
• Failure to enter legitimate transactions or file maintenance instructions. For example, when
an employee is terminated, that information should be entered into the computer system to
remove that employee from the payroll records. A failure to do this creates a ghost employee.
• Altering input data. For example, changing the amounts, dates, or other information contained
on the input data.
Other computer frauds involve program modification schemes, sometimes referred to as “throughput
frauds.” To accomplish these schemes requires an understanding of and the ability to modify computer
application programs. Typical schemes include:
• Bogus instructions. A computer programmer may place bogus instructions into a computer
program so the computer will perform unauthorized functions, for example, making payments
to a vendor not listed on an approved list.
• Siphoning funds. Funds can be siphoned in small amounts from a large number of accounts,
for example, pennies and portions of pennies (due to rounding) can be shaved from
thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a single account that is
accessed by the embezzler.
• Direct manipulation of accounts. Computer programs may be altered to obtain direct access to
manipulate files without authorization. For example, file maintenance changes may be
accomplished without the input of the normal documentation.
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What to Look For
Computers often are used to accomplish the frauds listed elsewhere in this section of the publication.
Observing signs of other frauds may lead you to one of the computer fraud schemes listed here. In
addition to the items listed elsewhere, be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds
described here are occurring or have occurred.
• Inability to process computer applications in a timely manner.
• Unexplained differences in batch or hash totals, or other means to control computer input.
• Undocumented or unauthorized account postings, file changes, or modifications to application
programs.
• Unexplained differences between the general ledger and computerized accounting records (for
example, a computer spreadsheet) maintained on a separate computer.
Most small businesses use microcomputers, either to process accounting information or to prepare or
summarize information for input (for example, through use of a spreadsheet). The use of
microcomputers and a highly decentralized computer processing environment can leave a company
vulnerable to various fraud schemes because of:
• A lack of segregation of duties. The same person can prepare a source document (for example,
an invoice), process the information (prepare a spreadsheet summary for the day or month),
and review the output (review the output and input the totals to the general ledger).
• Lack of logical access. Many off-the-shelf computer programs contain logical access controls,
such as password protection. Unfortunately, entities often fail to install these controls or do so
ineffectively.
• Lack of adequate computer processing controls. Most microcomputer accounting packages
contain controls to ensure the accuracy of processing or to identify conditions that require user
follow-up (for example, exception reports). Again, many entities fail to properly implement
these controls.
When gaining an understanding of the entity’s internal controls, be alert for weaknesses relating
to the entity’s use of microcomputers. An excellent source of additional information is Auditing
in Common Computer Environments, an Auditing Procedures Study published by the AICPA.

Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. Depending on your
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed
as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed
outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider
expanding their extent, for example by selecting more items.
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• Review documentation supporting a selection of financial transactions or file maintenance
procedures.
• Review error reports, batch processing totals, and other user controls over the input and
processing of financial transactions or file maintenance procedures.
• Reconstruct accounts or files from original source documents.

Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s
vulnerability to computer fraud. Make sure that the person completing the questionnaire
understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client
service matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client and
explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions
Related to Fraud
Computer Schemes
Yes

No

1. Is there a proper segregation of duties between the authorization of input, the
preparation of input, and the reconciliation of output?
2. Are employees with computer input duties required to take vacations, and
are other employees cross-trained to perform those functions when an
employee is absent?
3. Is there a proper segregation of duties between computer programmers and
computer operators?
4. Has the company implemented effective logical access controls, including
access to application programs, master files, and databases?
5. Does the company have adequate controls to ensure the adequacy and
legitimacy of input data?
6. Does the company have adequate controls to ensure that changes to computer
applications are authorized and they function as planned?
7. Are exception reports, error listings, and other computer-generated items that
require user follow-up investigated and resolved in a timely manner?
8. Are spreadsheets and other microcomputer applications used to process
significant accounting information checked for accuracy by someone other
than the person who prepared it?
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Extended Audit Procedures
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Inventory

Typical Frauds
Inventory frauds are perpetrated to manipulate earnings—inflated ending inventory balances
reduce the amount of reported cost of goods sold, which results in improper increases to gross
profit and net income. The usual method for inflating ending inventory is to report fictitious
inventory amounts. This can be done in numerous ways, including:
•
•
•
•

Altering quantities reported on inventory count tags that were not checked by the auditors.
Entering inventory count tags for nonexistent inventory.
Shifting the same inventory between several different locations.
Altering or disguising the physical characteristics of inventory items to make it appear as if
larger quantities are on hand. For example, hollow stacks of inventory that are made to appear
solid, or inventory boxes filled with weights.

In other instances, management may be predisposed to understate beginning inventory balances,
which has the same desired effect of increasing current period earnings. For example, this
scheme may be perpetrated when there has been a change in management, and current
management wishes to report improved profitability. The most common method for understating
beginning inventory is to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above are occurring or have
occurred.
• Inability to produce all inventory count tags.
• Lack of control over the population of used count tags.
• Slow inventory turnover; increases in certain types of inventory or in branches or other
locations not examined by auditors.
• Inability to produce vendor invoices supporting purchases (for example, invoices unavailable
while performing price test work).
• Significant changes in gross profit percentages.
• Large unexplained reconciling differences between the inventory amounts recorded on the
books and the physical inventory count.
• Large increases in inventory balances without corresponding increases in purchases.
• Journal entries made directly to the inventory account and not through the purchases journal.
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Example Audit Procedures
Your primary audit procedure relating to the existence of inventory is the physical inventory count. The
following audit procedures, performed during the physical inventory count, will help detect the frauds
described here. Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively,
they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit.
• Account for all inventory tags used during the physical count.
• Expand the number of test counts.
• Rigorously examine all items counted, for example by opening sealed boxes to observe the
contents.
• Perform physical inventory counts at all locations simultaneously.
• Use the work of a specialist to help determine the quality (for example, the purity, grade, or
concentration) of the inventory items.
• Perform analytical review procedures of gross profit; analyze according to location or
inventory type.
• Perform analytical review procedures of inventory balances and purchases; analyze according
to location or inventory type.
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Extended Audit Procedures
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Overvalued Assets

Typical Frauds
Overvaluing assets is a relatively simple way to directly manipulate reported earnings because
overstated assets usually result in understated expenses. Common schemes for reporting overvalued
assets include:
• Improper capitalization of costs that should have been expensed.
• Failure to recognize impairment losses on long-lived assets.
• Recognition of fictitious assets, for example, through the use of related-party transactions, the
manipulation of intercompany accounts, or the failure to write off expired assets.
• Recognition of assets that the company does not have title to.
• Unreasonable or unsupportable asset valuation allowances.
• Unreasonable or unsupportable estimates of fair value, for assets required to be reported at fair value.
• Improper classification of marketable securities such as trading, available-for-sale, or heldto-maturity.
• Manipulation of depreciation expense, for example through unreasonable assumptions about
the useful lives of assets or their residual values.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above are occurring
or have occurred.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Unusually high fixed-asset balances, when compared to total assets or to comparable entities.
Unrealistically large changes in asset balances.
Unusual or unexplained relationship between depreciation expense and fixed asset balances.
Events or changes in circumstances that indicate assets may have been impaired.
Missing documents related to asset transactions.
Journal entries affecting the reported amount of assets, particularly entries made near the end
of the reporting period or those that are unsupported or unauthorized.
• Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s asset-related records and the general ledger.
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Example Audit Procedures
Auditors have an advantage when auditing for overvalued assets because they direct their audit
procedures toward an amount the entity has already recorded. This is much easier than trying to detect
transactions or amounts that the entity has not recorded, such as unrecorded liabilities. In addition to
your normal procedures to address the assertions related to assets, you also might consider performing
the following:
• Extending the scope of detailed audit procedures related to the acquisition of fixed assets, such
as the examination of supporting documents.
• Physical observation of fixed assets.
• Confirm the terms of significant fixed asset additions with the counterparty to the transaction.
• Confirm that the entity has title to reported assets through a review of relevant legal documents
or public records.
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Extended Audit Procedures
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Underreported Liabilities

Typical Frauds
The fraudulent underreporting liabilities can have a direct positive effect on an entity’s financial
position and its reported earnings. Common schemes to underreport liabilities include the following:
• Understating accounts payable, for example, by recording purchases in subsequent accounting
periods, overstating purchase returns, or falsifying documents that make it appear liabilities
have been paid off.
• Recognizing unearned revenue as earned revenue.
• Failure to record all debt or other liabilities.
• Failure to recognize contingent liabilities.
• Underreporting future obligations, such as warranty costs.

What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may indicate that one of the frauds mentioned above is occurring or
has occurred.
• Unusual or unexplained trends in accounts payable balances or differences between the
entity’s payables balances and those of comparable entities.
• Evidence of contingent liabilities in attorney’s letter responses, correspondence from
regulatory agencies or others, or other information gathered during the engagement.
• Significant purchases of assets with no recorded debt.
• Unusual or unexplained relationships between interest expense and recorded liabilities.
• Unexplained significant decreases in liabilities.
• Unusual relationship between the trend in the accrual for estimated warranty expense and
sales.
• Receiving reports received near the end of the reporting period without a corresponding
invoice.
• Amounts listed on vendor’s statements that were not reported as purchases.
• Discrepancies in debt confirmations.
• Obligations reported as being discussed by management in the entity’s minutes, but not
reported in the accounting records.
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Example Audit Procedures
In addition to the audit procedures typically performed related to liabilities, you might also consider the
following:
• Perform lien searches on entity properties to search for unrecorded debt.
• Confirm the existence and terms of liabilities, including payables, with third parties.
• Read internal correspondence and correspondence between the entity and third parties to
identify the existence or possible underreporting of liabilities.

129

CHAPTER 8: COMPUTER ASSISTED AUDIT TECHNIQUES

For many years, fraud experts have recognized that computer assisted audit techniques (CAATs)
can be a powerful tool to help detect indicators of fraud. CAATs provide you with the ability to
apply audit techniques that would be either impossible to perform manually or very inefficient or
ineffective if applied manually. The purpose of using CAATs, as with performing manual
procedures, is the identification of the signs of possible material misstatements due to fraud.
CAATs are a perfect opportunity to use computerized procedures to make the audit more
effective and efficient. In general, CAATs allow you to:
• Identify patterns in the data that may indicate fraud
• Quickly examine large volumes of information
For the purposes of helping you identify or respond to the risks of material misstatement due to
fraud, the most popular CAATs involve the use of data extraction software.

Data Extraction Software
Data extraction software is used to read, analyze, and manipulate client data that is stored
electronically. After telling the software how the client’s data is organized (the file record
layout), you can manipulate that data in a variety of ways, including:
• Sort data into different categories, including numeric, date (for example, aging analysis), or
other nonfinancial criteria (for example, sales by region, product, or salesperson)
• Join and match files, for example, matching the vendors paid per the accounts payable master
file against the approved vendor file as a way to determine if any payments were made to
unapproved vendors.
• Select individual items that meet specified criteria for additional test work. Criteria may be
financial (all invoices over a certain dollar amount) or nonfinancial (all payments made to a
certain vendor).
• Perform analytical procedures.

Sample Uses of CAATs to Identify Material Misstatements Caused by Fraud
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), and this Practice Aid describe numerous
example procedures that will help you identify or respond to the risks of material misstatement
due to fraud. In this section, we summarize those tests that may be performed using CAATs.
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Fraudulent Financial Reporting
General Ledger Analysis

• Identify journal entries that meet certain criteria and require additional test work, for example:
― Nonstandard entries.
― Journal entries that exceed a specified dollar amount or occurred during a particular time.
― Entries made by individuals who typically do not make journal entries.
― Journal entries with no explanation, description, or account numbers.
Revenue Recognition

• Match recorded sales to customer database. Identify sales to customers not listed in the
database, which may indicate sales made to nonexistent customers.
• Match recorded sales to electronic shipping records and/or customer purchase orders.
Unmatched sales may indicate sales that were recorded before shipment or without being
ordered.
• Search sales records for duplicate invoices, which may indicate duplicate billing as a way to
increase reported sales.
• Search recorded sales for sales to related parties.
• Search sales records for entries made directly via journal entries or other unusual sources.
• Search sales and shipping records and identify sales that meet certain criteria (for example,
over a certain dollar amount or those made to a certain customer or shipped after a certain
date) for additional test work.
• Analyze revenue using disaggregated data. For example, compare revenue reported by month
and by product line or business segment during the current reporting period with comparable
prior periods or budgeted amounts.

Inventory
•
•
•
•

Search inventory records for entries made directly via journal entries or other unusual sources.
Analyze increases in inventory or inventory turnover at locations not visited by auditors.
Analyze gross profit using disaggregated data, such as individual products or location.
Compare inventory quantities for the current period with prior period or perpetual records. Use
disaggregated data, such as category of inventory, location, or other criteria.
• Search inventory records for unusual entries or adjustments, such as negative entries for
inventory received.
• Sort physical inventory records by:
― Tag number, to test tag control, or
― Item serial number to test the possibility of item omission or duplication.
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Misappropriation of Assets
Cash

• Analyze expense account activity at a disaggregated level. Compare current-year activity to
prior-year activity. Look for patterns that may indicate someone is debiting expense accounts
as a way to conceal a defalcation.
• Analyze sales returns by employee or compare current period to prior period.
• Sort disbursements by check number and look for missing or duplicate check numbers.
Accounts Receivable

• Search accounts receivable records and identify credit entries and other adjustments or credit
balances.
• Match accounts receivable aging to invoice and shipping files. Look for mismatched dates that
may indicate incorrect aging.
• Analyze credit memos at a disaggregated level, for example, by customer, sales person, or
product. Look for unusual patterns or trends, such as a large number of credits issued for the
customers of a particular salesperson.
Accounts Payable and Payroll

• Search accounts payable and vendor files for indications of fictitious vendors, including:
― Vendor invoices from the same vendor that occur in an unbroken consecutive sequence.
― Vendors with only a P.O. box address and/or no phone number.
― Different vendors that have the same address and phone numbers.
― Vendor names that are very similar to the names of approved vendors, for example, ABC
Enterprises instead of The ABC Company.
• Match accounts payable and vendor file with employee data. Look for vendors with the same
address or phone number as an employee, as this could indicate a fictitious vendor.
• Analyze payment details and look for prices from a particular vendor that are unreasonably
high when compared to the prices for the same or a similar product from a different vendor.
This unusual relationship may indicate a kickback scheme.
• Sort payments by amount and identify transactions that fall just under control limits
established by the entity.
• Search payroll records for indications of a “ghost employee,” for example:
― Employees with duplicate addresses, checking accounts, or Social Security numbers.
― Employees with no withholding taxes, insurance, or other normal deductions.
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Benford’s Law

Benford’s law was developed by Frank Benford, a research engineer for GE during the first half
of the 20th century. Benford’s law predicts the occurrence of digits in data, and it concludes that
the first digit in a large population will be a 1 about 30 percent of the time. Less frequently the
digit will be a 2, even less frequently a 3, and so on. A 9 will be a first digit only 5 percent of the
time.
Not all populations will have distributions according to Benford’s law. For example, suppose that
it costs an entity a minimum of $5.50 to ship all products that weigh less than two pounds and
that most products shipped weigh less than two pounds. In this circumstance, the digit 5 will
probably occur more frequently than predicted by Benford’s law.
To use Benford’s law to help identify risks of material misstatement caused by fraud, you should
make sure that the population has the following characteristics:
• No minimum or maximum values
• No price break points (for example, $5.50 to ship all products less than two pounds)
• No assigned numbers (for example, Social Security numbers)
Fraud specialists can use Benford’s law to identify indicators of possible frauds. When
populations of data are analyzed and the distribution of digits does not follow Benford’s law, that
may indicate the data has been manipulated or fraudulently prepared. For example, an auditor
might analyze disbursements from the accounts payable files or debit entries to expense accounts
and compare the digit frequency to Benford’s law. Discrepancies between actual and predicted
occurrence of digits may indicate fraudulent transactions.

Audit Considerations When Using CAATs
When determining whether and how to use CAATs on your audit, the factors to consider include
the following:
• Audit objective. To determine whether CAATs are appropriate for your engagement, you first
should consider the objective of the tests you want to perform and whether these tests are: (1)
possible and (2) most efficient if performed by computer. Making this determination will
require you to have a good understanding of the capabilities of the data extraction or analysis
software. You also will have to work closely with the client to determine the timing and
availability of all the necessary data files.
• Auditor’s knowledge, expertise, and experience. You should evaluate your own ability to
perform any CAATs. You or your team should have a thorough understanding of the basics of
data processing, as well as a working knowledge of the data extraction software. If you do not
possess that information in-house, some companies can provide it to you on an outsource
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basis. For example, you can provide your client’s data files and other information to a third
party, who will perform the data extraction and analysis for you.
• Reliability of the entity’s information technology (IT) system. The entity’s IT system must be
able to generate reliable information. If past client history indicates that the accounting system
is less than reliable and requires many adjustments to generate financial information, the use
of CAATs may not be efficient or effective.
• Completeness and accuracy of data received from the client. It is imperative that you review
the data files you receive from the client before you perform any analysis, extraction, or
other test. Make sure that you obtain information from the client that will allow you to
verify the completeness and accuracy of the information received. For example, you might
want to obtain a record count or a total of key information. It also helps to obtain a printout
of the first and last 100 or so records so you can compare these to the electronic information
you received. The file that you use to perform your tests must be a complete and accurate
copy of the client’s financial information, otherwise the results of the tests you perform will
not be valid.
• Postprocessing review. After you have completed your procedures, you should review the
results for possible indications that the files were not read or processed properly. For example,
an unusual number of exceptions or the absence of items that should have been identified for
follow-up, may indicate that the processing was performed incorrectly.

Additional Resources
Data Extraction Software and Processing
• Interactive Data Extraction & Analysis (IDEA). One of the leading data extraction software
packages. www.caseware.com or www.audimation.com.
• ACL. One of the leading data extraction software packages. www.acl.com.
• AuditWatch. Provides training on both IDEA and ACL. Also provides outsourced data
extraction services for auditors. www.auditwatch.com.
• PPC Guide to Data Extraction Software. www.ppcnet.com.
Use of CAATs to Identify or Respond to Risks of Fraud

• Audit Tools. Products, services, training and links to information about the use of CAATs.
www.audittools.com.
• Colorado Accountants. Information and links to other sites on general use of CAATs.
www.coloradoaccountants.com/Systems/dataextract.htm.
• Investigating by Computer. A self-study, CD-ROM-based course available from the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. www.cfenet.com.
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• Publications from Global Audit Publications, an independent division of ACL:
― Fraud Detection: Using Data Analysis Techniques to Detect Fraud, by David Coderre.
― Fraud Toolkit for ACL by David Coderre.
― Digital Analysis Using Benford’s Law: Tests & Statistics for Auditors, by Mark Nigrini.
― CAATs & Other BEASTs for Auditors, by David Coderre.
• Mark Nigrini, “I’ve Got Your Number,” Journal of Accountancy (May 1999). A discussion of
Benford’s law and how auditors might use it.
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As I’ve worked on this book, I’ve come to believe that Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 316), has the potential to significantly advance the profession—to help us do our
jobs more effectively, to audit smarter. It is a standard that reaches into all areas of the audit
process and it moves us in a different direction, away from the “checklist mentality” and into
more of a thinking person’s audit. It puts professional skepticism front and center and forces us
to examine the psychology that we bring to our engagements. Depending on how the standard is
implemented, it has the potential to be a watershed for how we think about and perform our
engagements.
As an auditor, I would like to see the development of the following initiatives, which would
continue what the issuance of SAS No. 99 has only just begun.
• Professional skepticism. If this is the cornerstone of auditing, more work needs to be done to
understand the psychology of auditing, the assumptions and biases that are part of our current
mindset, and how auditors can learn to develop and deploy an appropriate level of skepticism
on their engagements.
• More effective inquiries. Auditors gather a great deal of information through inquiry; it is one
of our primary auditing procedures. And yet, for all its importance, most auditors are never
trained in how to conduct an effective inquiry. This weakness in our collective skills reduces
the effectiveness of our audit procedures. For example, for years, observers of the profession
have called for the application of more effective analytical procedures. Remedies invariably
focus on how to perform a better analysis. That is not the problem—CPAs have analytical
skills in spades. The problem with the performance of analytical procedures is that auditors
have never been trained to ask the right questions and to structure their inquiries in a way that
gathers the information they need to conduct an effective analysis. The same phenomenon
occurs whenever inquiries are a significant part of the information gathering process, for
example, understanding internal control, or the client’s business, or auditing estimates.
SAS No. 99 places even more emphasis on inquiries as an effective audit procedure. To more
effectively implement SAS No. 99 and to improve the effectiveness of existing standards,
additional guidance on conducting inquiries is needed.
• Analysis vs. synthesis. Analysis involves the breaking apart of an item into its component
parts and then examining those parts to see how they’re related. Synthesis is the opposite.
Synthesis is the combining of elements to create a new, complex whole.
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As auditors, we are trained in (and some would argue, genetically predisposed toward)
analysis. SAS No. 99 reminds us that effective auditing also involves synthesis, taking a wide
variety of information and forming it into a coherent statement of where and how fraud is
most likely to occur at the entity.
What is the process for synthesizing information and how does this process differ from
analysis? How can auditors improve their ability to synthesize information? Audit
effectiveness would be improved if we as a profession could begin to explore and discuss
these questions.
• Skills training. SAS No. 99 introduces new procedures that require skills that, by and large,
receive little if any formal training. Client inquiry and the ability to synthesize information are
just two of these skills. The brainstorming requirement of SAS No. 99 calls for facilitation
skills and a large dose of intuitive, nonlinear thinking. All of these skills will directly benefit
the entire profession, not just auditors performing a generally accepted auditing standards
audit. Work should be done to identify these skills and develop effective diffusion strategies
so they can be adopted by the profession and those about to enter it. Do auditors need formal
training on fraud detection and investigation matters? Will more formal training on fraud
matters help us to better serve the public interest? Those questions should be addressed.
• Make fraud expertise available to smaller firms. With a renewed emphasis on detecting material
misstatements caused by fraud, it is plausible that many auditors will need to use a fraud specialist
on their engagements in the same way they use other specialists (for example, technology
specialists or those with expertise in valuing particular assets). Many of the larger CPA firms have
fraud specialists on staff to help with auditors performing a GAAS audit. But what about firms
who do not have these resources? Somehow, fraud expertise must be made available to firms that
do not possess it in-house or do not have the resources to acquire it. For example, strategic
alliances between CPA firms performing GAAS audits and firms that specialize in fraud could be
formed. Even a database of firms that provide fraud investigation and detection services would be
a major help to GAAS auditors who need this type of expertise.
All future initiatives in this area should be developed in the same type of environment present
during the writing of SAS No. 99. That environment was relatively apolitical and devoid of
marketing, public relations, or other extraneous needs creating artificial pressures and arbitrary
deadlines. The result was a standard that demonstrates an ongoing commitment to improving the
profession, a commitment that existed long before it became a political imperative, and one that
will continue long after the current situation facing the profession passes.
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Introduction
During the planning and performance of an audit, you may identify information that indicates the
presence of one of the three conditions of the fraud triangle (incentive/pressure, opportunity, and
attitude/rationalization). These conditions or events are referred to as fraud risk factors. Fraud risk
factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud; however, they often have been present in
circumstances where fraud exists.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), provides fraud risk factor examples that
have been written to apply to most enterprises. The purpose of this Appendix is to provide examples of
industry-specific fraud risk factors and other conditions that may indicate the presence of a material
misstatement due to fraud. Remember that fraud risk factors are only one of several sources of
information you consider when identifying and assessing risk of material misstatement due to fraud.

Contents of the Appendix
The industry-specific fraud risk factors that follow include interpretations of some of the SAS No. 99
example risk factors tailored to particular industries. Each section should be used to supplement, but
not replace, the example risk factors included in SAS No. 99.
One of the key changes to audit practice that SAS No. 99 sought to impose was a better linking of
auditor response to identified fraud risk factors. To help you develop more effective audit programs,
the following sections also contain example audit procedures you may perform in response to
specifically identified risks.

Additional Resources
You may be interested in fraud risk factors and possible audit responses for specialized industries
that are not listed here. The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention,
published by and available through the AICPA, is an excellent source for this information.
Specialized industries included in Appendix A to that handbook that are not included in this Practice
Aid include:
• Construction contractors
• High technology
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Manufacturing
Media and communications
Professional services
Recreation
Natural resources
Retail
Transportation
Wholesale

Appendix A: Industry-Specific Conditions That May Indicate the Presence of Fraud

Banks, Savings Institutions, and Credit Unions
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each type of fraud, the risk factors are further classified based on the
three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
The following are examples of risk factors that might result in misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by narrowing margins.
(1) An increase of competitor investment products that are close alternatives for the
institution’s deposit products (for example, mutual funds, insurance annuities, and
mortgage loans), placing pressure on the institution’s deposit rates.
(2) Competitor product pricing that results in loss of customers or market share for such
products as loan, deposit, trust, asset management, and brokerage offerings.
b. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
(1) A failure or inability to keep pace with or to afford rapid changes in technology, if the
financial stability or profitability of the particular institution is placed at risk due to
that failure or inability.
(2) Significant unexpected volatility (for example, in interest rates, foreign exchange
rates, and commodity prices) in financial markets where the institution has a
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significant capital market presence and is exposed to loss of revenue or has not
appropriately hedged its risk to price changes that effect proprietary positions.
c. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or overall economy.
(1) Deteriorating economic conditions (for example, declining corporate earnings,
adverse exchange movements, and real estate prices) within industries or geographic
regions where the institution has significant credit concentrations.
(2) For credit unions, losing a very substantial portion of the membership base, which
places considerable pressure on management insofar as financial projections are often
based on gaining new members and offering commercial loans.
d. Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other peer financial
institutions.
(1) Unusually large growth in the loan portfolio without a commensurate increase in the
size of the allowance for loan and lease losses.
e. New and existing accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) Substantially weak CAMELS, (capital adequacy, asset quality, management,
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk) or, for bank-holding companies,
BOPEC (bank’s CAMELS rating, operation of significant nonbanking subsidiaries,
parent’s strength and operations, earnings of the banking organization, and capital of
the banking organization) ratings.
(2) Regulatory capital requirements.
f. Decline in asset quality due to:
(1) Borrowers affected by recessionary declines and layoffs.
(2) Issuers affected by recessionary declines and industry factors.
2. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set
up by the board of directors or management, including incentive goals.
a. Unrealistically aggressive loan goals and lucrative incentive programs for loan
originations.
(1) Relaxation of credit standards.
(2) Excessive extension of credit standards with approved deviation from policy.
(3) Excessive concentration of lending (particularly new lending).
(4) Excessive lending in new products.
(5) Excessive pricing concessions not linked to enhanced collateral positions or other
business rational (for example, sales of other products or services).
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b. Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending
transactions, such as business combinations.
(1) Acquisition of another institution has been announced in the press with the terms
dependent on the future financial results of the acquiring institution.
c. Willingness by management to respond to these pressures by pursuing business
opportunities for which the institution does not possess the needed expertise.
d. Excessive reliance on wholesale funding (brokered deposits).
e. Speculative use of derivatives.
f. Failure to establish economic hedges against key risks (for example, interest rate) through
effective asset liability committee (ALCO) processes.
g. Changes in a bank’s loan loss accounting methodology that are not accompanied by
observed changes in credit administration practices or credit conditions.
h. Frequent or unusual exceptions to credit policy.
i. Threat of a downgrade in the institution’s overall regulatory rating (for example, CAMEL,
MACRO, or BOPEC) that could preclude expansion or growth plans.
j. Threat of failing to meet minimum capital adequacy requirements that could cause adverse
regulatory actions.
3. Management’s or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Heavy concentrations of their personal net worth in the entity.
b. Bank is privately owned by one person or family whose net worth or income (from
dividends) is dependent on the bank.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related entity transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Loans and other transactions with directors, officers, significant shareholders,
affiliates, and other related parties, particularly those involving favorable terms.
(2) Be aware of special purpose entities, subprime, and predetorial lending by banks in an
effort to obtain better yields.
(3) Transfers of impaired assets.
b. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
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(1) Significant estimates generally include the allowance for loan losses, and the
valuation of servicing rights, residual interests, and deferred tax assets, fair value
determinations, and the recognition of other impairment losses (for example, goodwill
and investments).
c. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) Could include consolidation questions with special purpose entities (SPEs).
(2) The institution has material amounts of complex financial instruments and derivatives
that are difficult to value, or the institution uses complex collateral disposition
schemes.
d. Frequent or unusual adjustments to the allowance for loan and lease losses.
e. Loan sales that result in retained beneficial interests. Valuation of retained beneficial
interests is based on estimates and assumptions and are susceptible to manipulation if not
properly controlled.
f. Complex transactions that result in income or gains, such as sale and leasebacks, with
arbitrarily short leaseback terms.
g. Deferred tax assets, arising from net operating loss carryforwards, without valuation
allowances.
h. Deferral of loan origination costs that exceed the appropriate costs that may be deferred
under Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 91, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated with
Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of Leases.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over
financial reporting, such as lack of oversight of critical processes in the following areas:
(1) Cash and correspondent banks―reconciliation and review.
(2) Intercompany or interbranch cash or suspense accounts and “internal” demand deposit
account―monitoring of activity and resolution of aged items.
(3) Lending―lack of credit committee.
(4) Treasury―securities/derivatives valuation (selection of models, methodologies, and
assumptions).
(5) Regulatory compliance―lack of knowledge of pertinent regulation.
(6) Deposits―lack of monitoring unusual and significant activity.
b. Ineffective internal audit function.
c. Lack of board-approved credit (underwriting and administration) or investment policies.
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d. Vacant staff positions remain unfilled for extended periods, thereby preventing proper
segregation of duties.
e. Lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of transactions in areas such as
lending and investment, where policies and procedures for authorization of transactions
are not established at the appropriate level.
f. Lack of independent processes for establishment and review of allowance for loan losses.
g. Lack of independent processes for evaluation of other than temporary impairments.
h. Inadequate controls over transaction recording including setup of loans on systems.
i. Lack of controls over perfection of interests in lending collateral.
j. Inadequate methods of identifying and communicating exceptions and variances from
planned performance.
k. Inadequate accounting reconciliation policies and practices, including appropriate
supervisory review, monitoring of stale items and out of balance conditions, and timeliness
of write-offs.
l. Failure to establish adequate segregation of duties between approval transactions and
disbursement of funds.
m. Lack of control over the regulatory reporting process, where key decision makers also
have control over the process.
n. Lack of adequate reporting to the board of directors and executive management regarding
credit, interest-rate, liquidity, and market risks.
o. Change from an internal audit function that has been outsourced to the external auditor or
other provider to a new in-house internal audit department or another outsourcing provider.
Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against
the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and
regulations.
a. Existence of a regulatory cease and desist order, memorandum of understanding, or other
regulatory agreements (whether formal or informal), which concern management
competence or internal control.
b. Repeat criticisms or apparent violations cited in regulatory examination reports, which
management has ignored.

145

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

2. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in, or preoccupation with, the selection of
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
a. Consideration of “business issues” (for example, shareholder expectations) in determining
significant estimates.
b. Adjustments to the allowance for loan losses by senior management or the board for which
there is no written documentation.
c. Unusual propensity to enter into complex asset disposition agreements.
3. Control-related recommendations from internal and/or external auditors are ignored.
4. High level of customer complaints (especially when management does not fix the cause of
them promptly).
5. Internal audit is not adequately staffed or trained, and does not have appropriate specialized
skills given the environment.
6. Internal audit is not independent (authority and reporting relationships) and does not have
adequate access to the audit committee (or equivalent).
7. The scope of internal audit’s activities is not appropriate (for example, balance between
financial and operational audits, coverage, and rotation of decentralized operations).
8. Internal audit has limited authority to examine all aspects of the client’s operations or fails to
exercise its authority.
9. Internal audit does not adequately plan, perform risk assessments, or document the work
performed or conclusions reached.
10. Internal audit does not adhere to professional standards.
11. Internal audit has operating responsibilities.
12. Inability to prepare accurate and timely financial reports, including interim reports.
13. Planning and reporting systems (such as business planning; budgeting, forecasting, and profit
planning; and responsibility accounting) that do not adequately set forth management’s plans
and the results of actual performance.
14. A low level of user satisfaction with information systems processing, including reliability and
timeliness of reports.
15. Understaffed accounting or information technology department, inexperienced or ineffective
accounting or information technology personnel, or high turnover.
16. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for transactions.
17. Management or ownership frequently requires dividends at or near the maximum allowable by
law. In closely held companies, executive management/ownership combines high dividends
with frequently substantial increases in cash salary or bonus compensation. The bank has been
cited for dividend violations by regulatory authorities.
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Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures,
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exist. The following are examples of risk factors
related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Incentives/Pressures

SAS No. 99 does not require an auditor to plan the audit to discover information that is
indicative of financial stress of employees or adverse relationships between the institution and
its employees. If the auditor becomes aware of the existence of such information, he or she
should consider it in addressing the risk of material misstatement arising from misappropriation
of assets.
1. Adverse relationships between the institution and employees with access to cash or other
assets susceptible to theft may motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For
example, the following may create adverse relationships:
a. It is likely that the institution will be merged into or acquired by another institution and
there is uncertainty regarding the employees’ future employment opportunities.
b. The institution has recently completed a merger or acquisition, employees are working
long hours on integration projects, and morale is low.
c. The institution is under regulatory scrutiny and there is uncertainty surrounding the future
of the institution.
2. Members of executive management evidence personal financial distress through indications
such as frequent informal “loans” or “salary advances” to key executive officers or their
family members.
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Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
a. Large amounts of cash on hand and wire transfer capabilities.
b. Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds or diamonds, that may be in safekeeping.
c. Inadequate or ineffective physical security controls, for example, overliquid assets or
information systems.
d. Access to customer accounts.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Vacant branch manager positions or manager away on leave without replacement for
an inordinate amount of time, causing a considerable lack of management oversight.
(2) The independent risk management function does not have the appropriate level of
sophistication or the capability to effectively monitor and measure the risks, such as
capital markets trading activities.
b. Inadequate job applicant screening and/or monitoring of employees:
(1) Federal Bureau of Investigation background checks, credit reports, and bonding
eligibility screening are not incorporated into the hiring process for employees with
access to significant assets susceptible to misappropriation.
(2) A monitoring process does not identify employees with access to assets susceptible to
misappropriation who are known to have financial difficulties.
c. Inadequate segregation of duties and independent checks:
(1) Lack of independent monitoring of activity in internal demand deposit accounts and
correspondent bank accounts.
(2) No independent monitoring and resolution of customer exceptions/inquiries related to
electronic-funds-transfer (EFT) transactions, loan disbursements/payments, customer
deposit accounts, securities/derivatives transactions, and trust/fiduciary accounts.
(3) Lack of key periodic independent reconciliations (in addition to reconciliations of
subledgers to the general ledger) for wire transfer, Treasury, trust, suspense accounts,
automated teller machines, and cash.
(4) Lack of segregation of duties in the following areas:
― EFT―origination, processing, confirmation, and recordkeeping.
― Lending―relationship management, underwriting (including approval), processing,
cash collection/disbursement, and recordkeeping. No periodic confirmation of
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customer loan information or indebtedness by personnel independent of the
relationship officer.
Treasury―trading, processing, settlement, and recordkeeping. The derivatives
positions on the Treasury system are not priced by an independent operations
area. The capital markets risk management process is not independent from the
trading function. There is no independent confirmation of individual trades.
Trust―relationship management, transaction authorization, transaction execution,
settlement, custody, and account recordkeeping. There is no annual review of the
activity in trust accounts by an investment committee to ensure compliance with
the terms of the trust agreement and bank investment guidelines.
Fiduciary―issuance, registration, transfer, cancellation, and recordkeeping.
Charged-off loan accounts and recoveries.
Dormant and inactive demand deposit accounts (DDA) and the escheatment
process.

d. No independent mailing of customer statements.
e. Lack of control over new accounts.
f. “Due from” bank accounts are not reconciled on a regular basis, and open items are not
reviewed.
g. Loans are purchased from loan brokers, but the loans are not reunderwritten before
purchase.
h. The institution is small and has limited staff, which does not allow for adequate
segregation of duties.
i. There is a lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of transactions.
(1) No verification of EFT initiation and authorization, including those instances when
bank employees initiate a transaction on a customer’s behalf.
(2) Frequent underwriting exceptions to board-established credit authorization limits.
(3) Frequent instances of cash disbursements on loans that have not yet received all
approvals or met all preconditions for funding.
(4) Lack of board approval for significant loans or unusually high loan-officer approval
limits. (Be alert to the existence of multiple loans being funded just below a loan
officer’s limit.)
j. Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, customer information, or fixed assets.
(1) Lack of adequate physical security over the EFT operations area and customer
records.
(2) Access to the vault is not appropriately limited to authorized employees acting within
the scope of their job.
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(3) Lack of dual control over the vault, negotiable instruments (including travelers’
checks and money orders), and blank check stock.
(4) Lack of accountability over negotiable instruments.
k. Inadequate training of tellers and operations personnel regarding:
(1) “Knowing your customer.”
(2) Recognizing check fraud and kiting activities.
(3) Controls over cash, negotiable instruments, and EFT.
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Brokers and Dealers in Securities
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover
a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to
consider additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors
provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) High-degree of competition relating to bank-owned broker-dealers that have been
granted expanded powers to engage in securities activities or registered investment
companies/mutual funds, accompanied by declining margins.
b. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
(1) A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid growth in electronic trading, if the
financial stability or profitability of the particular entity is placed at risk, due to that
failure or inability.
c. Unusually high level of “soft dollar” brokerage activities.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. The pressure on management to meet the expectations of analysts and rating agencies.
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3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s
financial performance arising from the following:
a. The structure of incentive plans induces traders to take unusually greater risks.
b. There is unusually high level of internal competition for capital allocation among product
types/trading desks.
4. Research analysts are not independent. Their compensation is controlled by investment
banking or other areas for which the firm receives fees from covered companies.
5. Extensive benefits are provided to money managers that may drive fraudulent behavior. The
value of such benefits is included in the commissions generated by customers on trades
directed by money managers.
6. There are certain arrangements between the broker who directs the trade and the market maker
who executes the trade that are not in the best interest of the customer.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. A failure by management to have an adequate understanding of the entity’s trading and
investment strategies as conducted by the entity’s traders, including the types,
characteristics, and risks associated with the financial products purchased and sold by the
entity.
b. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) Unusually significant increase in unsettled trades at year end.
(2) A high degree of complex accounting standards relating to, for example, financial
instruments and off-balance sheet transactions.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim
financial reporting.
(1) A failure by management and the board of directors to set parameters (for example,
trading limits, credit limits, and aggregate market risk limits) and to continuously
monitor trading activities against those parameters.
(2) Lack of sufficient access controls for front-office and back-office systems.
(3) Lack of adequate “Chinese Wall” between investment banking and trading (that is,
potential for insider trading).
(4) Failure to monitor the filling of customer orders from the firm’s inventory (for
example, front-running and excessive mark-up).
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(5) Lack of review of customer lists and insufficient controls surrounding the customer
account approval and maintenance process for both cash and margin accounts.
(6) A lack of sufficient controls over the review process of new products, structured
finance, and off-balance-sheet transactions.
(7) A lack of sufficient controls over the valuation process of less liquid securities,
including controls over the changes of valuation pricing and the appropriate
segregation of duties.
b. High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or
information technology staff.
(1) A failure by management to ensure that the brokers are properly trained, appropriately
licensed, and adequately supervised.
(2) Lack of policies and training over the range of product offerings.
(3) A failure by management to assess the quality and breadth of the company’s internal
audit department, to ensure that the department receives adequate training and
resources to match the sophistication and progression of the company.
c. Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable
conditions.
(1) Lack of board approval and a specialist’s independent evaluation of in-house
developed valuation models.
d. Use of error accounts to hide trading errors, made to meet commitments to clients,
particularly for block trades in meeting a predetermined value-weighted average price
(VWAP).
e. Use of valuation reserves for other purposes, such as to hide errors or expenses.
Assumptions in valuation reserves may be changed without adequate approval.
f. Use of customer collateral for firm purposes. Tested by possession or control procedures.
g. Use of subsidiaries to manage earnings.
h. Transactions accounted for as sales as opposed to financing.
i. Use of different valuations of same product in two related companies.
j. No provisions to record stock-borrow transactions. Use of the security to cover a theft of
customer-related security.
k. Poor controls over corporate actions in which the client fails to receive entire benefit.
l. Not properly valuing collateral or reflecting the extent of cross-collateralization on rate
swaps.
m. Weak controls causing a failure to record trades on a timely basis and a lack of proper
floor supervision, which may facilitate customers’ poor trading activity.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or
earnings trend.
a. Unusually aggressive interpretations of regulatory rules (for example, net capital rules and
weekly reserve formula) when the company is reaching minimum net capital required by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses.
• Extend confirmation procedures concerning agreements with counterparties (for example,
leases, clearing, custody, margin, and subordinated debt).
• Extend confirmation procedures concerning the terms of selected transactions (for example,
swaps, financing transactions, and fails) with counterparties.
• Review the results of valuation testing performed by departments of the company (for
example, controllers, internal audit, and middle office).
• Review background information about the board of directors and management to determine if
they have the capacity to understand trading and investment strategies. Conversations with
appropriate people and review of the board’s and management’s experience and credentials
may be necessary.
• Review management summary reports on performance and meet with management to discuss
trading and business direction.
• Perform periodic reviews of valuation methodologies by independent specialists throughout
the year.
• Meet with middle office personnel to gain an understanding of the company’s policies
concerning managing risk (for example, stress testing and valuations).
• Extend testing on regulatory computations for companies barely meeting the minimum net
capital requirements.
• Extend testing of the entity’s “soft dollar” arrangements to ensure compliance with the SEC
rules and regulations.
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Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be
present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
a. Large amounts of securities (for example, bearer instruments) held in the company’s vault.
b. Commingling of customer securities with the entity’s securities at a custodian bank.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility to misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Lack of management oversight of extensive retail branches, or overseas branches and
subsidiaries.
(2) Inadequate supervision of traders’ trading practices and limits, especially for those
generating a large proportion of the entity’s total revenue.
b. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks.
(1) Lack of segregation of duties between the front-office (that is, execution of trades)
and the back-office (that is, settlement and accounting for trades).
(2) Lack of independent review of periodic reconciliations (for example, settlement
accounts, cash accounts, and stock records).
(3) Failure to confirm failed transactions on a timely basis.
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(4) Failure to periodically review items in suspense accounts.
(5) Failure to review the aging of items, including failed transactions and receivables.
(6) Lack of or infrequent independent pricing of inventory performed by middle-office or
back-office (that is, risk management and controller’s group).
c. Inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
(1) Lack of safeguarding and insuring securities in transfer.
(2) Lack of sufficient access controls for cash wiring systems.
d. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions.
(1) Lack of documentation related to “soft dollar” brokerage activities.
(2) Lack of documentation related to derivative transactions with counter parties, such as
ISDA master agreements.
e. Lack of controls relating to the rehypothecation of securities.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses.
• Review exception and break reports for settlement activities.
• Ensure that the compliance function reviews the personal account statements of the company’s
brokers and traders.
• Review registration statements of individual traders, account representatives, and principals.
• Extend testing of access controls of online fund wiring system terminals.
• Review revenue trend of an individual trader over a period of time.
• Review level of errors and broker chargebacks of commissions.
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Employee Benefit Plans
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover
a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to
consider additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors
provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressure

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures exist in either the
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
(1) The plan sponsor is in an industry that is declining in stability, which could lead to
difficulties in meeting financial commitments to the plan, including contributions
and/or debt repayments (leveraged employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)).
b. The plan holds employer securities and the employer is in an industry in which the value
of the securities is subject to significant volatility or is not readily determinable.
c. Plan sponsor or plan restructuring (for example, layoffs, spin-offs, business combinations,
and bankruptcy).
d. Severely deteriorating financial condition or the threat of regulatory intervention of the
plan.
e. The plan has limited investment options or the plan has invested significantly in employer
securities or other employer assets (for example, real estate).
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
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a. Senior management of the plan sponsor appoints itself trustee of the plan and uses that
position to benefit the plan sponsor, for example, uses the plan’s money to do speculative
investing or to support the company through buying employer assets.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Indications of significant or unusual parties-in-interest transactions not in the ordinary
course of operations.
(2) Excessive or unusual transaction or prohibited party in interest transactions with the
plan sponsor/administrator.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim
financial reporting.
(1) Failure by management to have adequate valuations performed, including actuarial
valuations and valuations of real estate partnerships and other hard-to-value plan
assets.
(2) The plan administrator lacks an understanding of the major regulations that govern
the plans (that is, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and
the Internal Revenue Code).
b. Unusually high levels of participant complaints and corrections to account balances or
plan records.
c. Lack of qualified service provider organization or change in service provider.
Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or
employees that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting may not be
susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the
existence of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement
arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the
following information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Management displaying a significant disregard toward compliance with ERISA and
Internal Revenue Code and Department of Labor (DOL) regulations.
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b. The plan administrator or trustees have been investigated by the DOL or IRS for fiduciary
violations in operating the plan.
2. Lack of management candor in dealing with plan participants, claimants, actuaries, and
auditors regarding decisions that could have an impact on plan assets, including restructuring
or downsizing arrangements.
3. The plan has participated in a voluntary compliance program in conjunction with the IRS or
DOL (such participation could be an indication of ineffective management of the plan or
controls over the plan).
4. Named fiduciary not actively involved in the plan’s activities.
5. High level of plan participant complaints.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor in an employee benefit plan
audit engagement may want to consider the following responses.
• Investment results. Obtain the requisite investment information directly from the plan trustee,
and obtain the same information from the party named as having discretion to make
investment decisions, such as the plan administrator, the plan’s investment committee, or the
plan’s investment adviser ( the directing party), and review and reconcile the directing party’s
reports (investment position and activity) with those of the trustee.
• Claim reserves. Confirm, with third parties, the historical and statistical information that is
being used to prepare the reserves. Review the qualifications of the individuals preparing the
reserves.
• Procedures. Apply the following procedures to fully understand a party in interest transaction:1
― Confirm transaction amount and terms, including guarantees and other significant data,
with the other party or parties to the transaction.
― Inspect evidence in possession of the other party or parties to the transaction.
― Confirm or discuss significant information with intermediaries, such as banks, guarantors,
agents, or attorneys, to obtain a better understanding of the transaction.
― Refer to financial publications, trade journals, credit agencies, and other information
sources when there is reason to believe that unfamiliar customers, suppliers, or other
business enterprises with which material amounts of business have been transacted may
lack substance.
― With respect to material uncollected balances, guarantees, and other obligations, obtain
information about the financial capability of the other party or parties to the transaction.
Such information may be obtained from audited financial statements, unaudited financial
1

See Chapter 11 of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide Audits of Employee Benefit Plans for further audit guidance.
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statements, income tax returns, and reports issued by regulatory agencies, taxing authorities,
financial publications, or credit agencies. The auditor should decide on the degree of
assurance required and the extent to which available information provides such assurance.
• For single employer plans, obtain the most recent financial statements of the plan sponsor and
review for indicators of financial difficulties. For multiemployer plans, obtain an
understanding of the industry.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures,
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties related to benefit payments, contributions, investment
transactions, and loans or independent checks.
(1) No independent records of the plan are maintained to enable the plan administrator to
periodically check the information to the custodian.
b. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Lack of review of investment transactions by trustees, sponsors, or investment
committees.
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(2) Lack of independent preparation and review of reconciliations of trust assets to
participant accounts or accounting records of the plan.
c. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions.
(1) Insufficient approval over transactions with parties-in-interest that could lead to
prohibited transactions.
d. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, for example, credits for
merchandise returns.
(1) Trustee does not prepare required supplemental information (for example, historical
cost records not maintained).
e. Lack of controls surrounding benefit payments, including the termination of payments in
accordance with plan provisions.
f. Lack of appropriate segregation of plan assets from the sponsor’s assets or inappropriate
access to plan assets by plan sponsor.
g. SAS No. 70, Service Organizations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
324), as amended, report indicates a lack of controls at an outside service provider.
h. Use of service provider that does not provide a SAS No. 70 report.
i. Unreconciled differences between net assets available for benefits per the trustee/custodian
records and the recordkeeping amounts for a defined contribution plan (unallocated assets
or liabilities).
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor in an employee benefit plan
engagement may want to consider the following responses.
• Review reconciliations of the assets held by the trust with participant records throughout the
year. Review any reconciling adjustments for propriety.
• Review the account activity for participants who have access to plan assets or assist in
administering the plan.
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to a
lack of a qualified outside service provider acting as trustee and/or custodian for plan assets.
In these instances, the auditor should physically inspect assets and examine other evidence
relating to ownership. In addition, the fair value of investments should be tested by reference
to market quotations or other evidence of fair value in accordance with SAS No. 57, Auditing
Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.1, AU sec. 342).
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to
unreconciled differences between net assets available for benefits per the trustee/custodian
records and the recordkeeping amounts for a defined contribution plan. If the trustee/custodian
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records are higher than the recordkeeping totals (excluding accrual adjustments), an
unallocated asset exists that should be allocated to participant accounts. If the
trustee/custodian records are lower than the recordkeeping totals (excluding accrual
adjustments), plan assets may have been misappropriated requiring further investigation by the
auditor (for example, reconciliation of monthly trustee/custodian activity to the recordkeeper).
The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to
remittance of employee contributions for a defined contribution plan with a sponsor
experiencing cash flow problems. In this instance, the auditor may perform a reconciliation of
the total employee contributions per the payroll register to the recordkeeping report for the
year. In addition, the auditor may select certain months to test for the timely remittance of
employee contributions in accordance with regulations.
The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to
expenses being paid by an overfunded defined benefit plan on behalf of an underfunded plan.
In this instance, the auditor might select expense amounts paid by the overfunded plan and
trace them to specific invoices noting that the expense pertained to the proper plan.
Alternatively, the auditors could also ask to review expense invoices pertaining to the
underfunded plan paid by the company to make sure the overfunded plan did not pay them.
Review the timeliness of contributions from the plan sponsor throughout the year.
Compare cancelled checks to disbursement records. Where benefits are paid by check
disbursements, compare the signature on the canceled check to participant signatures on other
employee documents.
Confirm benefit payments with participants or beneficiaries.
Confirm medical bills directly with service providers.
Review plan expenses to ensure that the plan is not paying for expenses that the employer
should be paying for.

Fraud Examples
Listed below are actual instances of fraudulent activity on employee benefit plan engagements. They
are presented to help auditors become better acquainted with fraudulent activities. Although none of
these particular examples resulted in a material misstatement of the financial statements, similar
fraudulent activity at other benefit plans may cause a material misstatement of the financial
statements, depending on the circumstances.
• A pension plan notifies participants who have reached the age of 70½ that they must under law
take their distributions from the plan. An employee of the company is responsible for
notifying the participants and providing distribution forms. The completed forms are provided
to a supervisor for approval and submitted to the insurance company (custodian) for payment.
For all participants reaching the age of 70½, the employee decides to forge the distribution
forms and not notify the participants of the distributions. The forged forms are provided to the
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supervisor, who approves them and the insurance company is directed to make lump sum
distributions via wire transfers into an account set up with the employee’s name as a relative
for the beneficiary. The fraud continues for several months until a participant notifies the
supervisor that he would like to receive his distribution, and the supervisor notices that a lump
sum was already distributed.
A long-time employee at a company is responsible for reporting loan repayments (for loans
not paid off by automatic payroll deduction) to the recordkeeper by providing copies of the
face of the repayment checks to the recordkeeper. The employee is also a participant in the
plan and currently has a $20,000 loan from her account. The employee decides to take a
second loan but under plan provisions cannot do it until her first loan is paid off. The
employee makes out a check to pay off the $20,000 loan from her personal account and
provides a copy of the check to the recordkeeper. A second loan of $25,000 is taken out for
the employee. However, the first loan is never paid off because the employee never deposits
the $20,000 check into the plan. Cash reconciliations continually show immaterial
unreconciled items that are not followed up timely and the fraud is not discovered for months.
A company has two defined benefit plans; one is overfunded and one is underfunded. In past
years, administrative expenses were paid from each plan’s assets; however, this year the
company decides it will pay the expenses for the underfunded plan. The overfunded plan
continues to pay its own expenses. Due to an administrative error, the overfunded plan ends
up paying the expenses for both plans. When management discovers this fact, a decision was
made to reimburse the plan that paid the expenses because it is fully funded.
Continuation of pension benefits to a deceased participant. A participant dies but his relatives
or other persons do not report his death in order to continue receiving his pension checks.
A health and welfare supervisor submits phony claims using the names of the plan participants
who have the same last name as he or she does. The checks are diverted to the supervisor
before they can be mailed to the plan participant in question.
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State and Local Government Entities: Basic Financial Statements
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) Imminent or anticipated adverse changes in program legislation or regulations could
impair the financial stability and profitability of the entity.
(2) Under Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34, Basic
Financial Statements―and Management’s Discussion and Analysis―for State and
Local Governments, some governments’ net assets may be in deficit positions, while
the fund balances are positive. This may result in significant pressure for management
to misstate financial statements.
b. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
(1) Major taxpayers in declining industries or tenuous financial condition.
(2) Declining property values or tax base or other restrictions on revenue recognition or
realization.
(3) A stagnant tax base or revenue base, declining enrollments, or declining demand or
use.
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c. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
(1) Rapid changes in major taxpayers’ industries, such as significant technology changes,
customer bases, or product obsolescence.
(2) Decreases in interest rates when the government owns significant amounts of
investments that are highly sensitive to interest rate changes.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. Substantial political pressure on management creating an undue concern about reporting
positive financial accomplishments.
b. Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including financing
of major research and development or capital expenditures.
(1) Significant pressure to obtain additional funding necessary to stay viable and maintain
levels of service considering the financial or budgetary position of the entity or of a
specific fund or program, including need for funds to finance major infrastructure
improvements or other capital expenditures.
c. Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
(1) Threat of imminent third-party funding termination or significant reduction in thirdparty funding levels, the effect of which would be financially material to the entity.
d. A mix of fixed price and cost reimbursable program types funded by third parties that
create incentives to shift costs or otherwise manipulate accounting transactions.
e. Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending
transactions.
f. Significant investments in high risk financial instruments or high risk ventures.
g. An individual or individuals with no apparent executive position(s) with the entity
apparently exercising substantial influence over its affairs or over individual departments
or funds (for example, a major political donor or fundraiser, or major employer in the
community).
h. A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting.
(1) Substantial political pressure on management creates an undue concern about federal
program accomplishments.
3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, or other
incentives), being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for operating results,
financial position, or cash flow.
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(1) A significant portion of entity-wide, department, or fund management compensation
or performance appraisals linked to budgetary or program accomplishments or other
incentives, the value or results of which are contingent upon the entity achieving
unduly aggressive targets for budgetary or operating results.
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set
by the owner, including sales or profitability incentive goals.
a. Unrealistically aggressive budget or program goals.
Opportunities

1. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. A governing body that lacks appropriate background knowledge or experience regarding
the function and responsibilities of government.
b. A vendor, such as a management company, who provides turnkey services of a
department, exercises substantial influence over the affairs of the entity.
2. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial
lines of authority, or contractual arrangements without apparent programmatic or
government purpose.
(1) Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships for which there appears to be no
clear programmatic or business justification (for example, a subrecipient providing
services it does not appear qualified to provide, or a vendor geographically distant
from the entity when nearby vendors are available).
3. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls.
(1) Lack of established policies or controls related to investment risk levels.
(2) Inadequate controls over process to prepare offering documents related to initial
offerings of municipal securities.
(3) Inadequate controls over process to prepare required continuing disclosures related to
those municipal securities.
b. An increased perception of opportunity by employees/management to perpetuate a fraud
when a fraud has occurred in the past at that entity and there were no negative
ramifications to the perpetrators(s), for example, no substantive investigations, no criminal
charges, and no terminations.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees,
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or
earnings trend.
a. An excessive interest in meeting or exceeding the entity’s budgetary targets or maintaining
fund balance or debt coverage requirement through the use of unusually aggressive
accounting practices.
2. Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
a. An ineffective or nonexistent means of communicating and supporting the entity’s
accountability for public resources and ethics, especially regarding such matters as
acceptable business practices, conflicts of interests, and code of conduct.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional or more focused analytical procedures concerning actual to expectation variances
and their underlying causes.
• Testing of larger samples of transactions of expenditures for conformity with allowable cost
principles.
• Consultation with the funding agency’s inspector general or other oversight organization
regarding specific risks and responses for particular programs.
• More focused testing of programs or cost categories for which the entity has a history of prior
findings and questioned costs.
• More detailed testing of transactions made by or potentially affected by entity or program
managers who have motives to produce particular budgetary, programmatic, or financial results.
• Confirmation of transaction details with other governments (for example, grants, tax
collections, receivable/payable balances), pertaining to year-end cut-offs.
• Additional inquiry and tests on collectibility of interfund receivables, particularly those
reporting large continuing balances.
• More focused review of documentation of write-offs of uncollectible taxes and other
receivables.
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• Confirmation with revenue sources to determine if revenue recognized was for services
performed prior to year end, and vouching revenue to bank statements to ensure that the
revenue was received in the availability period.
• A more rigorous search for unrecorded liabilities by more closely examining disbursements
made after year end. (Consider looking at wire transfers, debit memos, and other EFTs, not
just checks.)
• More detailed analysis of investment portfolios and investments policies; and use of
investment risk specialists to better assess the risk levels of the entity’s investments.
• Review of “top-level” adjustments made by management.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures,
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks, especially in areas such as
purchasing, accounts payable, cash handling, and force account labor supervision.
b. Lack of appropriate management oversight.
c. Lack of job applicant screening procedures relating to employees with access to assets
susceptible to misappropriation.
d. Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets susceptible to misappropriation.
e. Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
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Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional participant eligibility testing, including unannounced visits to intake centers, work
sites, and other sites where the existence and the identity of participants can be verified.
• Observation of benefit payment distribution to identify “ghost” program participants (another
option: reconciling terminated employees per the human resources system with active
employee lists per the payroll system).
• Use of confirmation letters to ensure the existence of program participants.
• Review of governmental entity’s purchasing practices to make sure that prices are reasonable
for the products purchased. (Inflated prices could indicate and disclose purchasing agent
acceptance of bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks.)
• Examination of outstanding encumbrances and encumbrances that were released in the first
part of the next year to determine if the encumbering of the funds was appropriate and legal.
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State and Local Governmental Entities and Not-for-Profit Organizations:
Recipients of Federal Awards
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Auditors should note that since SAS No. 99 applies only to an audit of financial
statements, its requirements do not apply to an audit of an auditee’s compliance with specified
requirements applicable to its major programs. However, as part of assessing audit risk in a single or
program-specific audit, the auditor should specifically assess the risk of material noncompliance with
a major program’s compliance requirements occurring due to fraud. The auditor should consider that
assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. Some of the following factors and
conditions are present in entities where specific circumstances do not present a risk of material
misstatement. Also, specific controls may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to
fraud, even though risk factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other
conditions, you should assess whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) Imminent or anticipated adverse changes in program legislation or regulations that
could impair the financial stability and profitability of the entity.
b. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) High degree of competition for federal funding, especially when accompanied by
declining availability of federal funding nation-wide or region-wide.
c. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
(1) A stagnant tax base, revenue base, or declining enrollments, or eligible participants.
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(2) Declining federal program funding, declining program participant populations, or
declining benefit amounts.
d. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
(1) Rapid changes in federal programs, such as significant centralization or
decentralization initiatives, funding shifts from federal to state or local levels,
increases or decreases in participant populations, higher vulnerability to significant
changes in compliance requirements, or pending program elimination.
e. Threat of imminent program terminations or significant reduction in scope, the effect of
which could have a material financial impact on the entity.
f. A mix of fixed-price and cost-reimbursable program types that create incentives to shift
costs or otherwise manipulate accounting transactions.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting.
(1) Substantial political pressure on management creates an undue concern about federal
program accomplishments.
b. Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including the need
for funds to finance major research and development or capital expenditures.
(1) Significant pressure to obtain additional funding necessary to stay viable and maintain
levels of service considering the financial or budgetary position of the entity or of a
specific federal program, including need for funds to finance major research and
development or capital expenditures.
c. An individual or individuals with no apparent executive position(s) with the entity appear
to exercise substantial influence over its affairs or over other individual federal programs
(for example, a major donor or fundraiser, or a politician).
3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, or other
incentives) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for operating results,
financial position, or cash flow.
(1) A significant portion of entity-wide or program management’s compensation or
performance appraisals linked to budgetary or program accomplishments or other
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incentives, the value or results of which are contingent upon the entity achieving
unduly aggressive targets for budgetary or operating results.
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set
by the owner, including sales or profitability incentive goals.
a. Unrealistically aggressive budget or program goals.
Opportunities

1. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. A vendor, such as a management company, that provides turnkey services of a department,
exercises substantial influence over the affairs of the entity.
2. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial
lines of authority, or contractual arrangements without apparent programmatic or
government purpose.
(1) Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships for which there appears to be no
clear programmatic or business justification (for example, a subrecipient providing
services it does not appear qualified to provide, or a vendor geographically distant
from the entity when nearby vendors are available).
Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees,
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or
earnings trend.
a. An excessive interest by management or employees in meeting or exceeding the entity’s
budgetary targets through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
2. Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
a. An ineffective or nonexistent means of communicating and supporting the entity’s values
or ethics, especially regarding such matters as acceptable business practices, conflicts of
interests, and code of conduct.
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3. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Management displaying or conveying an attitude of disinterest regarding strict adherence
to federal rules and regulations, such as those related to participant eligibility, benefit
determinations, or eligibility.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional or more focused analytical procedures concerning actual to expectation variances
and their underlying causes.
• Testing of larger samples of transactions of expenditures for conformity with allowable cost
principles.
• Consultation with the funding agency’s inspector general or other oversight organization
regarding specific risks and responses for particular programs.
• More focused testing of programs or cost categories for which the entity has a history of prior
findings and questioned costs.
• More detailed testing of transactions made by or potentially affected by entity or program
managers who have motives to produce particular budgetary, programmatic, or financial results.
• Confirm transaction details with other governments (for example, grants, tax collections, or
receivable/payable balances) pertaining to year-end cut-offs.
• Additional inquiry and tests on collectibility of interfund receivables, particularly those
reporting large continuing balances.
• More focused review of documentation of write-offs of uncollectible taxes and other
receivables.
• Confirm with revenue sources to determine if revenue recognized was for services performed
before year end, and vouch revenue to bank statements to ensure that the revenue was received
in the availability period.
• Conduct a more rigorous search for unrecorded liabilities by more closely examining
disbursements made after year end. (Consider looking at wire transfers, debit memos, and
other EFTs, not just checks.)
• More detailed analysis of investment portfolios and investments policies; and use of
investment risk specialists to better assess the level of risk of the entity’s investments.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Auditors should note that since SAS No. 99 applies only to an audit of
financial statements, its requirements do not apply to an audit of an auditee’s compliance with
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specified requirements applicable to its major programs. However, as part of assessing audit risk
in a single or program-specific audit, the auditor should specifically assess the risk of material
noncompliance with a major program’s compliance requirements occurring due to fraud. The
auditor should consider that assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. Some
of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where specific circumstances do
not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may exist that mitigate the
risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or conditions are present.
When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether those risk factors
and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material misstatement of the
financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures,
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks, especially in areas such as
outreach, intake, eligibility determination, and benefits awards.
b. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions, such as purchasing,
benefit determinations, and eligibility.
c. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, such as eligibility and
benefit determinations.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional participant eligibility testing, including unannounced visits to intake centers, work
sites, and other sites where the existence and the identity of participants can be verified.
• Observation of benefit payment distribution to identify “ghost” program participants (another
option: reconciling terminated employees per the human resources system with active
employee lists per the payroll system).
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• Use of confirmation letters to ensure the existence of program participants.
• Review of governmental entity’s purchasing practices to make sure that prices are reasonable
for the products purchased (inflated prices a possible indication or disclosure of purchasing
agent acceptance of bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks).
• Examination of outstanding encumbrances and encumbrances that were released in the first
part of the next year to determine if the encumbering of the funds was appropriate and legal.

175

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

Health Care Organizations
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
(1) A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid growth on medical technology, if the
financial stability or profitability of the particular entity is placed at risk due to that
failure or inability.
b. Intense scrutiny by governmental bodies, watchdog groups, and other interested parties of
the organization, placing unusual pressure on management. Situations targeted for
investigation might include:
(1) Improper billing of services performed by residents.
(2) Inappropriate transfers or discharges.
(3) Illegal arrangements involving physicians.
(4) Improper referrals.
(5) Billing for nonapproved medical devices.

176

Appendix A: Industry-Specific Conditions That May Indicate the Presence of Fraud

(You should be aware of the existence of these types of situations in the health care
industry. If these situations are identified on an engagement, they should be considered in
the auditor’s assessment of material misstatement due to fraud.)
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. Intense pressure from governmental bodies and health maintenance organizations to
embrace cost containment and efficiency enhancement programs.
3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Bonuses or incentive compensation are tied to operating results.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. The existence of many complex third-party payor contracts.
2. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. A board of directors mainly composed of local business people and doctors. A board
composed of such people, combined with large available financial resources, creates the
potential for insider business deals.
b. A board of directors composed of people who lack the necessary experience and skills to
properly oversee a health care organization.
3. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of significant controls, including automated controls.
(1) Lack of oversight or control of various affiliations in an integrated health delivery
system.
(2) Lack of management review of dispersed locations.
(3) Insufficient board or senior management oversight of critical processes, such as:
― Establishment of allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual
adjustments, build-up of unallocated reserve.
― Incident monitoring, follow-up, and settlement.
― Business affiliations and combinations.
― Regulatory compliance.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
a. Lack of an effective corporate compliance program.
2. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Failure to respond to recent regulatory reviews.
3. Attitude that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) is not as strict for nonpublic
entities (for example, often seen in setting up “cookie-jar” reserves or ignoring other than
temporary impairments).
4. Attitude that materiality can be stretched further for not-for-profits.
Auditor Response

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99. An auditor may want to consider the
following response.
Allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual adjustments. If there is the risk of material
misstatement concerning the allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual adjustments, the
auditor should consider taking a more substantive approach to testing the factors used to determine
such allowances. Such steps might include more detailed analytical procedures, such as analyses of
historical contractual adjustments and accounts receivable runoff (actual cash) by specific payors to
the recorded allowance or the testing and analysis of the collectibility of a sufficient number of
accounts to arrive at an independent conclusion about the adequacy of the allowance.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
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Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be
present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
a. Large amounts of cash payments received for medical care.
b. Pharmaceutical inventory with high street value, or in high demand.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the
following responses.
Cash receipts. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement relating to the
potential embezzlement of cash receipts. The lack of internal accounting controls provides the
opportunity for the embezzlement to be covered up through bad debt, contractual, or other write-offs.
In this situation, the auditor might expand the review of cash receipts to compare remittance advises
to accounts posted as received or might review specific accounts which have been written off for
appropriateness.
Kickbacks from suppliers. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement relating to
potential kickbacks from suppliers. Such kickbacks might result in the entity paying excessive
amounts for goods. The auditor might have concluded that the lack of adequate internal accounting
control over the purchasing process provides the opportunity for this to occur. The auditor might
consider, in these circumstances, a more detailed analytical review of expenses and a review of a
sample of invoices to compare amounts paid for specific items to amounts per purchase contracts or
with independent prices obtained from other vendors.
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Insurance Companies
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) New criteria used by rating agencies to assign ratings to insurers.
(2) Impact of codification of statutory accounting principles.
(3) Demutualization.
(4) Changes in risk-based capital requirements.
(5) Changes in consolidation criteria (for example, SPEs)
(6) Changes in liability recognition for GMDBs and other proposed GAAP changes
affecting the insurance business.
b. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
(1) Rapidly changing distribution network results in different sales vehicles without
adequate controls (for example, possible use of the Internet).
(2) Changes in interest rates may have a significant impact on the financial results of
many life insurance companies.
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c. Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in
the same industry.
(1) Unusual and considerable increases in the number of policyholders over a short
period of time.
(2) Loss ratios significantly different from companies offering similar insurance
coverages.
(3) Unusual or significant increases in fee income (for variable products where fees are a
direct result of assets under management) in a period of market decline, as compared
to other companies in the same industry.
(4) Unusual increases in the number of policies in mature lines of business, potentially
indicating inadequate pricing to gain business from competitors.
d. Emerging trends in claims settlement and litigation, including:
(1) Identification of emerging new classes of claims.
(2) Plaintiffs’ expanded theory of liability.
(3) Court coverage decisions and judicial interpretations.
(4) Expanded liability due to changes in legislation.
e. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) Rapid development of new products reacting to the market environment without
adequate review of long-term strategies.
(2) Volatility of earnings due to market environment that could cause a company to
manipulate earnings.
f. Volatility of earnings due to catastrophic losses could cause the company to manipulate
earnings in other areas.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. Profitability or trend expectations of investment analysts.
b. Pressure to maintain or improve ratings from rating agencies.
c. Close to tripping risk-based capital (RBC) requirements.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Unusual or complex intercompany reinsurance transactions.
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(2) Transactions entered into with affiliates, the impact of which are to increase statutory
surplus.
(3) Complex and/or inconsistent expense allocation agreements.
b. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
(1) Estimates for loss and loss adjustment expenses, reinsurance recoverables, deferred
acquisition costs (DAC), reserves, and others based on unusually subjective judgments.
(2) Significant purchases and sales of securities that do not have an active market, which
could indicate “parking losses.”
(3) Aggressive policies related to revenue recognition for administrative-service type
contracts.
(4) Improper classification of normal operating losses as “catastrophe-related” in
financial reporting (for example, management discussion and analysis, footnote
disclosure). Also, the diversion of an insurer’s resources in dealing with a catastrophe
could put a strain on internal controls.
c. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to period end,
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) High yields on investments that appear to be low risk.
(2) Transactions that “convert” nonadmitted assets to admitted assets.
(3) Numerous and complex off-balance-sheet financing transactions.
(4) Reinsurance transactions that embody loss assumptions that are very different from
industry or historical trends in order to pass the “transfer of risk” rules.
(5) Transactions that “convert” realized capital gains/losses to ordinary income or vise versa.
(6) Significant closing journal entries for insurers that maintain their books on a statutory
basis of accounting, which requires the need to post several statutory-to-GAAP
adjusting entries.
(7) Significant or unusual amount of quarter-end or year-end manual entries posted after
consolidation.
(8) Estimates of the value of closely held securities.
― Agreements accounted for as reinsurance transactions that do not transfer risk.
2. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. Domination of the board of directors because it is composed primarily of a company’s
close business partners (for example, agents, bankers, and lawyers)
3. There is a complex organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Significant transactions included in noninsurance affiliates with the sole purpose of excluding
such activity from the statutory-basis financial statements filed with the insurance regulators.
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4. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Information systems cannot account for the complex features of insurance policies issued.
(for example, policies with complex deductible features).
Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees,
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or
earnings trend or statutory capital position.
a. Risk transfer criteria for reinsurance transactions rarely met.
b. Use of discretionary reserves to manipulate earnings.
2. A failure by management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regarding
internal control and the financial reporting process.
a. Lack of board or management oversight of critical processes:
(1) Underwriting―control risk, price risk.
(2) IT systems or resources to effectively administer complex insurance or reinsurance
contract provisions.
(3) Monitoring of creditworthiness of reinsurers.
(4) Suspense account clearance.
(5) Treasury―securities/derivatives valuation (selection of models, methodologies, and
assumptions).
(6) Establishment of loss and loss adjustment expense reserves.
(7) Investment decisions.
(8) Understanding of critical accounting policies and significant estimates.
b. No business risk management responsibility or function.
c. No accounting policy responsibility or function.
d. Management’s inattention to establishing independent reporting lines for key assurance
functions (for example, internal audit and quality control reviews of claims and
underwriting).
e. Lack of insurance-industry or finance experience on the audit committee.
3. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Existence of a regulatory enforcement action.
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b. Prior examination findings not addressed or inadequately addressed.
c. Mandated restatements of regulatory financial reports due to inappropriate accounting
treatment.
d. Assessments of market conduct fines.
4. A strained relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor, as
exhibited by the following:
a. Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or
reporting matters such as the reasonableness of sensitive estimates (for example, loss and
loss adjustment expense reserves, allowances for uncollectible reinsurance, DAC, and
other amounts).
b. Issuance of reportable condition or material weakness letters.
c. Failure of management to address reportable condition or material weakness issues on a
timely basis.
5. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of
the accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
a. Lack of management to establish controls over accounting policy issues.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures,
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
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Incentives/Pressures

1. Adverse relationships between the entity and employees with authority over cash and assets
could motivate employees to misappropriate those assets.
a. History of workforce reductions (for example, combining regional claims offices).
Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation, for example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
a. Significant activity and/or balances present in suspense accounts.
b. Large volume premium checks received by the insurance company rather than being sent
to a lockbox.
c. Premiums are not directly remitted to the insurer but are instead collected by the agent.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks.
(1) Lack of rotation or review of claim adjusters on long-term claims.
(2) Custodial reconciliations performed by an individual who records the amount to the
ledger.
b. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Lack of adequate monitoring of underwriting policies and procedures.
(2) Lack of management review or control processes over year-end or month-end
transactions.
(3) Extensive use of managing general agents (MGAs) with little or no supervision by
management.
(4) Lack of internal audit and/or claim quality review functions.
(5) Inadequate payment approval process.
(6) Lack of review or inadequate controls over system overrides (for example, claim
payments and commissions)
(7) Lack of strong custodial controls over cash/investments.
c. Loans requested on life policies occurring soon after large deposits on the policy are made.
The loan could be issued before the deposit check clears, and then the check is returned for
insufficient funds.
d. Large volume of duplicate claims processed.
e. Large volume of claims paid to post office boxes.
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f. Large volume of claims paid to the same claimant.
g. Large volume of claims paid to employees.
Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of employee attitudes/rationalizations that allow them to justify
misappropriations of assets, are not susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the
auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it in identifying the
risks of material misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may
become aware of the following information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Failure to report all instances of fraud to the audit committee.
2. Failure to properly staff internal audit and other (claims/underwriting) quality control functions.
3. Poor relationships between management, employees, and agents that may appear to justify
misappropriations of assets.
4. Disregard for internal control over misappropriation of assets by overriding existing controls
or by failing to correct known internal control deficiencies.
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Investment Companies
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Significant transactions with affiliates that are not approved by the board of directors
in accordance with Section 17 of the Investment Company Act.
(2) Transactions involving affiliates that are not readily apparent in the circumstances, or
apparent but not properly disclosed.
b. Significant investments for which readily available market quotes are not available and
inadequate procedures for estimating these values.
c. Significant investments in derivative financial instruments for which value is very difficult
to estimate.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. A failure by management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regarding
internal control and the financial reporting process.
b. Unusual and considerable influence of the portfolio manager over pricing sources and fair
valuation methodology used to value securities.
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c. Lack of board’s involvement in the establishment of the fair valuation policies and
procedures or lack of oversight over those policies and procedures.
d. Ability of management to unilaterally override internal control system, particularly
security valuations.
e. Lack of adviser’s supervisory or oversight procedures over the subadviser.
f. Inadequate controls around the calculation of the net asset value.
g. Reconciliation of security holdings with the custodian that are infrequent and incomplete.
h. Inadequate monitoring of the fund’s tax status as a regulated investment company.
i. Inadequate monitoring of the fund’s compliance with its prospectus requirements.
j. Transfer agency controls are ineffective or implementation of user controls are ineffective.
k. Lack of an appropriate policy regarding corrections of net asset value errors, or failure to
comply with policy.
l. Lack of board members’ understanding of how portfolio management intends to implement
the fund’s investment objectives, thereby creating a situation in which management can
aggressively interpret or disregard policies in place.
m. Lack of board members’ understanding of derivatives used by portfolio managers and
involvement in approving or disapproving use of specific strategies such as embedded
leverage, thereby creating a situation in which management can aggressively interpret or
disregard policies in place.
n. Incomplete or insufficient description of portfolio positions in accounting records to
permit adequate monitoring of prospectus requirements.
Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in, or preoccupation with, the selection of
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
a. An excessive focus on maintaining a high rate of dividend payments regardless of the
fund’s actual earnings.
2. Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against the
entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and regulations.
a. Past suspensions of ability to act as an investment adviser or requirement that the adviser
be supervised by others.
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3. A practice by management of committing to creditors and other third parties to achieve
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.
a. Commitment to achieving a low-targeted expense ratio at or below competitors’ average.
4. Adviser’s fee revenues (including performance incentives) directly related to either the value
of fund assets or performance, if the adviser has substantial discretion in valuing portfolio
investments and changes in fee revenues may be significant to the adviser.
5. Undisclosed use of soft-dollar credits and other items to reduce a gross ratio below a cap so
the adviser does not have to reimburse the fund for excess expenses.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures;
opportunity; and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
a. Use of soft dollar arrangements for the benefit of the adviser without client consent
(including existence of undocumented or ill-defined arrangements).
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
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a. Access to funds and securities and accounting for them directly controlled by adviser, with
inadequate segregation of duties (or no direct communication between custodian and
accounting personnel).
b. Lack of any periodic review of a transfer agency’s control design and operation by an
independent auditor knowledgeable in the area (such as a SAS No. 70 report).
c. Infrequent and incomplete reconciliation of security holdings with the custodian.
d. Lack of clearly defined policy with respect to personal investing activities (for example,
front-running fund trades or taking investment opportunities for personal use).
e. Ineffective transfer agency controls or ineffective implementation of user controls in a
service center environment.
f. Lack of segregation of duties between portfolio management and trading, or absence of
independent review of trading executions (for example, unexpected concentrations of
trading with counterparties, poor trade executions, or higher-than-normal commissions
that may indicate existence of collusion between portfolio personnel and counterparties).
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Not-for-Profit Organizations
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or the ability to generate excess revenues over expenses is threatened by
economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) Unusually intense competition for the limited pool of resources, such as contributions
and grants, exists, thereby pressuring management to present a particular financial
picture in the hope of attracting those contributions and grants.
(2) An increase in not-for-profits (NPOs) trying to serve the same niche, thereby causing
market saturation.
(3) Pressure to decrease costs because of market competition, such as privatization.
(4) Increased costs due to changes in market conditions or other factors.
b. The threat of imminent third-party funding termination or significant reductions in thirdparty funding.
(1) Political and economic events, causing dramatic decreases in resources, such as grants
and contributions.
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2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. An intense focus by external financial statement users, such as rating agencies and the
media, on the amounts reported as program, management and general, and fund-raising
expenses.
b. A mix of fixed price, units of service, and cost-reimbursement program types funded by
third parties that creates incentives to shift costs or manipulate the manner in which certain
transactions are reported.
c. Funders or others pay undue attention to certain ratios, such as program expense to total
expense, or fundraising costs to contributions.
d. An entity embroiled in a scandal or bad publicity that threatens its charitable base or, for
regulatory or other economic reasons, its very existence.
e. Resource providers who set up restrictions or conditions based on amounts reported in the
financial statements.
f. NPOs involved in certain activities which, if disclosed to the public, may affect
contributions.
3. Management personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising
from the following:
a. Significant portions of their compensation represented by bonuses, or other incentives,
being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for operating results, financial
position, or cash flow.
(1) A significant portion of management’s compensation linked to aggressive program
accomplishments or aggressive fund-raising targets.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) The existence of numerous split-interest agreements containing complex provisions.
b. Diverse programs funded by multiple sources involving many complex requirements that
must be complied with.
c. Complex and changing administrative or programmatic requirements imposed by resource
providers.
d. Several restricted gifts and/or purchase of service contracts with terms, which may create
incentives to improperly shift costs among them.
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2. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. Domination of management by a single person or small group without compensating
controls.
(1) Executive director possesses significant power and latitude to manage programs,
activities, and transactions and to override controls.
(2) Board member or group of board members possessing significant power or significant
community influence, thereby potentially adversely affecting management and
auditors’ decisions.
b. Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting
process and internal control.
c. Board members or management—paid or volunteer—charged with oversight
responsibilities, lacking the necessary background experience in NPO management and
NPO program activities or lacking a commitment to fulfilling their duties.
d. A major donor or fundraiser exercising substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization.
3. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial
lines of authority.
(1) Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships, without a clear program purpose
or business justification.
(2) Unusual investment vehicles without appropriate board oversight.
(3) Multiple locations with inadequate management to properly oversee decentralized
operations.
Auditor Responses

In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor of a not-for-profit
organization may want to consider the following responses.
• Send confirmations to donors not only to confirm the amount of promises to give in the future,
but also to clarify the nature of any restrictions.
• Perform more focused analytical procedures related to program-specific budgets.
• Test larger samples of expenditures for conformity with allowable cost principles.
• Extend confirmation procedures with donors to attempt to determine that all contribution
revenue was recorded.
• Thoroughly analyze and test the assumptions underlying allocation of costs to various
programs.
• Review reports received from subrecipients.
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Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be
present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the following:
a. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Failure to develop adequate controls over contributions and grants, resulting from the
assignment of scarce resources more to program activities and less to internal control.
b. Inadequate job applicant screening of employees and volunteers with access to assets.
(1) The presence of volunteers working in the organization, who have access to assets
susceptible to misappropriation and who have not been adequately screened.
c. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions.
(1) Inadequately documented promises to give in the future.
d. Board members or management—paid or volunteer—charged with oversight
responsibilities, lacking the necessary background experience in NPO management and
NPO program activities or lacking a commitment to fulfilling their duties.
e. Fundraising, in general (due to inherent limitations on ability of management and auditor
to perform full inclusion testing).
f. Fundraising from “anonymous donors.”
g. Fundraising involving currency.
h. Fundraising taking place outside of formal supervision.
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Public Utilities
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. Proposed changes in the federal and state regulatory environment introducing a high level
of competition into the market that may create pressure on profitability and potential
losses related to “stranded investments.”
b. Considerable pressure to maintain or reduce rates that may create pressure on earnings.
Opportunities

1. Nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in fraudulent
financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
(1) Consideration should be given to:
― Significant regulatory deferrals.
― Embedded regulatory assets.
― The recognition of regulatory liabilities.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Failure to appropriately respond to findings from the latest commission-mandated
management audit.
b. Significant disallowances of allowable cost in latest rate proceeding.
2. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or
earnings trend through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
a. Inappropriate deferral of incurred cost or failure to write off previously deferred cost
pursuant to the provisions of FASB Statement No. 71, Accounting for the Effects of
Certain Types of Regulation.
b. Failure to recognize a regulatory liability pursuant to the provisions of FASB Statement
No. 71.
c. Unusually aggressive accrual of performance awards and incentives.
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Real Estate Entities
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
General:
a. There has been a loss or possible loss of a significant tenant or group of tenants.
b. There are major tenants experiencing financial difficulties that may affect their ability to
meet lease obligations.
c. There have been events or changes in circumstances that indicate that the carrying value of
real estate assets may not be recoverable.
d. Real estate assets are held for sale.
e. Rental collection problems have been noted.
f. The entity has sold real estate for which the collectibility of the sales price is not
reasonably assured, the entity is obligated to perform significant activities after the date of
sale, or the entity has a substantial continuing involvement in the property without transfer
of substantially all risks and awards.
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g. There are real estate projects under development for which issues related to capitalization
of expenses are evident.
h. The entity has entered into sales-leaseback transactions.
i. The entity’s construction activities are subject to an overbuilt market, abnormal
construction delays, or other potentially detrimental occurrences.
Factors applicable to real estate investment trusts (REITs):
a. The REIT is in jeopardy of noncompliance with REIT tax requirements.
b. There have been significant changes in the number of shareholders of the entity, or in the
amounts of stock owned by its largest shareholders.
c. There have been significant changes in the amount of real estate assets owned as a
percentage of the entity’s total assets.
d. There have been significant changes in the nature of the investments that are the primary
sources of the entity’s income.
e. There have been significant changes in the entity’s established policies or strategies for
distributing its income.
Factors applicable to real estate companies involved in lending activities:
a. The entity has entered into transactions using futures, options, swaps, or other financial
instruments for purposes other than to hedge against exposure to interest rate risk.
b. The entity has a significant volume of commercial real estate loans in any geographic area.
c. The entity has significant foreign loans.
d. The entity has a significant amount of real estate acquired through foreclosure at the end
of the current period.
e. The entity has sold loans with recourse during the year.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
General:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Interdependent, multiple transactions between the same parties or their affiliates.
b. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
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(1) Complicated criteria for recognizing sales transactions, making it difficult to assess
the completeness of the earnings process.
(2) Significant “side agreements” or transaction terms not previously disclosed.
c. Key contracts awarded without a competitive bidding process.
d. Significant transactions for which documents are dated close to the last business day of
the year.
e. Significant one-time fees or other payments (for example, easements and bill board).
f. Aggressive billing of expenses to tenants under expense recovery provisions of leases.
Factors applicable to real estate companies involved in lending activities:
a. The entity has engaged in transactions that are defined as “ADC Arrangements” in the
AICPA Practice Bulletin 1, Exhibit I.
b. Several sales of foreclosed property or other troubled assets have been made to one
individual or group, with financing by the entity.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
Factors applicable to real estate companies involved in lending activities:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls.
(1) The entity has an underwriting policy that does not require appropriate approvals
based on the size and complexity of the loan.
b. High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or
information technology staff.
(1) The individual responsible for the entity’s interest-rate risk management program is
inexperienced in that area.
Attitudes/ Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or
employees, that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be
susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the
existence of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement
arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the
following information that may indicate a risk factor.
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General:
1. Revenue recognition in accordance with lease terms when there are significant receivables due
from the tenant.
2. Excessive optimism with respect to uncollected rents from tenants.
3. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or
earnings trend.
a. An excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the reported amount of
real estate assets though the use of unusually aggressive appraisal assumptions.
b. The use by management of unusually aggressive accounting practices in recognizing
revenue from real estate sales.
c. The use by management of unusually aggressive accounting practices in recognizing
revenues from the termination of leases with tenants.
4. Aggressive assumptions related to subleasing space assumed by the entity as a result of a lease
with a tenant(s).
5. The existence of tax indemnities.
6. Loan agreements have significant up-front or back-end fees, which are atypical and are not
amortized into interest expense over the life of the loan.
7. Excessive capitalization of general, administrative, and overhead expenses.
8. Capitalization of interest and other costs on land and developments with limited actual
development activity.
9. Inadequate responses or an unwillingness to respond to inquiries about known regulatory or
legal issues (for example, the presence of environmental contamination on an entity-owned
site).
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where
specific circumstances do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, specific controls may
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be
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present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
General:
a. Significant unencumbered real estate that could be used as collateral for an unauthorized
loan, the proceeds of which are distributed to an individual or outside entity.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
General:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Real estate asset purchases or sales occur with related parties.
Lease agreements exist with related parties at below-market terms.
Debt of an individual or outside entity is guaranteed.
Transaction with related parties exist in which capital items are combined with expense
items.
e. Capital items are expensed and billed to tenants as recoverable expenses.
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Small, Privately Owned Businesses
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur:
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
The following list of example risk factors for small, privately owned businesses includes SAS No. 99
example risk factors most relevant to these entities as well as additional example risk factors.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Incentives/Pressures

1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
b. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
c. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
d. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.
e. Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy or foreclosure imminent.
f. Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from
operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth.
g. Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in
the same industry.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the following:
a. Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including financing
of major research and development or capital expenditures.
b. Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
3. Management’s personal net wealth is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising
from the following:
a. Heavy concentrations of their personal net worth in the entity.
b. Personal guarantees of debt of the entity that are significant to their personal net worth.
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c. Adverse consequences on significant matters if good financial results are reported.
Specific examples include management’s motivation to inappropriately reduce income
taxes, to defraud a divorced spouse or a partner of his or her share of the profits or assets
of a business, or to convince a judge or arbitrator that the business in dispute is not capable
of providing adequate cash flow. Keep in mind that you are not required to plan your audit
to discover personal information (for example, marital status) of the owner-manager.
However, if you become aware of such information, you should consider it in your
assessment of risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set
by the owner, including sales or profitability incentive goals.
Opportunities

1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
b. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
c. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
2. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in
the entity.
b. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial
lines of authority.
c. High turnover of senior management or counsel.
3. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls.
b. High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting staff.
c. Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable
conditions.
Attitudes/ Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
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information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. A failure for management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regarding
internal control and the financial reporting process.
2. Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
3. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
4. Known history of violations or claims against the entity, its owner, or senior management
alleging fraud or violations of laws and regulations.
5. A practice by management of committing to creditors and other third parties to achieve
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.
6. Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis.
7. An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings
for tax motivated reasons.
8. Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the
basis of materiality.
9. The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is strained, as
exhibited by the following:
a. Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or
reporting matters.
b. Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding the
completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report.
c. Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access to people or
information or the ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or audit
committee.
d. Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the selection or continuance of
audit personnel assigned to the engagement.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriations of
assets.
Incentives/Pressures

1. Personal financial obligations may create pressure on management or employees with access
to cash or other assets susceptible to theft to misappropriate those assets.
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2. Adverse relationships between the entity and employees with access to cash or other assets
susceptible to theft may motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For
example, adverse relationships may be created by the following:
a. Known or anticipated future layoffs.
b. Promotions, compensation, or other rewards inconsistent with expectations.
Opportunities

1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
a. Large amounts of cash on hand or processed.
b. Company-issued credit cards.
c. Inventory items that are small in size, of high value, or in high demand.
d. Easily convertible assets.
e. Fixed assets that are small in size, marketable, or lacking observable identification of
ownership.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks. Inadequate segregation of duties
is quite often understandable in a small business environment in that it is a function of the
entity’s size. However, you should consider it in conjunction with other risk factors and
with mitigating controls.
b. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
c. Inadequate job applicant screening of employees with access to assets.
d. Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets.
e. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions (for example, in
purchasing).
f. Inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
g. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, for example, credits for
merchandise returns.
h. Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key control functions.
i. Inadequate management understanding of information technology, which enables
information technology employees to perpetrate a misappropriation.
j. Inadequate access controls over automated records.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations

Risk factors reflective of employee attitudes/rationalizations that allow them to justify
misappropriations of assets, are generally not susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless,
the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it in identifying
the risks of material misstatement arising from misappropriations of assets. For example, auditors
may become aware of the following attitudes or behavior of employees who have access to assets
susceptible to misappropriation:
1. Disregard for the need for monitoring or reducing risks related to misappropriations of assets.
2. Disregard for internal control over misappropriation of assets by overriding existing controls
or by failing to correct known internal control deficiencies.
3. Behavior indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction with the company or its treatment of the
employee.
4. Changes in behavior or lifestyle that may indicate assets have been misappropriated.
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APPENDIX B: PITF PRACTICE ALERT 94-2,
AUDITING INVENTORIES—PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS

Date: July 1994 (Updated through July 1, 1999)

Notice to Readers
This Practice Alert is intended to provide auditors with information that may help them improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of their audits. This document has been prepared by the SEC
Practice Section Professional Issues Task Force and is based on the experiences of the individual
members of the task force and matters arising from litigation and peer reviews. It has not been
approved, disapproved or otherwise acted upon by any committee of the AICPA.

Introduction
The inventories of most commercial entities, especially those of manufacturers or distributors, are
material to their financial statements. By its nature, accounting for inventories is complex and
generally involves a great deal of detail and is therefore susceptible to inadvertent errors. For similar
reasons and the fact that auditors test only a portion of the inventories, there exists more than a low
risk of manipulation when management is disposed toward financial statement fraud.
This Alert discusses some ways in which inventory frauds have been perpetrated and presents
information that might help prevent such frauds from going undetected. This Alert deals primarily
with issues related to the physical existence of inventories. This Alert does not cover matters
pertaining to inventory obsolescence, pricing or costing.

Inventory Fraud Schemes/Techniques
Unfortunately, in many cases of inventory fraud, client personnel at various levels knowingly
participated and assisted in the scheme. The following are examples of inventory frauds:
• Including inventory that is not what it is claimed to be or valuing nonexistent inventory.
Examples are:
― Empty boxes or “hollow squares” in stacked goods.
― Mislabeled boxes containing scrap, obsolete items or lower value materials.
― Consigned inventory, inventory that is rented, or traded-in items for which credits have not
been issued.
― Diluted inventory so it is less valuable (e.g., adding water to liquid substances).
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• Increasing or otherwise altering the inventory counts for those items the auditor did not test count.
• Programming the computer to produce fraudulent physical quantity tabulations or priced
inventory listings.
• Manipulating the inventory counts/compilations for locations not visited by the auditor.
• Double-counting inventory in transit between locations.
• Physically moving inventory and counting it at two locations.
• Including in inventory merchandise recorded as sold but not yet shipped to a customer (“bill
and hold sales”).
• Arranging for false confirmations of inventory held by others.
• Including inventory receipts for which corresponding payables had not been recorded.
• Overstating the stage of completion of work-in-process.
• Reconciling physical inventory amounts to falsified amounts in the general ledger.
• Manipulating the “roll-forward” of an inventory taken before the financial statement date.

Planning Considerations
Even though there are numerous ways inventory frauds can be orchestrated, a well planned
audit―appropriately executed with professional skepticism―can thwart many inventory
falsification schemes. The audit procedures to be applied stem from and are responsive to the
auditor’s assessment of risk (i.e., What could go wrong?). The use of analytical procedures (e.g.,
review of preliminary high-to-low inventory-value listings or comparison of year-to-year
quantities) in planning the audit often helps identify inventory locations, areas or items for
specific attention or greater scrutiny during and after the physical count.
To plan an appropriate and effective inventory observation, it is important for the engagement team
leaders to have an understanding of the client’s business, its products, its computer processing
applications and relevant controls before the physical count occurs, including knowledge of the
physical inventory or cycle count procedures and the inventory summarization, pricing and
cutoff procedures.
When a client plans to count inventories at various dates or at a date other than that of the financial
statements, the early consideration of its business, internal controls and their effectiveness, and cutoff
procedures are especially important. Heightened risks or the lack of adequate internal controls may
suggest that the inventory should be taken and observed at year end.
An appropriate understanding of the client’s business systems, relevant computer processing
applications and inventory procedures helps determine the experience needed by the personnel
assigned to observe the physical count and their individual responsibilities. Assigning junior
personnel to observe the count at a complex manufacturing operation may or may not be prudent,
depending on the extent of on-site supervision provided. Similarly, work-in-process inventory
presents completion/valuation issues that may call for a more experienced auditor.
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When the observation requires the use of personnel from another office or another CPA firm,
adequate planning also enables the auditor to provide clear, comprehensive instructions about the
scope of the engagement, the important risk factors, the relevant controls, cutoff procedures, and the
expected level of reliance to be placed on internal controls.

The Actual Physical Count
• The risk of inclusion of duplicate or fictitious items is higher in areas and for items not test
counted by the auditor. Testing some counts made by all count teams at locations visited and
ensuring that hard-to-count items are test counted helps minimize the risk of misstatement.
• Applying analytical procedures to the final priced-out inventory detail can help identify
inventory items that might require additional audit scrutiny.
• Although client personnel are often helpful to the auditor making test counts, making test
counts of which client personnel are unaware provides added assurance. The auditor can also
record the details of some quantities that the auditor did not actually count for comparison
with the final inventory listing. Also, the auditor needs to maintain appropriate control over
the audit work papers so the client is not aware of the details of the test counts.
• Because the description on a container may not always match the goods inside, it is a good
idea to open some containers or packages. Checking for empty containers or “hollow squares”
(i.e., spaces between stacks of boxes) and verifying the units of measure on tags or count
sheets are meaningful procedures. When observing work-in-process inventory, the auditor also
needs to consider the reasonableness of the recorded stage of completion.
• When incorrect counts are observed, the auditor considers the nature and significance of the
errors and whether to increase the extent of test counts or expand other procedures. Recounts
of particular areas or the work of particular count teams may be necessary.
• Scanning inventory tags or count sheets for unusual or unreasonable quantities and
descriptions is a useful technique to verify their propriety. Subsequent to the physical count, it
may be desirable to test large or unusual inventory quantities or items with large extended
values that were not test counted during the observation.
• The need to monitor the client’s control over the physical count tags or sheets used should not
be downplayed or overlooked. Paying close attention to tag/count sheet control procedures
helps avoid the inclusion of improper items and ensures appropriate items are included in the
final inventory listing.

Multiple Locations
Knowledge of all inventory locations is necessary to prevent the exclusion of any area(s) from audit
consideration. Following are a few matters for auditors to consider related to multiple inventory
locations.
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To help discourage the shifting of inventory from one location to another, the merits of taking the
physical inventory at all significant locations at the same time should be considered. When the
physical count at each significant location will not be observed, informing management that
observations will be performed at some locations without advance notice might help discourage the
manipulation of the quantity or quality of the inventory. For locations not visited, the auditor may
perform alternative procedures to detect material misstatements. Comprehensive analytical
procedures subsequently applied to priced-out inventory summarizations may be one such technique
(e.g., the analysis of year-to-year inventories by location, the relationship of inventory to sales levels,
etc.). However, the auditor needs to remember that analytical procedures may not always detect
erroneous changes in inventory.

Inventories Held for or by Others
Ascertaining whether all inventory items on hand are the property of the client can be difficult in
some situations. A client’s procedures for identifying, segregating and excluding from inventory
goods held on consignment should be considered. Requesting information from selected suppliers
about such goods helps in this regard. Once consignment goods have been identified, noting the
descriptions, quantities, serial numbers and shipping advice numbers for some items will help the
auditor determine whether those items were properly excluded from the client’s inventory.
When a client consigns inventory to others or stores merchandise at a third-party location, written
confirmation of the goods held is ordinarily obtained directly from the custodian. If such goods are
significant in amount, one or more of the procedures discussed in AU section 331.14, “Inventories
Held in Public Warehouses,” which include visits to such locations and observation of physical
counts, may be appropriate.

Use of Specialists
An auditor is not expected to possess the expertise of a specialist trained or qualified in another
profession or occupation. Consequently, use of a specialist in certain situations to determine
quantities (e.g., stockpiled materials, mineral reserves) or to value special-purpose inventory (e.g.,
high-technology materials or equipment, chemicals, works of art, precious gems) or to measure the
stage of completion of long-term contracts may be appropriate. If the specialist used is affiliated or
otherwise has a relationship with the client, the auditor will want to consider the need to perform
procedures or otherwise test some or all of the specialist’s assumptions, methods and findings. This
will provide information about the reasonableness of the findings. Alternatively, the auditor could
engage another specialist for this purpose.
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Post-Observation Matters
The extent of audit procedures required normally increases when the inventory observation is
performed at a date other than the balance sheet date. The extent and nature of the increase depends
on the nature of the client’s business, the type of inventory, inventory turnover period, the records
maintained, the strength of the related internal controls, and the time interval between the observation
and the date of the balance sheet. Interim physical inventories or the client’s use of cycle count
programs present different audit risks warranting careful assessment of controls, and by extension,
different audit tests. This assessment of audit risks and key controls and the focused testing thereof,
along with appropriate analytical procedures, are important audit procedures to consider in these
circumstances. The guidance in AU section 313, “Substantive Tests Prior to the Balance-Sheet
Date,” is relevant in these circumstances.
Testing significant items in the reconciliation of the physical inventory to the general ledger helps
identify inadvertent errors along with intentional misstatements. Significant reconciling items for
those locations where the physical counts were not observed by the auditor generally merit scrutiny.
Goods in-transit and inventory transfers between affiliates, locations or departments are tested to
ascertain their existence and to determine the propriety of their inclusion or exclusion.

Conclusion
Unfortunately, there are no foolproof methods for assuring that all inventory counts are free from
inadvertent or intentional misstatement. No audit will necessarily detect all fraudulent activity,
especially when collusion to mislead the auditors occurs among client personnel or with third parties.
However, understanding the client’s business, its count procedures and controls and a resulting
careful assessment of where and how quantity error might occur helps reduce the risk of inadvertent
or intentional misstatement. Appropriate planning for the physical inventory observation together
with healthy audit skepticism can effectively reduce the incidence of inventory misstatements.
This Practice Alert is not a complete list of all audit procedures, nor is every procedure discussed
herein applicable in all circumstances. Additional information on this important subject is provided
in the AICPA’s Auditing Procedures Study, Audits of Inventories (Product No. 021045MJ, $25).
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APPENDIX C: PITF PRACTICE ALERT 03-2,
JOURNAL ENTRIES AND OTHER ADJUSTMENTS
Date: June 2003

Notice to Readers
This Practice Alert is intended to provide auditors with information that may help them improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of their audits and is based on existing professional literature, the
experience of members of the Professional Issues Task Force (PITF) and information provided by
the SEC Practice Section member firms to their own professional staff. This information represents
the views of the members of the PITF and has not been approved by any senior technical committee
of the AICPA. The auditing portion of this publication is an Other Auditing Publication as defined in
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 95, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. Other
Auditing Publications have no authoritative status; however, they may help the auditor understand
and apply Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). If an auditor applies the auditing guidance
included in an Other Auditing Publication, he or she should be satisfied that, in his or her judgment, it
is both appropriate and relevant to the circumstances of his or her audit. This publication was
reviewed by the AICPA Audit and Attest Standards staff and published by the AICPA, and is
presumed to be appropriate.

Introduction
The Auditing Standards Board has promulgated standards that address an auditor’s understanding
and evaluation of journal entries and other adjustments. For example, in SAS No. 94, The Effect of
Information Technology on the Auditor’s Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement
Audit, the Auditing Standards Board expanded the auditor’s required understanding of the automated
and manual procedures an entity uses to prepare its financial statements and related disclosures to
include procedures an entity uses to (a) enter transaction totals into the general ledger, (b) initiate,
record and process journal entries in the general ledger, and (c) record recurring and nonrecurring
adjustments, such as consolidating adjustments, report combinations and reclassifications, that are
not reflected in formal journal entries.
In addition, SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, states, “Material
misstatements of financial statements due to fraud often involve the manipulation of the financial
reporting by (a) recording inappropriate or unauthorized journal entries throughout the year or at
period end, or (b) making adjustments to amounts reported in the financial statements that are not
reflected in formal journal entries, such as through consolidating adjustments, report combinations,
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and reclassifications. Accordingly, the auditor should design procedures to test the appropriateness
of journal entries recorded in the general ledger and other adjustments (for example, entries posted
directly to financial statement drafts) made in the preparation of the financial statements.”
SAS No. 99 further states, “Standard journal entries used on a recurring basis to record transactions
such as monthly sales, purchases, and cash disbursements, or to record recurring periodic accounting
estimates generally are subject to the entity’s internal controls. Nonstandard entries (for example,
entries used to record nonrecurring transactions, such as a business combination, or entries used to
record a nonrecurring estimate, such as an asset impairment) might not be subject to the same level
of internal control. In addition, other adjustments, report combinations, and reclassifications
generally are not reflected in formal journal entries and might not be subject to the entity’s internal
controls. Accordingly, the auditor should consider placing additional emphasis on identifying and
testing items processed outside of the normal course of business.”
In response to the risk of management override, SAS No. 99, which will be effective for audits of
calendar year 2003 financial statements, requires the auditor, in all audits, to (a) obtain an
understanding of the entity’s financial reporting process and controls over journal entries and other
adjustments, (b) identify and select journal entries and other adjustments for testing, (c) determine the
timing of the testing, and (d) inquire of individuals involved in the financial reporting process about
inappropriate or unusual activity relating to the processing of journal entries or other adjustments.
The purpose of this Practice Alert is to provide auditors with guidance regarding the design and
performance of audit procedures to fulfill the responsibilities outlined in SAS No. 99 regarding
journal entries and other adjustments.

Obtaining an Understanding of the Entity’s Financial Reporting Process
and Its Controls Over Journal Entries and Other Adjustments
SAS No. 99 states, “An entity may have implemented specific controls over journal entries and other
adjustments. For example, an entity may use journal entries that are preformatted with account
numbers and specific user approval criteria, and may have automated controls to generate an
exception report for any entries that were unsuccessfully proposed for recording or entries that were
recorded and processed outside of established parameters. The auditor should obtain an
understanding of the design of such controls over journal entries and other adjustments and
determine whether they are suitably designed and have been placed in operation.”
An entity’s financial reporting system also includes the use of nonstandard journal entries to record
nonrecurring or unusual transactions or adjustments such as business combinations, or a nonrecurring
estimate such as an asset impairment. Additionally, nonstandard entries include consolidation
entries, reclassification entries, and spreadsheet or other worksheet adjustments. Because of the risk
of misstatements (intentional or unintentional) oftentimes linked to nonstandard journal entries and
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other adjustments, the engagement team needs to obtain a thorough understanding of the entity’s
controls surrounding this aspect of the financial reporting process.
Obtaining an understanding of the entity’s financial reporting process helps the auditor to identify
important information such as:
• The entity’s written and unwritten policies and procedures regarding the initiation, recording
and processing of standard and nonstandard journal entries and other adjustments;
• The sources of significant debits and credits to an account;
• Individuals responsible for initiating entries to the general ledger, transaction processing
systems, or consolidation;
• Approvals and reviews required for such entries and other adjustments;
• The mechanics for recording journal entries and other adjustments (for example, whether
entries are initiated and recorded online with no physical evidence, or created in paper form
and entered in batch mode);
• Controls, if any, designed to prevent and detect fictitious entries and unauthorized changes to
journals and ledgers; and
• Controls over the integrity of the process used to generate reports used by the auditors.

Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement Resulting From Journal Entries
and Other Adjustments
Although SAS No. 99 requires the auditor to test journal entries and other adjustments regardless of
the risk assessment, the nature, timing, extent and focus of the testing will be influenced by the
auditor’s risk assessments. The auditor should assess the nature and risk of management’s incentive
to manipulate earnings or financial ratios through financial statement misstatement. That assessment
should be made in conjunction with the interim reviews as well as the year-end audit. For example,
if a client has loan covenant ratios that depend on earnings, and net income is close to causing
covenant violations, then the auditor may assess the risk of material misstatement as higher. The
auditor may also assess the risk of material misstatement as higher when executive compensation is
tied to earnings thresholds and earnings are close to the threshold. Additionally, market expectations
in many cases have led to earnings manipulations. In those cases where the auditor determines that
the risk of fraudulent journal entries is high due to questions regarding the integrity of management,
the auditor should reassess his or her client acceptance/continuance decision.
SAS No. 99 states, “Members of the audit team should discuss the potential for material
misstatement due to fraud. The discussion should include… an exchange of ideas or “brainstorming”
among the audit team members, including the auditor with final responsibility for the audit, about
how and where they believe the entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material
misstatement due to fraud, how management could perpetrate and conceal fraudulent financial
reporting, and how assets of the entity could be misappropriated.”
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Journal entries and other adjustments oftentimes exist only in electronic form, which requires
extraction of the desired data by an auditor with information technology (IT) knowledge and skills or
the use of an IT specialist. In audits of entities with complex IT systems, the IT auditors and/or IT
specialists should be included in the brainstorming session. In the brainstorming session, the auditors
normally will discuss the following:
• The various ways in which management could originate and post inappropriate journal entries
or other adjustments.
• The kinds of unusual combinations of debits and credits that the engagement team should be
looking for.
• The types of journal entries or other adjustments that could result in a material misstatement
that would not likely be detected by standard audit procedures.

Inquiries of Individuals Involved in the Financial Reporting Process
SAS No. 99, paragraph 24, states, “The auditor should inquire of others within the entity about the
existence or suspicion of fraud. The auditor should use professional judgment to determine those others
within the entity to whom inquiries should be directed and the extent of such inquiries. In making this
determination, the auditor should consider whether others within the entity may be able to provide
information that will be helpful to the auditor in identifying risks of material misstatement due to
fraud—for example, others who may have additional knowledge about or be able to corroborate risks
of fraud identified in the discussions with management… or the audit committee.” Where practical,
regardless of the fraud risk assessment, the auditor should inquire of the entity’s accounting and data
entry personnel about whether those individuals were requested to make unusual entries during the
audit period. The auditor should also consider asking selected programmers and IT staff about the
existence of unusual and/or unsupported entries and specifically inquire about these entries, including
whether any were initiated directly by top management outside the normal accounting process. The
auditor should not expect client personnel to volunteer information about known or suspected fraud.
However, those same individuals may be more likely to provide information if asked directly.

Assessment of Completeness of Journal Entry and Other Adjustments Sources
It is important in testing journal entries and other adjustments that the auditor be aware of and
consider the entire population of journal entries and other adjustments. The auditor’s ability to detect
fraud is adversely affected if he or she is not assured of access to all of the journal entries posted and
other adjustments made during the audit period. The auditor should be aware that journal entries and
other adjustments may be made outside of the general ledger and should obtain a complete
understanding as to how the various general ledgers are combined and the accounts are grouped to
create the consolidated financial statements. For example, at large, multi-national companies,
multiple general ledgers are utilized, adjustments are made to convert from local GAAP to U.S.
216

Appendix C: PITF Practice Alert 03-2, Journal Entries and Other Adjustments

GAAP, and translation and other adjustments are made before the numbers are combined (perhaps at
more than one level of sub-consolidation) and become subject to further elimination and adjusting
entries. Appropriate procedures should be applied to all of the various sources of information from
which journal entries and other adjustments are selected for testing to assist the auditor in assessing
completeness. The nature and extent of these procedures will depend on the engagement risk
assessments and the client’s systems for recording transactions.

Identification and Selection of Journal Entries and Other Adjustments
for Testing
After the auditor has made his or her assessment of the risk of fraudulent journal entries and other
adjustments and has performed appropriate procedures to assess completeness, he or she should
design procedures, based on that assessment, to test the appropriateness of the journal entries and
other adjustments from the various sources previously identified including (a) journal entries
recorded in the general ledger, and (b) top side consolidation or report entries that are not actually
posted to the general ledger. The auditor should test the appropriateness of selected journal entries
and other adjustments in all engagements — including those in which the risk of fraudulent journal
entries is assessed as low. Those tests are performed to confirm that entries are appropriately
approved by management, are adequately supported and reflect the underlying events and
transactions. Such tests should be designed to detect inappropriate entries.
After considering the identified population of journal entries and other adjustments, the auditor
should use professional judgment to determine the nature, timing and extent of the testing of journal
entries and other adjustments. SAS No. 99 requires that the auditor consider:
• The auditor’s assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
• The effectiveness of controls that have been implemented over journal entries and other
adjustments.
• The entity’s financial reporting process and the nature of the evidence that can be examined.
• The characteristics of fraudulent entries or adjustments.
• The nature and complexity of the accounts.
• Journal entries or other adjustments processed outside the normal course of business.
For many entities, routine processing of transactions involves a combination of manual and automated
steps and procedures. Similarly, the processing of journal entries and other adjustments might involve
both manual and automated procedures and controls. Regardless of the method, the auditor’s
procedures should include selecting, from the various sources of information from which journal
entries and other adjustments are posted, specific entries and other adjustments to be tested and
examining the support for those items. In addition, the auditor should be aware that journal entries and
other adjustments might exist in either electronic or paper form. In an IT environment, it may be
necessary for the auditor to employ computer-assisted audit techniques (“CAATs”) (for example,
217

Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit

report writers, software or data extraction tools, or other systems based techniques) to identify the
journal entries and other adjustments to be tested. In addition, the CAATs ordinarily are designed to
detect the following:
• Entries made at unusual times of day, that is, outside regular business hours.
• Entries made by unusual users, blank or nonsensical user names, senior management, or the IT
staff.
• Electronic entries that, through management manipulation, are not documented in the general
ledger.
Additionally, it is normally beneficial if the CAATs filter out recurring transactions in order to
identify nonrecurring transactions and foot the detail in accounting records. The CAATs should be
designed specifically to assist in evaluating whether all journal entries and other adjustments are
included in the population to be reviewed. Firms utilizing internal IT specialists to perform the
CAATs should invest appropriate resources in training to ensure that the IT specialists are able to
competently perform the procedures and understand the importance of detecting any inappropriate
journal entries or other adjustments.
Characteristics of fraudulent journal entries may include entries (a) made to unrelated, unusual, or
seldom-used accounts, (b) made by individuals who typically do not make journal entries, (c) recorded
at the end of the period or as post-closing entries that have little or no explanation or description, (d)
made either before or during the preparation of the financial statements that do not have account
numbers, or (e) containing round numbers or a consistent ending number. The auditor should look for
unusual entries during both the year-end and quarter-end cut-off procedures. Additionally, any entries
that were reversed at the beginning of the subsequent period should be scrutinized more carefully.
Also, the auditor ordinarily should consider looking for unusual entries that affect revenue.
Inappropriate journal entries may be applied to accounts that (a) contain transactions that are
complex or unusual in nature, (b) contain significant estimates and period-end adjustments, (c) have
been prone to errors in the past, (d) have not been reconciled on a timely basis or contained
unreconciled differences, (e) contain intercompany transactions, or (f) are otherwise associated with
an identified risk of material misstatement due to fraud. The auditor should recognize, however, that
inappropriate journal entries also might be made to other accounts.
Several high profile cases that resulted in restatements and allegedly involved management fraud,
purportedly extensively utilized inappropriate journal entries and other adjustments. In many of
those instances, management accomplished the fraud by posting numerous improper journal entries
in relatively small amounts, which impacted large balance sheet and income statement accounts
thereby not resulting in a significant fluctuation being identified through analytical procedures. The
affected accounts included receivables, inventory, fixed assets, accumulated depreciation, goodwill,
prepaid expenses and operating expenses, among others. If management is committed to creating
fraudulent financial statements it can design journal entries to, among other things:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mask the diversion of funds.
Record topside adjustments that improperly increase revenue.
Improperly adjust segment reporting.
Improperly reverse purchase accounting reserves.
Improperly write-off uncollectible accounts receivable to purchase accounting reserve
accounts and intercompany accounts thereby not reducing income.
Understate payables through the recording of post-closing journal entries to increase various
revenue accounts.
Improperly decrease accounts payable and general and administrative expenses.
Improperly capitalize costs as fixed assets or construction in progress instead of expensing
those costs as incurred.
Improperly record adjustments to allowances.

In audits of entities that have several locations or components, the auditor should consider the need to
select journal entries from locations based on factors set forth in SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and
Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.18). Those
factors include (a) the nature and amount of assets and transactions executed at the location or
component, (b) the degree of centralization of records or information processing, (c) the effectiveness
of the control environment, particularly with respect to management’s direct control over the exercise
of authority delegated to others and its ability to effectively supervise activities at the location or
component, (d) the frequency, timing, and scope of monitoring activities by the entity or others at the
location or component, and (e) judgments about materiality of the location or component.
After considering the factors outlined above, as well as the number and monetary amount of journal
entries and other adjustments, the auditor should select journal entries and other adjustments from the
population and examine documentary evidence indicating that the journal entries are properly
supported and approved by management. The selections should include both journal entries recorded
in the general ledger and top side or report adjustments that are not actually posted to the general
ledger. Because fraudulent journal entries often are made at the end of a reporting period, the
auditor’s testing ordinarily should focus on the journal entries made at that time. However, because
material misstatements in financial statements due to fraud can occur throughout the period and may
involve extensive efforts to conceal how it is accomplished, the auditor should consider whether
there is also a need to test journal entries throughout the period under audit. Additionally, if entries
are used to correct errors in financial statements of a previous period, the auditor should evaluate
whether those previously issued financial statements should be restated.
The auditor should introduce an element of unpredictability regarding the dollar amount and types of
journal entries and other adjustments tested. Often, companies are able to perpetrate fraud when,
over a period covering several engagements, management is able to determine the auditor’s scope
and/or strategy and therefore design inappropriate journal entries and other adjustments that have a
high probability of not being tested.
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SAS No. 100, Interim Financial Information, paragraph 23, states, “The accountant performing the
review of interim financial information ordinarily will also be engaged to perform an audit of the
annual financial statements of the entity. Certain auditing procedures may be performed concurrently
with the review of interim financial information.” SAS No. 100 is effective for interim periods with
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2002. As a matter of good practice, the auditor should
consider auditing journal entries and other adjustments concurrently with the interim reviews. The
auditor should especially focus on journal entries and other adjustments that were reversed at the
beginning of the subsequent period.

Other Adjustments
In many cases, entities utilize spreadsheets to group general ledger accounts and make consolidating
adjustments, reclassifications and other adjustments to arrive at financial statement amounts. Those
consolidating adjustments, report combinations and reclassifications that are not reflected in formal
journal entries should also be tested based on the auditor’s risk assessment. Tests of other
adjustments would normally involve comparing the adjustments to underlying supporting
information, and considering the rationale underlying the adjustment as well as the reason it was not
reflected in a formal journal entry.

Documentation
SAS No. 96, Audit Documentation, requires that audit documentation be sufficient to show that the
accounting records agree or reconcile with the financial statements or other information being reported
on. The results of procedures performed relative to the entity’s journal entries and other adjustments
should be documented in the appropriate section of the current audit file. This documentation should
include:
• The procedures used by the engagement team to assess the completeness of the population of
journal entries and other adjustments subject to review and testing.
• The journal entries and other adjustments that were selected for testing and the basis therefore.
• The procedures performed to audit the journal entries and other adjustments.
• The conclusions reached.
• Who performed and reviewed the work.
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Introducing AICPA practice tools to help you
prevent, detect and investigate fraud.
SAS No. 99 is the cornerstone of the AICPA’s Anti-Fraud and
Corporate Responsibility Program. This program is designed to
rebuild investor confidence in the capital market system and reestablish the audited financial statement as a clear picture
window into corporate America. From providing CPAs with
expanded auditing guidance to establishing a new institute on
fraud studies, the AICPA is determined to help reduce the
incidents of financial statement fraud.

Revised! Fraud Detection
in a GAAS Audit
By Michael J. Ramos, CPA
The newly revised Fraud Detection in
a GAAS Audit reviews the implementation requirements of SAS No.
99, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit. It offers you
a detailed understanding of the
requirements, guidance and lessons
learned from firms that have complied
with SAS No. 99’s requirements. In
addition, the appendix arms you with
example industry-specific risk factors
for twelve industries.
The revised edition of this popular
practice aid now also includes PITF
03-2, Journal Entries and Other
Adjustments. This Practice Alert provides guidance on the design and
performance of audit procedures to
fulfill the responsibilities outlined in
SAS No. 99.
AICPA April 2004, Paperback
No. 006615
AICPA Member $69.00
Nonmember $86.25

The Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, is more far-reaching
than its predecessor, SAS No. 82. To help members fully
understand and comply with the standard — and see their
responsibility in fraud prevention and detection — the AICPA
has developed a variety of programs and materials. The
following continuing education courses and practice aids are
now available:

Fraud and the Financial
Statement Audit: Auditor
Responsibilities
Under New SAS
Choose Text or Videocourse
The fraud standard may not change
your responsibilities for detecting
fraud in a financial statement audit,
but it will change how you meet that
responsibility. Practitioners will
benefit from a risk assessment
approach to detecting fraud in a
financial statement audit. You’ll
learn the conceptual framework
necessary to understand the
characteristics of fraud.
Objectives
• Recognize how the new fraud
standard differs from the existing
standard and the effect on your
audit experience
• Understand the auditor’s
responsibilities for detecting fraud
during the performance of a
financial statement audit
• Apply a risk assessment approach
to detecting fraud in a financial
statement audit
Prerequisite: None
Recommended CPE Credit (based
on a 100-minute hour): Text — 8;
Video/DVDcourse — 9
Recommended CPE Credit (based
on a 50-minute hour): Text — 16;
Video/DVDcourse — 19
QAS Credit: Text — 16;
Video/DVDcourse — 19
Author(s): Michael J. Ramos, CPA
Level: Intermediate

From the AICPA and the
Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners

Fraud and the CPA
All CPAs have a responsibility to be
diligent in preventing and detecting
financial statement fraud. Whether
you are a preparer of financial
statements, an auditor, or just want
to help your company or your
clients, this course will help you be
more effective in preventing and
detecting such devastating frauds.
In today’s environment, this is
knowledge you can’t afford not to
have.
Objectives
• Gain insights from fraud
specialists that will deepen your
fraud knowledge enhance your
professional skepticism and improve
your decision processes
• Understand the different ways
people “cook the books” and learn
what to watch out for
• Go beyond the checklists and
learn to think like a fraudster so you
can catch them
Prerequisite: None
Recommended CPE Credit (based
on a 50-minute hour): 8
QAS Credit: 8
Level: Basic
Format: CD-ROM
No. 731730HS
AICPA Member $119.00
Nonmember $148.75

Format: Text
No. 731811
AICPA Member $119.00
Nonmember $148.75
Format: 120-min.VHS Tape/Manual
No. 181811
AICPA Member $149.00
Nonmember $186.25
Format: 135-min.DVD/Manual
No. 181821
AICPA Member $149.00
Nonmember $186.25

Order now at: www.cpa2biz.com/store
888.777.7077

More AICPA Publications and CPE Self-Study Courses on
Fraud Prevention, Detection and Investigation
The CPA’s Handbook of
Fraud and Commercial Crime
Prevention
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and
Commercial Crime Prevention takes you
through all the issues, both theoretical
and practical.
The Handbook deals in detail with the
controversial issues of write-offs,
cookie-jar reserves, materiality and bigbath restructuring. All these issues are
illustrated by a close analysis of cases
that reveals how multimillion dollar
frauds occur.
The world’s top experts prepare you
to fight fraud
This is your chance to learn effective
prevention policies and methods of
dealing with specific types of fraud from
a team of leading fraud prevention
professionals and forensic accounting
experts from the famed Kroll firm: Tedd
Avey, CPA, CA, CFE, Kroll Lindquist
Avey, Toronto & Atlanta; Ted
Baskerville, CA, CFE, Kroll Lindquist
Avey, London; Alan E. Brill, CISSP, Kroll
Associates, New York; Hazel de Burgh,
CA, CFE, Kroll Lindquist Avey, Toronto;
and Bill Jennings, CPA, CFE, Kroll
Lindquist Avey, Chicago.
You’ll get business sector-by-sector
fraud prevention checklists and
vulnerability grids
You’ll get a breakdown of fraud in the
following business sectors, complete
with prevention checklists and fraud
vulnerability grids: construction, financial
services, government, high technology,
manufacturing, media and
communications, nonprofits,
professional services, real estate,
recreation, natural resources, retail,
small businesses, transportation and
wholesale.
Bonus: A Checklist CD-ROM
containing ready-to-use checklists in
critical areas of fraud prevention.
Extra Bonus: Report on Fraud
Newsletter subscription with 6 issues
per year.
Annual updates keep you current and
are shipped upon approval.
Loose-leaf
No. 056504
AICPA Member $180.00
Nonmember $225.00

Auditing for Internal Fraud

Financial Reporting Fraud:
A Practical Guide to Detection
and Internal Control

Everybody’s talking about fraud.
Auditing for Internal Fraud, this
course provides an auditor with the
tools to identify fraud schemes. It
trains CPAs to focus their analytical
and substantive tests on the fraud
triangle when evaluating internal
controls. It also illustrates the latest in
fraud prevention and detection
programs implemented by industry
leaders.
Objectives
• Develop fraud audit program
• Evaluate gaps in internal controls
• Design fraud prevention and
detection programs
• Understand the auditor’s
professional responsibilities
• Identify critical indicators of fraud
schemes
Prerequisite: None
Author: Michael Connelley, CFE,
CPA
Recommended CPE Credit: 6
Level: Intermediate
QAS Credit†: 12

Charles R. Lundelius, Jr., CPA/ABV
This guide, written by a CPA for CPAs in both
public practice and industry, provides the
knowledge necessary to minimize fraud
exposure for the CPA, the employer, and the
client. Through case studies, you'll find
explanations on:
• Where to look for the fraud
• Who is most likely to perpetrate the fraud
• What the fraud is going to look like
• What should be done to expose the fraud
• What to do to cut down the risk of future
fraud
Example scenarios and analysis illustrate key
points, especially the red flags that CPAs,
both internal and external, should be aware
of and timely installed procedures and
controls that could have prevented or limited
the fraud.

Also Available from the AICPA

Format: Text
No. 730272
AICPA Member $109.00
Nonmember $136.25

SAS 99: An Advanced Analysis
"SAS 99: An Advanced Analysis" is an
advanced-level discussion of how to
implement the standard's requirements
and is designed for participants who have
a basic level of familiarity with the
standard. Whether you audit publicly-held
or privately-held organizations, make sure
that you and your staff have the latest
information available on how to effectively
implement SAS No. 99.
Moderator: John Hudson, CPA
Speakers: Michael J. Ramos, CPA
David L. Cotton, CPA, CFE, CGFM
Objectives: N/A
Prerequisite: N/A
Recommended CPE Credit (based on a
100-minute hour): 2
QAS Credit: 4
Level: Intermediate
Format: CD-ROM
No. 737133HS
AICPA Member $59.00
Nonmember $59.00

Order now at:

Go to www.cpa2biz.com/store for
more information and to order these
CPE self-study courses:
•
Legal Elements of Fraud
•
Detecting Misappropriation
Schemes
•
Introduction to Fraud Examination
and Criminal Behavior
•
The Fraud Trial
•
Finding the Truth: Effective
Techniques for Interview and
Communication
•
Fraud Investigation Methods
•
Computer Fraud and Information
Security
•
Corporate Espionage
† AICPA is registered with the National
Association of State Boards of Accountancy
as a Quality Assurance Service (QAS)
sponsor of continuing professional education.
Participating state boards of accountancy
have final authority on the acceptance of
individual courses for CPE credit. Complaints
regarding QAS program sponsors may be
addressed to NASBA, 150 Fourth Avenue
North, Suite 700, Nashville, TN 37219-2417.
Telephone: (615) 880-4200.

www.cpa2biz.com/store
888.777.7077
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